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- 1  -I.  US  ECONOMIC  POLICY  AND  ITS  INTERNATIONAL  REPERCUSSIONS 
The  new  US  administration of  President  Reagan  introduced  in  1981  a  policy of 
strong  fiscal  expansion,  which  coupled  with  a  non-accommodating  tough  monetary 
policy  of  the  Federal  Reserve  resulted  in  high  current  account  and  budget 
deficits,  and  high  nominal  and  real  interest  rates1•  During  the  period 
1981-1984  the  exchange  rate  of  the dollar appreciated substantially towards 
all  currencies.  In  1985  the  dollar's  exchange  rate  started to fall,  but 
remains  still  in  high  levels. 
The  dollar's appreciation  and  the  expectations  it fed  during  the  period 
1981-1984  that  it would  continue  to  appreciate,  related  to  the  high  real 
interest  rates  in  the  USA  resulted  in  a  major  capital  inflow to  the  USA.  The 
American  budget  deficits  have  thus  been  financed  in  part  by  non-US  capital. 
During  the  1970's  the  dominant  position  of  the dollar  weakened  somewhat  in  its 
role  among  central  banks  but  increased  in  the  private markets  due  to  the 
developments  that  took  place  in  international  private banking.  The  dollar 
enhanced  its position  ~s  the  US  financial  markets  offered to  its participants 
a  considerably  higher  degree  of  liquidity simply  due  to  their size  and  the 
financial  mnrkets  took  over  the  job  of  financing  balance  of  payments  deficits 
especially for  non-oil  exporting  but  also  for  some  oil exporting  LDC's.  As 
Lo~g as  inflation prevailed private  banks  did  not  encounter  any  real 
difficulties,  since  floating  interest  rates  seemed  to  reduce  the  risk of 
lending  and  allowed  bank  profits  to  soar.  But  the  situation changed 
dramatically with  the  reduction  of  inlation  and  increasing  interest  rates  in 
the  80's,  coupled  with  the  appreciating dollar and  the  deep  worldwide  economic 
recession.  Savings  that  ~ere directed  previously to  LDC's  and  some  Eastern 
Black  borrol<ers  increasingly  went  to  the  USA.  The  USA  thus  absorbed  more  and 
More  world  private  savings.  This  permitted  the  US  administration to  treat  the 
I 
budget  deficit  not  as  a  constraint  but  ns  exogeneous.  The  Federal  Reserve's 
comnitmcnt  to  a  tough  monetary  policy  that  would  limit  inflation almost  under 
I 
any  conditions  gave  the  US  administration  anotl1cr  degree  of  frecdo~:  Not 
fearing  a  reoccurcnce  of  inflation and  not  having  any  difficulties with  the 
financing  of  the  budget  deficits  the  administration  does  not  have  any 
- 2  -compelling  reason  to  reduce  the deficit drastically and  this although  many 
intentions  to  do  that  have  been  announced  on  many  occasions.  At  the  same 
time,  capital  inflows  have  helped  to  finance  the  US  trade  and  current  amount 
deficit2  which  also  no  longer  was  a  constraint  to  the  domestic  policy aims 
followed  by  the  US  administration.  Under  the  actual  situation,  the  US 
administration  was  able  to  pursue  internal policy  aims  without  having  to  take 
into  account  the  external  repercussions  of this policy.  The  high  capital 
mobility  in  the  international  financial  market  has  given  the  possibility to 
the  US  administration  in  the  period  1981-84  to treat  the  US  as  a  closed 
economy. 
There  are  basically three  explanations  for  the dollar appreciations: 
1.  The  sharp  increase  in  the  international  competitive  strength of  the  US  as 
a  producer  of  financial  assets  (a  safe  haven)  and  services.  The  USA 
nroved  to  be  during  1981-84  more  dynamic  than  most  other  economies  in  the 
world,  having  at  the  same  time  one  of  the  freest  capital  markets  and  a 
governement  considered  to  be  stable. 
2.  The  rise  in  interest  rates  has  made  the  US  a  preferred  place  for 
international  portfolio  investments,  leading  to  capital  inflows,  and  since 
the  exchange  rate  is  set  in  the  short  to  mediu~ run  in  the  asset  market, 
also  to  appreciation.  In  the  standard  model  of  exchange  rate 
determination  securities  are  considered  to  be  perfect  substitutes  but 
aoods  are  not.  Prices  adjust  slowly  to  excess  demand  or  supply  in  the 
goods  ~arket.  Interest  parity  implies  that  the  home  nominal  short-term 
rate  of  interest  is  equal  to  the  foreign  interest  rate plus  the 
anticipated  rate  of  depreciation.  The  same  relationship  is  also  valid  for 
real  interest  rates:  The  real  interest  rate differential  between 
countries  is  equal  to  the  rate  of  change  of  the  real  exchange  rate, 
defined  as  the  exchange-rate  adjusted  ratio of  national  price  levels. 
The  real  exchange  rate  is  assumed  to adjust  to its  long-run  equilibrium 
level  over  time.  The  rate of  adjustment  is  proportional  to  the  deviation 
from  long-run  equilibrium.  When  the  current  real  rate  is  below  the 
Long-run  rate,  then  there  \Jill  be  real  depreciation  which  is  the  faster 
the  Larger  the  current  deviation.  yJhen  one  combines  the  dynamics  of  the 
real  exchange  rate  and  the  requirement  of  interest  rate parity,  one 
- 3  -obtains  a  Link  between  the  Long-run  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate,  the 
real  interest differential  and  the  current  real  rate.  If there  is  a  real 
interest differential  in  favour  of  the  one  country,  for  example  the  USA, 
then  the  real  exchange  rate  Level  will  be  below  the  long-run  Level.  On 
the  other  hand,  with  an  adverse differential  the  real  rate will  exceed  the 
Long-run  equilibrium  Level.  Since  the  long-run  equilibrium  level 
corresponds  to  the  full  employment  real  exchange  rate,  it follows  that  the 
country  that  has  a  relatively high  real  interest  rate will  find  its goods 
over  priced  in  world  trade  on  account  of  an  over-appreciation of  the 
exchange  rate.  This  is exactly the  case  with  USA  goods  in  the  period 
1981-85.  Conversely,  the  low  real  interest  countries  enjoy  a  transitory 
under-pricin~ of  its goods. 
This  interpretation  implies  further  that  these  misalignments  of  real 
exchange  rates  are  transitory.  Real  interest  rates  under  the  impact  of 
monetary  disturbances  diverge  only  transitorily,  therefore  real  exchange 
rates  are  out  of  Line  only transitorily.  If the  real  exchange  rate  is 
Low,  then  it must  be  also  rising.  If it is  high,  it is  also falling.  To 
explain  a  sustained or  persistent  real  appreciation  of  the  dollar,  as 
experienced  during  1981-84,  one  has  to  consider either a  succession  of 
monetary  surprises or  Look  for  factors  that  change  both  the  tong-run 
equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  and  real  interest  rate.  Fiscal  policy  is 
such  a  factor. 
3.  The  US  Long-term  fiscal  expansion  implies  an  increase  in  current  and 
future  demand  for  US  goods  and  hence  a  real  appreciation.  Forward-Looking 
asset  and  exchange  markets  Lead  to  increases  in  current  Long  rates  and 
exchange  rates. 
During  1981-84  Europe  and  the  US  followed  different  fiscal  policies. 
Fiscal  expansion  incrc3sed  rapidly  in  the  US  uhile  in  Europe  (with  the 
exception  of  France  in  19B1)  it was  in  a  rather  contractive  phase.  This 
asynchronization  resulted  in  a  net  fiscal  stimulus  to  world  demand, 
because  the  US  expansion  outweighted  the  European  tightening.  The 
resulting  ~10rld excess  demand  for  goods  forced  up  the  real  interest  rate 
(combined  as  it  was  with  restrictive monetary  policy  both  in  the  US  and 
Europe)  there  being  at  the  same  time  a  shift of  the  composition  of  world 
demand.  The  demand  for  US  goods  increases,  while  the  demand  for  European 
- 4  -goods  declines  relatively.  Therefore,  the  full  employment  long-run 
relative price of  US  goods  must  rise,  or  the  US  real  exchange  rate  must 
appreciate.  Thus  the  complete,  long-run  or full  employment  adjustment  is 
a  higher  world  interest  rate  and  a  real  currency  appreciation  for  the  US. 
The  real  appreciation  assures  that  the deflationary effects  of  higher 
world  interest  rates  on  European  spending  are offset  by  a  shift  in  demand 
towards  Europe's  goods  as  a  consequence  of  the  European  real  depreciation 
and  increased  European  exports  to  the  USA. 
In  the  short-run  rational,  forward  looking  asset  markets  anticipate  the 
rise  in  real  interest  rates  and  the  prospective  real  appreciation.  The 
world  long-term  interest  rate will  therefore  rise  immediately  and  the 
expanding  country's  currency  appreciate  ever  ahead  of  the  full  fiscal 
stimulus. 
Taking  into  account  the  above,  it  can  be  expected  that  the  appreciation  and 
hish  real  exchange  rate of  the dollar  will  remain  as  long  as  fiscal  expansion 
in  the  US  is  high  and  in  Europe  is  low.  There  are,  however,  some 
~ualifications:  1.  Trade  deficits  lead  to  a  transfer  of  wealth  to  Europe  and 
this  leads  to depreciation  tendencies  because  as  US  residents  become 
relatively poorer  and  European  relatively  richer,  the  composition  of  world 
demand  shifts  in  favour  of  Europe's  goods.  2.  If  investors  are  risk  averse 
and  the dollar  and  European  securities are  not  considered  perfect  substitutes 
(as  they  are  assumed  to be  in  standard  models)  then  the  relative  supplies  will 
he  important.  Large  US  deficits  imply  a  growing  accumulation  of  dollar debts 
in  portfolios,  leading  to  long-run  risk  premia  on  US  securities and  to  a 
depreciation  of  the dollar3• 
It  i~  obvious,  as  Triffin  remarks4  :"that  the  strength of  the  dollar  should 
not,  and  cannot,  remain  indefinitely dependent,  as  is  the  case  today,  on  such 
continued  capital  inflows  into  one  of  the  richest  and  most  capitalized 
countries  of  the  world.  We  must  certainly  face  the  possibility of  a  decrease, 
cessation,  or  even  reversal  of  such  inflows,  in  the  event  - deeply  to  be  hoped 
- of  an  abatement  of  the  fears  of  war  and  of  a  decline  in  interest  rates. 
Although  successful  price-wise,  the  administration  programme  has  also  so  far 
v~stly increased  thP  fiscal  deficits  ~1hose  correction  was  previously deemed 
imper~tive.  Finally,  the  persistence  of  such  capital  movements  would  be  bound 
- 5  -to  raise  increasing objections  abroad,  and  to  prompt  the  adoption  of  policies 
distateful  to all:  domestic  deflationary  measures,  and/or  protectionism  and 
exchange  controls". 
One  of  the  main  difficulties  in  the  actual  economic  situation was  the 
inability of  the  present  US  administration to  recognise  the  problem  that  the 
US  budget  deficit  and  the  resulting  capital  inflows  represent  for  the  rest  of 
the  world.  According  to  the  administration's  view,  the dollar's exchange  rate 
was  a  market  phenomenon  and  was  not  influenced  (or  very  little influenced)  by 
the  US  budget  deficit  and  the  resulting  high  interest  rates.  The  strength of 
the  dollar  was  due  to  the  strength of  the  US  economy  which  was  in  turn due  to 
sound  US  economic  policy.  The  cause  of  slow  growth  around  the  world  has 
nothing  to  do  with  the  strong dollar  and  the  capital  inflow  to the  US,  which 
on  the  contrary  has  been  beneficial  through  the  impetus  given  by  the  American 
trade deficits  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  The  cause  of  slow  growth  has  been 
inferior  economic  policies  in  Europe  and  in  other  countries5• 
From  the  point  of  view  of  Europe,  the dollar appreciation  had  repercussions  on 
capital  movements,  interest  rates,  investment,  inflation and  trade  flows. 
Capital  export  from  Europe  to  the  USA  put  the  European  policy makers  before 
the  following  dilemma:  They  had  either  to  continue  a  restrictive monetary 
policy  in  order  to  avoid  further  capital  export  that  would  lead  to more  rapid 
depreciations  of  their  currencies vis-a-vis  the dollar  so  as  to  avoid  imported 
inflation,  mainly  through  an  increased bill for  oil  payments.  This  would  Lead 
to  higher  interest  rates  which  would  bring  adverse  effects  on  investments, 
particularly  in  the  low-inflation  European  countries,  and  would  reinforce  the 
c.td~nation  in  Europe.  Or  they  could  relax  monetary  policy  and  follow  the  US 
in  a  more  expansionary  fiscal  policy  that  would  presumably  keep  interest  rates 
down  in  Europe  btJt  would  bring  even  stronger  capital  export,  depreciation of 
their  currencies  and  increased  inflation.  Although  both  options  presented 
serious  disadvantages  for  Europe,  all  Community  countries  (with  the  exception 
of  France  for  a  relatively  short  period  of  expansionary  policy  in  1981  which 
was  reversed  in  1982)  chose  to  continue  with  tight  monetary  and  fiscal 
rolicies  to  restrict  inflation.  Still, some  decoupling  of  real  interest  rates 
took  place,  Leading  to  lower  real  interest  rates  in  Europe,  further  capital 
exports  and  continuous  appreciation  of  the  dollar  up  to  the  beginning  of  1985. 
- 6  -The  appreciation of  the  dollar facilitated  the  export  of  the  rest  of  the  world 
to  the  US  market,  from  which  the  Community  has  also benefitted.  The  trade 
deficits  of  the  USA  have  thus  acted  as  a  fiscal  stimulus  for  the  rest  of  the 
world  and  the  Community  Member  States  in particular.  It  is quite difficult  to 
estimate  the  net  effect  of  the  US  fiscal  expansion  to  Europe  this  involving 
the  estimation  of  the  magnitudes  of  two  contrary effects:  the  fiscal  stimulus 
of  the  US  trade deficits  as  against  the  depressing  effects  on  European 
investment  of  higher  interest  rates  and  capital  export.  According  to one 
empirical  study6  the  net  effect  on  non-US  GNP  may  have  been  moderately 
positive,  but  the  results obtained  depend  greatly  from  the  specification of 
the  model  used. 
Jhe  appreciation  of  the dollar  had  a  disadvantage  for  the  competitive  position 
of  some  US  industries.  It  was  only  a  question  of  time  for  the  trade  issue  to 
emerge.  The  US  administration  in  fact  claims  that  restrictive practices 
pursued  by  the  US  trading  partners  and  not  the  overvaluation of  the dollar 
deprives  the  competitive  US  economy  from  thriving  in  the  world  market  place. 
The  increasing  imports  pressure  on  some  US  industries  like the  steel  industry 
led  to  the  adoption  of  some  protectionist  measures  by  the  US  and  the  threat  of 
an  even  more  protectionist  stance  in  the  future,  unless  favourable  to the  US 
ngreements  were  to  be  reached. 
The  threat  of  protectionism  and  the  increasing  exchange  rate volatility have 
contributed substantially to  the  foreign  investment  in  the  US.  Instead of 
continuously  exporting  goods  and  services  produced  abroad,  foreigners  had  to 
provide  employment  in  the  US  economy  in  order  to  assure  their share  in  the 
biggest  market.  This  trend  has  been  hailed  by  the  US  administration  as  a 
rroof  of  their  successful  economic  policies  and  not  as  an  abuse  of  economic 
and  political  power  to dislocate  investment. 
By  the  mid  1985  the  dollar started to  fall  and  this  trend  continues  through 
the  first  half  of  1986.  Still, even  after  this  realignment,  it is  argued 
that  the  real  exchange  rate  remains  too  high  to  be  consistent  with  a 
substantial  narrowing  of  the  external  deficit.  Failing  f~~ther adjustment  the 
US  foreign  debt  would  increase  as  a  percentage of  US  GNP  and  exports  in  a 
~anner that  ultimately  becomes  unnacceptable  to portfolio holders,  whose 
preferences  would  change  and  who  would  back  out  of dollar denominated  assets. 
Therefore  either  now  or  later the  dollar  must  take  another  corrective plunge, 
- 7  -or  else  US  interest  rates  must  rise  relative to those  abroad  to maintain 
investors  in  their dollar  positions.  Were  this to  happen,  it would  influence 
ne~atively investment  and  ultimately  growth  in  the  us7• 
At  the  same  time  the  US  Launched  a  campaign  for  further  trade  liberalisation, 
not  for  the  global  good  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  US,  this  campaign  being 
designed  to  improve  the  US  terms  of  trade  through  the  choosing  of  sectors  and 
industries  where  the  US  economy  is  thought  to  be  strong,  as  for  example,  high 
technology,  agriculture  and  services.  The  US  authorities,  both  Congress  and 
administration  seem  to  give  a  new  meaning  to  the  old principle of  reciprocity 
th~t  stands  at  the  very  core  of  the  world  trade order.  Reciprocity  should  now 
mean  that  the  US  is to  be  treated  in other  economies  in  the  same  way  as  these 
other  economies  are  treated  in  the  US.  But  this  means  that  the  US  econom~c 
order,  ~s  it  results  from  the  US  economic  structure,  is  the  standard  to  be 
accc~tcd by  all  her  trading  partners,  under  the  threat  of  effecting 
retaliatory measures.  Not  enough  reciprocity should  also  mean  that  perceived 
distortion  in  bilateral  trade  relations  should  be  resolved  on  a  bilateral 
The  result  from  the  US  fiscal  expansion  is that  the  US  cannot  have  foreign 
capital  without  disadvantages  for  the  export  and  import  competing  industry, 
while  the  Europeans  and  Japanese  cannot  have  strong exports  to the  USA  without 
r~rallel  capital  transfer,  high  interest  rates  and  protectionist  pressures 
q 
that  build  up· 
- 8  -II.  THE  INTERNATIONAL  f·~ONETAR\'  SYSTEn  AND  THE  CO~~UNITY 
The  actual  international  monetary  system  is characterised by  highly variable 
exchange  rates  and  high  mobility of capital. 
The  move  to floating  rates  in  1973  was  welcomed  by  most  economists,  supported 
mainly  by  the  argument  that  floating  would  permit  each  country to  choose  its 
own  rate of  inflation and  pursue  an  independent  monetary  policy,  while  being 
insulated  from  imported  inflation  from  other more  inflation-prone  countries. 
The  scepticism  about  the  consequences  of  floating  that  were  voiced  by  some 
economists,  such  as  R.  Triffin,  concerning  (a)  the  possibility of  loss  of 
discipline on  fiscal  and  monetary  authorities  with  respect  to anti-inflation 
policies;  (b)  turbulence  in  price-cost  relationships  leading  to protectionist 
actions  and;  (c)  disintegrative  impact  on  economic  and  political  relations 
bet•1een  nations,  seems  to  have  been  only  in  part  well-grounded,  because 
floating  was  shown  to  be  viable. 
Although  the  present  exchange  rate  regime  is  commonly  referred to  as  a 
"floating''  one  and  the  IMF  in  describing  the  exchange  rate  arrangements  of 
members  has  detected  a  broad  tendency  over  the  years  towards  "more  flexible" 
arangements,  there  is  in  reality a  wide  diversity of  exchange  rate 
~rrangements among  countries.  The  international  monetary  system  shows  the 
following  main  characteristics: 
1.  Exchange  rate  arrangements:  Peggers  far  outnumber  floaters,  but  most  of 
world  trade  and  finance  is  conducted  among  countries  whose  exchange  rates 
float  against  each  other.  In  mid-1983,  93  countries,  almost  all of  them 
developing,  were  pegging  their  currencies.  Seventeen  countries  had  opted 
for  what  the  IMF  calls "limited flexibility vis-A-vis  a  single  currency or 
cooperative  arrangements."  These  include  the  8  members  of  the  exchange 
rate  arrangement  of  the  EMS.  Thirty  five  countries  had  adopted  "more 
flexible''  exchange  arrangements  including  "independent  floating"  by  4  of 
the  largest  industrial  countries.  During  the  period of  flexible  rates 
since  1973,  there  has  been  a  trend  away  from  pegged  exchange  arrangements 
and,  within  these,  from  single  currency  to  composite  pegs. 
- 9  -Despite  the  larger  number  of  countries  that  peg  their  currencies,  in 
trade-weighted  terms  the  current  system  is better classified as  floating 
because  most  of  the  largest  traders  maintain  more  flexible  forms  of 
exchange  arrangements.  In  trade-weighted  terms  about  t~lo-thirds to 
four-fifths  of  world  trade  is  conducted  at  floating  rates. 
2.  Exchange  rates  continue  to be  viewed  as  a  domestic  policy variable  and  a 
matter  of  international  concern.  With  regard  to  the  role  of  exchange 
rates  in  macroeconomic  policies,  many  countries  have  assigned  greater 
weight  to  the  exchange  rate  as  a  tool  for  domestic  and  external 
adjustment,  since  the  switch  to  floating.  The  exchange  rate  has  continued 
to  rank  high  among  the targets  and/or  the  instruments  of  macroeconomic 
policy,  and  in  many  cases  the  authorities  have  managed  their  exchange 
rates  t~ith  fair  success  through  some  combination  of  aggregate  demand 
policies  and  official  intervention  in  exchange  markets.  As  a  result, 
exchange  rates  have  varied  more  frequently  than  previously and  have,  in 
many  cases,  moved  in  the  direction  required  to  correct  external  imbalances 
and  offset  inflation differentials,  although  there  have  also  been  notable 
exceptions,  the  case  of  the  dollar  being  prominent  among  them. 
Internationally a  stable  system  of  exchange  rates  is  seen  as  dependent 
more  on  stable macroeconomic  policies at  the  national  level  than  on  the 
form  of  the  exchange  rate  regime  itself.  Present  codes  recognise 
explicitly that  a  system  of  stable  exchange  rates  can  be  jeopardised  as 
much  by  insufficient  as  by  excessive  exchange  rate flexibility.  The  main 
difference  to  the  previous  Bretton  Woods  system  is  the  absence  of  agreed 
rules.  In  the  present  situation,  stagflation makes  policy choice  very 
hard,  consultations  are  a  difficult  and  fragile  instrument  to  deal  with 
interdependence.  In  such  circumstances,  consultatio,.s  have  to deal  with  a 
wide  range  of  policy objectives,  instruments  and  techniques. 
3.  Exchange  rate variability is  perhaps  the  most  marked  characteristic.  This 
has  been  substantial  both  for  nominal  and  real  exchange  rates,  bilateral 
and  effective  exchange  rates  and  short  and  longer-term  horizons,  so  that 
more  and  more  observers  have  been  alarmed  by  the  violent  swings  in 
exchange  rates,  thus  voicing  increasing  doubts  as  to the desirability  (as 
against  the  viability that  is  in  general  no  longer  doubted)  of  the present 
exchange  rates  regime. 
- 10  -Exchange  rate variability  has  been  significantly greater  than  under  the 
adjustable  par  value  system  and  greater  than  variability  in  national  price 
Levels,  but  Less  than  the variability of  other  asset  prices  Like  stock 
market  prices,  changes  in  interest  rates  and  commodity  prices,  suggesting 
that  the  floating  rate  period  has  been  sufficiently turbulent  to  make  all 
asset  prices  and  not  just  exchange  rates  fluctuate  widely.  At  the  same 
time,  the  floating  rate  period  has  not  shown  a  sustained  tendency  for 
exchange  rate variability to decline  over  time,  while  the  failure  of  the 
purchasing  power  parity  to  hold  hns  been  very  marked  in  the  short  and 
medium-term.  The  standard deviation of daily percentage  changes  in  the 
bilateral  rates  among  key  currencies  has  been  close  to  0.5%  for  the  entire 
period  of  floating,  with  daily  changes  often  above  1%  in  some  periods. 
Variability  has  remained  substantial  in  spite of  the  considerable  progress 
made  in  reducing  divergences  in  economic  conditions  and  policies  among  the 
major  countries,  as  exemplified  in  the  convergence  of  rates  of  inflation. 
4.  Official  intervention  in  exchange  market  persisted  and  the  evidence  points 
to  the  fact  that  demand  for  reserves  has  not  diminished  to  a  great  extent 
under  floatin9  rates.  Intervention arising out  of  the  above-mentioned 
fact  that  most  countries  regard  the  exchange  rate  as  a  policy objective 
l1as  not  been  aimed  solely at  countering disorder  but  has  also  included 
resisting  rate  movements  that  bear  no  relation  to  the  fundamentals  and 
resisting depreciation  out  of  concern  for  its inflationary consequences  or 
appreciation  in  order  to  maintain  competitiveness.10 
A~ evaluation  of  the  actual  regime  can  be  done  on  the  following  Lines: 
1.  The  most  critical  problem  has  been  the  great  variability of  the  exchange 
rates.  Here  it  is  important  to distinguish  between  short-term volatility, 
e.g.  the  amount  of  short-run variability  in  the  exchange  rate  from  hour  to 
hour,  day  to  day,  week  to  week,  or  month  to month,  and  misalignment,  e.g. 
0  persistent  departure  of  the  exchange  rate  from  its  Long-run  equilibrium 
L  L  {\  d.  W"ll"  11  h  .  l"  h  .  0ve  •  ccor  1ng  to  1  1amson,  ,  t  ese  m1sa  1gnments  ave  been  h1gh, 
permanent,  and  there  is  no  indication that  they  are  subsiding  over  time  as 
experience  with  floating  accumulates.  The  reverse  seems  to be  true. 
Thus,  the  dollar  could  be  overvalued  by  as  much  as  18%  in  the  first 
quarter  of  1983,  sterling  by  11%,  while  the  German  mark,  the  yen  and  the 
French  franc  were  undervalued  during  the  same  period. 
- 11  -The  high  variability of  exchange  rates  involves  substantial  costs.  The 
costs  of  volatility relate to  increased  uncertainty  which  can  lead  to  a 
reduction  in  trade  and  other  international  transactions.  Uncertainty 
regarding  the  domestic  currency  value  of  receipts  from  foreign 
transactions  could  lead  to  a  bias  against  foreign  trade  coupled  possibly 
with  a  bias  towards  increased direct  foreign  markets  less  exposed  to the 
vagaries  of  volatile exchange  rates.  The  empirical  evidence  as  to  the 
effects of  volatility on  trade  are  mixed.  Some  studies  (Hooper  and 
Kohlhagen  1978,  Cushman  1983)  find  that  uncertain  percentage  changes  in 
real  exchange  rates  arc  risky  in  international  trade,  thus  having  a 
negative  effect  on  trade quantity12•  A study  by  n.  Canzoneri,  P.  Clark 
and  others  suggests  that  exchange  rate variability is  not  always 
necessarily costly to  firms  but  the  specific  outcome  depends  on  some 
additional  factors  that  have  to  be  taken  into  account13• 
Nevertheless,  volatility between  the  currencies  of  the  industrial 
countries  complicates  the  task  of  economic  management  in  the  developing 
countries,  confronting  them  with  the  need  to  choose  between  stabilising 
their effective  exchange  rates  in  order  to  minimise  macroeconomic  shocks 
and  stabilising their bilateral  rate against  a  major  trading  currency  in 
order  to  minimise  the  risk  of  traders,  who  must  invoice  in  a  specific 
currency.  Furthermore,  volatility diverts  considerable  managerial  talent 
to  the  commercially  necessary  but  socially unproductive  activity of 
covering  not  only  trade  risks  but  also  balance-sheet  positions.  However, 
as  Williamson  remarks,  "Exchange  rate volatility is  a  nuisance  rather  than 
a  major  source  of  concern:  if this  were  the  principal  drawback  in  present 
arrangements,  it is doubtful  whether  it would  be  worth  contemplating  major 
changes."14 
The  costs  of  misalignments  arc  much  more  serious  and  have  been 
systematically analysed  by  Williamson.  He  discusses  six  types  of  costs, 
several  of  which  are  alternative  in  nature: 
(a)  Consumption  variations:  The  misalignment  of  CYGh1nge  rates  leads  to 
variations  in  consumption  which  leads  to  a  dissatisfaction  resulting 
from  alteration of  splurge  and  austerity.  This  is  a  welfare  cost  of 
living  with  misalignment. 
- 12  -(b)  Adjustment  costs:  This  is  the  cost  of  shifting  resources  between 
industries  producing  trndeable  goods  and  those  producing 
non-tradeables.  They  can  be  high. 
(c)  Unemployment:  A major  reason  that  adjustment  is  costly  is that  it 
docs  not  start  instantaneously,  implying  waste  of  resources  until 
these  resources  are  employed  again.  Where  it is  expected  that  an 
overvaluation will  prove  temporary,  unemployment  in  the  tradeable 
goods  industries  is  a  rational  response  to misalignment.  Whether  it 
is at  the  same  time  socially optimal  depends  on  how  temporary  the 
misalignment  will  be.  One  of  the  problems  of  floating  is that  it 
leaves  every  economic  decision-maker  to  make  his  own,  often  inexpert, 
judgement  as  to  whether  a  change  in  the  exchange  rate  represents  a 
signal  that  should  influence  resource  allocation or  a  temporary  signal 
that  can  safely  be  ignored.  Consequently,  it may  well  be  that  a 
change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  that  is  needed  to effect  adjustment 
is  initially  largely  ignored,  leading  to  larger  unemployment  costs 
that  are  necessary.  Thus,  it would  appear  that  the  dollar's 
over-valuation during  1981-85  has  maintained  higher  US  unemployment 
that  it need  have  been. 
(d)  Productive capacity:  Under  uncertainty,  firms  cannot  be  sure  when  an 
overvaluation  is  sufficiently temporary  to  merit  adjustment  rather 
than  a  decision  to  ride  out  the  period of  slack  demand.  An 
overvaluation  of  the  exchange  rate  can  therefore  induce  a  firm  to 
reduce  capacity that  could  be  productively  employed  at  equilibrium 
levels.  Multinationals  may,  on  the other  hand,  shift  investment 
overseas  and  come  to  rely  on  foreign  sources  of  supply.  Overvaluation 
may  thus  lead  to de-industrialisation. 
(c)  Ratchet  effects of  inflation:  Depreciation produces  strong 
inflationary pressures  while  appreciation  does  not  induce  equivalent 
pressures  to  cut  domestic  prices  and  wages.  Thus,  a  sequence  of 
overvaluations  and  undervaluations  tends  to  ratchet  up  the  price  level 
more  than  would  occur  with  the  maintenance  of  a  similar pressure  of 
demand  and  a  constant  real  exchange  rate. 
- 13  -(f)  Protectionis~:  This  is  a  weLL-known  phenomenon  and  has  manifested 
itself again  in  the  relations  of  the  US  with  its trade  partners  and 
the  EC  in particular.15 
2.  Insulation.  Against  the expectations of  its proponents,  floating  rates 
have  not  provided  complete  or  even  satisfactory  insulation against all 
types  of  external  disturbances,  nor  have  they  eliminated or  even 
substantially  reduced  the  demand  for  international  reserves.  Furthermore, 
they  have  not  provided  rapid  and  automatic  equilibration of  external 
payments  imbalances  (the  US  being  the  most  important  example)  and  they 
have  not  encouraged  enough  stabilising speculation to  keep  real  exchange 
rate  movements  within  narrow  bands  corresponding  to permanent  changes  in 
the  terms  of  trade~ on  the  contrary  the  large  capital  inflows  to  the  US 
indicate  rather  a  destabilising  influence  of  speculation.  It  could  even 
be  argued  that  in  this  case  floating  has  produced  perverse  medium-run 
effects  on  current  account  imbalances.  On  the positive  side,  floating  has 
not  Led  to  a  collapse  in  international  trade  <though  protectionism 
tendencies  have  strained  the  system,  they  have  not  destroyed  the 
discipline to  fight  inflation),  although  it has  facilitated more  lax  and 
inflationary policies  than  would  have  been  possible  under  fixed  exchange 
rates  in  many  developing  countries,  in particular  in  Latin  America,  and 
they  have  not  reduced  the  size of  price elasticities  in  international 
trade. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  importance  of  discipline  and  coordinated 
macroeconomic  policies  for  the  successful  operation of  floating  rates  is 
still dominant.  Floating  rates  have  allowed  more  autonomy  than  fixed 
rates  did  in  the  use  or  control  of  policy  instruments,  but  in  a  situation 
of  free  trade  of  goods  and  especially assets,  and  wh~re assets  are  close 
substitutes  across  countries,  this  increased  autonomy  cannot  be  translated 
into  more  effective policies  if domestic  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  are 
unstable,  unbalanced  and  Lack  some  degree  of  coordination  with  those  of 
the  main  trading  partners.  Wrong  domestic  policies uill eventually 
destabilise  the  exchange  rate  because  current  rates  ~re  heavily  dependent 
on  expected  exchange  rates;  the  Latter are  closely tied to  expected  future 
macroeconomic  policies  and  these,  in  turn,  are  strongly  influenced  by  past 
- 14  -policy  behaviour.  It is  an  illusion for  a  smnll  or  even  medium-size  open 
economy  to  pursue  an  expnnsionary  policy  when  its main  trade  partners 
follow  the  opposite  course. 
Floating  rates  might  avoid  or  reduce  balance  of  payments  deficits 
(although  even  this  has  proved  in  ~any situations  not  to be  the  case,  the 
balance  of  payments  deficit  increasing  rather  under  floating  rates,  as 
happened  for  example  to  Greece  after  Greece  adopted  floating)  but  they  do 
so at  the  cost  of  increases  in  iQport  prices,  which  are  quickly 
transmitted  to  general  levels  of  prices,  costs  and  wages.  Speculation 
accelerates  and  amplifies  these  movements  leading  to  increased  capital 
exports  - even  in  situations  of  cnpital  controls  - putting  more  pressure 
on  the  exchange  rates,  without  on  the  other  hand  correcting  in  itself the 
internal  economic  policies  causing  them.  At  some  point  restrictive 
monetary  policies will  become  indispensable  in  avoiding  a  currency 
collapse,  but  intervening price  and  wage  rises  are  likely to be 
irreversible and  so  make  depreciation  of  the  currency  irreversible too  -
the  ratchet  effect  mentioned  above.16 
Deflationary policy mistakes  will  result,  on  the  other  hand,  in  currency 
arpreciation,  similarly accelerated  by  speculation.  This  may  reduce  or 
eliminate  balance  of  rayments  surpluses  on  current  account  but  it will  not 
reduce  sticky wages,  tending  instead to  reduce  economic  activity and 
employment  and  thus  lead  the  econom}'  into a  recession. 
Furthermore,  as  has  been  pointed out,17  supporting  measures  are  Less 
likely  to  be  taken  with  floating  than  with  fixed  exchange  rates,  because 
the  promise  of  speedy  adjustment  of  payment  imbalances  functions  as  an 
anti-incentive  to  take  corrective  policy  ~easurcs at  the  appropriate 
moment  because  it  has  dininished political pressure  to  adopt  the necessary 
fiscal  and  monetary  nolicies.  To  that  must  be  added  that  under  floating 
carital  movements  make  it difficult  for  a  country  to  keep  under  control  an 
inflationary process  that  t1ould  at  least  be  disciplined  by  the  external 
constraint  under  fixed  exchange  rates. 
3.  Still  the  existence  of  exchange  rate  arrangements  does  not  imply  a  total 
lack  of  logical  foundation,  a  non-system  of  anarchic  relations.  The 
optimal  degree  of  exchange  rate  flexibility differs across  countries  in 
- 15  -Large  part  because  of  differences  in their economic  structures.  Both 
theory  and  empirical  evidence  indicate  that  exchange  rate  changes  in  the 
smaller,  more  open,  more  highly  indexed  economies  have  a  proportionally 
larger  impact  on  domestic  prices  and  give  them  a  less  lasting  relative 
price  advantage  than  changes  in  the  larger,  less  open  and  less  indexed 
economies.  Therefore  the  latter,  like  the  USA,  favour  increased  exchange 
rate flexibility  while  the  former,  like most  EC  countries,  try to avoid 
frequent  or  substantial  movements  in  exchange  rates.  It  follo~s that 
uniform  judgements  about  whether  exchange  rates  fluctuated  too  much  over 
the  past  decade  are  not  likely to  be  valid across  countries,  and  for 
reasons  that  go  beyond  inter-country differences  in  the  theory prevailing 
about  the  efficiency of  markets.  At  the  same  time,  these  same 
cross-country  viewpoints  concerning  optimal  exchange  rate flexibility 
strengthen  the  case  for  better  coordination  of  policies,  since  in  the 
absence  of  such  consultation  and  coordination,  it is unlikely that 
"common''  views  about  the  proper  distribution of  the  adjustment  burden 
between  exchange  rates  and  other  policy  instruments  will  emerge  on  their 
own. 
4.  In  order  to  appraise  correctly the  present-day  system,  it is  important  to 
distinguish  the  effects of  floating  rates  from  other  developments 
occurring  during  the  period  of  floating.  No  exchange  rate  regime  would 
have  emerged  unscathed  from  the  combination  of  shocks,  portfolio shifts 
and  structural  and  institutional  changes  of  the  last  ten  years.  Even  if 
m0jor  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  system  could  be  brought  about,  such 
changes  ~1ould not  by  themselves  be  likely to  reduce  unemployment 
significantly,  and  lead  to  a  fast  world  recovery.  A different  exchange 
rate  system  could  have  facilitated  economic  coordination  and  thus  could 
contribute  more  to  recovery  but  would  not  be  sufficient  by  itself to bring 
it about. 
5.  Some  authors18  defend  floating  on  the  grounds  that  it brings  about 
competition  of  economic  and  monetary  policies  among  countries  with 
beneficial  effects.  Fixed  rates  (or  even  managed  rntc~)  and  greater 
international  cooperation  could  increase  the  inflationary bias  in  the 
system.  Under  the  current  non-cooperative  system  of  flexible  exchange 
rates,  a  monetary  authority  that  follows  an  expansionary  monetary  policy 
faces  the  inflationary  consequences  of  a  currency depreciation.  The  fear 
- 16  -of  depreciation  weighs  against  unilateral  monetary  expansion  with  the 
consequence  of  mitigating  the  inflationary bias  arising  from  the  time 
inconsistency  problem19•  If, on  the  other  hand,  a  group  of  countries 
decided  to  coordinate their monetary  policies,  they  could  undertake  a 
joint expansion,  because  the  common  action  would  eliminate  the  fear  that 
any  particular  currency  would  depreciate  relative to  the others.  A joint 
action  of  the  various  countries  would  thus  bring  about  a  monetary 
expansion  that  any  one  of  them  would  be  unwilling  to  undertake  on  its own. 
According  to this  view,  "currency  competition"  rather  than  "currency 
cooperation"  is the  best  check  against  over-inflationary politicians  and 
this  is only  possible  under  flexible  exchange  rates. 
These  fears  appear  to be  exaggerated.  This  argument  assumes  symmetry 
among  the  cooperating  countries  <i.e.  absence  of  a  policy setter for  the 
group  whose  currency  would  assume  the  role  of  the  n-th  currency)  and  also 
the  absence  of  objective  criteria that  would  permit  to  point  out  the 
diverging  country,  which  would  then  have  to bear  the  burden  of  adjustment. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  there  is  an  asymmetry,  then all  depends  on  the 
stance  of  the  country  whose  currency  has  the  n-th  currency  status.  In 
this  case  the  stance  of  the  cooperating  group  would  depend  primarily on 
the  stance  of  the  Leading  country.  This  is  what  happened  in  the  EMS  ~ith 
the  DM  having  the  n-th  currency status.  Germany's  leading  role  in  the  EMS 
has  brought  about  a  stronger anti-inflationary bias  among  the  EMS 
countries  than  would  have  been  the  case  under  floating20• 
Furthermore,  in  a  system  with  relatively fixed  exchange  rates,  there  is  an 
asymmetry  between  an  inflation  prone  and  a  deflation  prone  country of 
nearly  equal  size,  because  the  inflation prone  country  sustains  losses  of 
reserves  that  sooner  or  Later  will  force  a  reversal  of  policy,  while  the 
deflation  prone  country  can  pursue  this policy durina  a  much  longer  period 
~1ithout  facing  any  direct  constraints.  Criticism that  fixed  exchange  rate 
regimes  leading  to  coordination  are  more  inflationary is  not  correct  if 
there exists  a  deflation  prone  country21 • 
More  generally,  the  "  competition''  argu~cnt postulates  that  all  countries 
being  free  to  choose  their  oHn  and  possibly different  policies, after  some 
periods  a  Learning  process  occurs  and  the  countries  that  have  originally 
- 17  -chosen  wrong  policies  change  them  and  follow  or  adopt  the  correct  policies 
that  some  other  countries  have  chosen  from  the beginning.  This  means  that 
after  some  periods,  a  de  facto  ex  post  cooperation  is achieved  through  the 
convergence  of  policies  towards  those  that  have  proved  to be  correct.  But 
in  this  case  it  is  clear  that  the  countries  having  made  originally wrong 
policy  choices  sustain welfare  Losses.  Even  the  countries  that  have 
chosen  correct  policies  from  the  beginning,  can  sustain  welfare  Losses  due 
to their  interdependence  with  the  countries  having  made  wrong  choices. 
Thus,  the  ••competition"  case  brings  about  de  facto  ex  post  cooperation  as 
against  the  ex-ante  cooperation  of  the  target  zones  case,  and  accepts 
1~elfare  losses  occuring  through  non-cooperation,  in  order to  avoid 
potential  welfare  losses  that  could  arise if all  cooperating  countries 
chose  originally wrong  policies. 
Viewed  thus,  the  "competition••  argument  becomes  much  weaker,  since  it also 
entails welfare  losses  and  since  its merit  over  the  cooperation  case 
depends  on  a  comparison  of  the  magnitude  of  Loss  of  the  "competition"  case 
with  the  potential  Loss  occuring  in  a  wrong  choice  in  the  cooperation 
case,  this  last  weighted  with  the  probability of  such  a  wrong  choice 
really occuring. 
In  the  case  of  a  managed  bi-polar or tri-polar exchange  rate  system  with 
the  Dollar,  the  ECU  and  the  Yen,  the  outcome  of  the  system  would 
ultimately  depend  on  the  controls  built  into the  system.  If one  of  the 
three  countries  (the  EEC  taken  as  one  country)  were  to  be  more 
inflationary  than  the others,  then  the  possibility of  realignment  of 
central  rates  would  always  remain  open. 
Furthermore,  it  seems  that  the  actual  situation of  currency  competition 
has  brought  a  deflationary bias  into  the  system  leading  to  a  deeper 
recession  and  loss  of  growth  that  would  have  been  the  case  under 
cooperation  with  managed  exchange  rates. 
6.  The  political  business  cycle  arguments  are  closely  r~:lJted to  the  above. 
To  the  extent  that  politicians manipulate  the  economy  for  electoral 
purposes,  as  argued  under  this  view,  international  rules  of  behaviour 
could  help  to  keep  such  proclivities  in  check.  On  the  other  hand,  to the 
- 18  -extent  that  the  resulting  global  rules  can  be  manipulated  jointly by  all 
politicians of  the  coordinating  monetary  area,  the  problems  of  the 
political  business  cycle  might  be  exacerbated  rather  than  diminished22• 
Even  if  the  last  argument  were  to  be  correct,  there  is  one  point  which 
makes  it  irrelevant  for  an  international  system:  Elections  are  national 
and  in  the  major  industrial  countries  that  would  cooperate  they  fall 
apart,  so  that  global  manipulation  for  electoral  purposes  becomes  well 
nigh  impossible.  Thus,  the  existence  of  a  political  business  cycle 
supports  the  argument  in  favour  of  international  rules. 
Even  if one  does  not  make  a  purely  negative  evaluation of  the  actual  regime 
and  even  if one  recognises  that  past  US  policies  are  justified from  an 
American  point  of  view,  the  fact  remains  that  these  policies  in  relation to 
the  2ctual  exchange  rate  regime  represent  serious  disadvantages  from  a 
European  standpoint. 
Firstly,  for  most  European  countries  the  level  of  real  interest  rates 
necessary  to  keep  their  currencies  from  depreciating  to  a  Level  inconsistent 
with  economic  fundamentals  is  much  higher  than  the  Level  required  for  domestic 
reasons. 
Secondly,  the  overvaluation  of  the  dollar  has  contributed  to  EC  growth  through 
increased  exports  but  has  Led  also to protectionist  measures  in  the  US  which 
hdr:1per  US-EC  trade  relations. 
:hirdly,  the  uncertainty of  an  about-turn  of  the  dollar's  exchange  rate, 
(Oupled  with  fears  about  the  long-run  unsustainability of  the  US  deficits, 
,;;1ve  !)rought  about  a  cLimate  of  insecurity.  The  actual  US  situation  has  been 
cnHpared  to  the  policy  package  that  evolved  under  President  Lopez  Portillo in 
~exico,  although  the  scale of  borrowing  relative  to  GNP  is  much  less  for  the 
llS.  Until  1982  the  market  was  happily  financing  what  has  since  been 
I'Yco"nised  to  have  been  an  unsustainable  policy  course  in  Mexico  (and  the  same 
•r~s  happened  for  so~e other  Latin  American  countries).  The  mere  fact  that  the 
market  was  equally  happily  bidding  the  dollar  up  during  1981-84  does  not  prove 
either  than  the  market  is  infallible,  as  the  American  administration  seems  to 
- 19  -believe,  nor  that  the  current  US  policy  is on  a  sustainable course.  If 
confidence  were  to collapse,  the  result  would  be  very  unpleasant  for 
everybody. 23 
The  factors  which  have  preserved  the  role  of  the dollar until  now  as  an  anchor 
for  the  international  monetary  system  may  not  be  counted  upon  to preserve it 
jndefinitely in  the  future.  The  financial  resources  derived  from  it by  the  US 
have  been  used  since  the  1960s,  and  particularly today,  for  purposes 
increasingly questioned  by  a  large  fraction of  public  opinion  in  the  rest  of 
the  world,  but  also  in  the  USA  itself.  Most  people  cannot  justify the drain 
of  capital  from  the  world  and  especially  from  poor  developing  countries  in one 
of  the  richer  countries  of  the  world.  Resources  that  should  have  been 
earmarked  for  collectively agreed  high-priority goals  of  the  international 
community  are  used  instead  for  other objectives  ~1hich  may  be  distasteful  even 
to  those  who  ultimately  finance  them.  One  of  these  is the  over-financing  by 
commercial  banks  of  lax  policies of  all sorts,  unduly  postponing 
anti-inflationary  readjustments  in  a  Large  number  of  countries.  Together  with 
US  military aid  these  have  made  possible  an  absurd  level  of  military 
expenditure,  often  devoted  to  keeping  in  power  corrupt  and  military and 
political dictatorships  abhorred  by  public  opinion.24 
Another  weakness  of  the  system  that  has  manifested  itself again  reccntty25  is 
that  it amplifies  psychological  upheavals  in  the  markets  that  arc  not 
justified by  underlying  economic  conditions.  The  actual  regime  has  very  weak 
defences  against  such  upheavals,  unilateral or at  best  hastily agreed  upon 
multilateral  intervention  by  the  Central  Banks  on  an  ad  hoc  basis. 
26  As  has  been  suggested  by  Sachs,  the  EC  could  take  measures  to decouple 
foreign  monetary  policies  from  the  US  ones,  by  reducing  the  international  role 
of  the dollar.  Through  such  a  strategy,  the  US  monetary  authorities  could 
pursue  more  inward  looking  policies,  without  having  to  ~1orry much  about  the 
policy  reaction  abroad.  Such  reactions  would  presumably  be  much  weaker  than 
actually,  since  the  international  repercussions  of  US  monetary  policy would  be 
much  less,  Here  the dollar to  loose  its actual  internat~;,n :l  hegemonic 
position.  An  enhanced  international  role of  the  ECU  could  go  a  Long  ~1ay  in 
breaking  the  dependence  of  European  monetary  and  financial  policies  on 
corresponding  US  policies.  The  emergence  of  a  bi- or tri-polar  international 
- 20  -monetary  system,  centered around  the  Dollar,  the  ECU  and  the  Yen  uould  thus 
bring  advantages  not  only  to  the  EC  but  also  to  the  US  if it were  to  lead  to  a 
better  sharing of  international.monetary  responsibility. 
The  fast  depreciation of  the  dollar starting  in  July  1985  confronts  the 
Community  with  a  different  set  of  problems  for  the  future  than  during  the 
period  1981-1984. 
The  depreciating dollar  should  help  keep  inflationist  pressures  in  Europe  Low 
and  also  ease  protectionist  pressures  in  the  USA  by  making  US  export  and 
import  competing  industries  more  competitive.  The  US  current  account  should 
also  improve.  On  the  other  hand,  an  increased  reversal  of  capital  flows  can 
be  expected,  with  capital  seeking  placements  ~Jith  the dollar substitute 
currencies,  in  particular  the  German  mark.  Appreciation  of  the  DM  and  the 
other  EC  currencies  against  the dollar  will  make  EC  goods  less  co~petitive 
vis-a-vis  American  goods,  reducing  EC  exports  and  so  export  induced  growth  in 
the  Community.  Capital  flows  towards  the  OM  will  also strain the  exchange 
rate  mechanism  in  the  EMS.  After  two  and  a  half  years  of  calm,  the  longest 
period  without  realignments  of  the  central  rates of  the  EMS,  pressures  for 
realignment  have  manifested  themselves. 
This  happened  actually with  the  realighnment  of  the  Italian lira  in  July  1985 
and  the  major  realignment  of  April  1986. 
I css  clear  is  the  effect  of  dollar depreciation on  interest  rates.  With 
depreciating dollar  and  capital  outflows  from  the  US,  the  US  budget  deficit 
can  no  longer  be  treated as  exogenous,  since  if capital outflow  from  the 
dollar  continues,  then  the  financing  of  the deficit  will  encounter  Li~its. 
The  US  administration will  have  to  decide  on  one  of  the  following  policy 
options,  all of  which  necessitate  a  painful  adjustment: 
a)  The  administration opts  for  a  drastic  budget  deficit  reduction,  while 
monetary  policy  remains  tight.  Interest  rates  can  be  expected to fall, 
thus  having  an  expansionary  effect  on  the  US  economy  and,  through  the 
international  transmission mechanism,  lowering  world  interest  rates  may 
contribute  further  to  some  recovery  in  the  Community  and  the  rest  of  the 
world.  On  the  other  hand,  the  tightening  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  US  could 
- 21  -bring  about  a  reduction  of  economic  activity  in  the  US  and  could  further 
weaken  the dollar,  bringing  some  inflationary pressures  to bear  on  the  US 
economy. 
b)  The  administration opts  for  no  or  a  very  slow  budget  deficit  reduction 
combined  with  easier monetary  policy.  In  this  case  lower  interest  rates 
will  be  the  outcome,  both  in the  US  and  in  the  rest  of  the  world  with  a 
positive effect  on  recovery  through  reduced  cost  of  investment.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  policy  would  lead  to  higher  inflation in  the  US, 
increased depreciation of  the  dollar  and  higher  capital  outflou  from  the 
us. 
c)  The  administration opts  for  no  or  a  very  slow  budget  deficit  reduction 
combined  with  tight  monetary  policy,  i.e.  continues  its present  policy 
course.  In  this  situation,  interest  rates will  remain  high  and  the 
dollar's depreciation  will  be  slower,  inflation being  held  under  control. 
On  the  other  hand,  crowding  out  will  be  much  stronger  on  the  US  capital 
market  due  to  the  lack  of  foreign  capital that  has  put  this pressure out 
till now.  A recession  might  result.  Interest  rates  can  be  expected  to 
remain  at  high  levels  or  even  start  rising again.  If no  unforeseen  events 
take  place  in  the  near  future,  the  high  real  interest  rates  might  in due 
course  reverse  capital  flows  again  and  bring  about  a  new  appreciation  of 
the dollar,  transmitting  the  recession  through  capital  exports  to  the  USA 
and  high  real  interest  rates  to  the  Community  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Although  each  situation and  policy option  of  the  US  has  different  effects  on 
the  Community,  all  relatively  sudden  changes  of  policy  and  the  economic 
situation  in  the  US  are  fraught  with  the  necessity of  painful  adjustments  in 
Europe. 
In  the  actual  exchange  rate  regime  the  US  and  the  European  countries  can  be 
seen  as  oligopolists  producing  and  offering one  good,  their  currency,  on  the 
world  market.  The  currencies  are  close  substitutes and  their  relative prices, 
the  exchange  rates,  vary  according  to  the  demand  for  ther~,  both  from  private 
and  official  sources.  Demand  for  each  currency  depends  on  the  currency's  main 
characteristics  Like  the  extent  of  its use  (depending  on  the  size of  the 
national  economy),  the  real  interest  rate of  the  assets  denominated  in this 
- 22  -currency,  expectations  concerning  its future  exchange  rate  (depending  on 
expectations  about  the  rate of  inflation  in  the  national  economy  and  its  real 
.  )  d  .  L.  27  1nterest  rates  an  1ts qua  1ty. 
The  demand  function  for  the dollar  is  characterised  by  asymmetry;  other  things 
being  equal,  there  is  a  higher  demand  for  the  dollar  than  would  be  the  case 
for  any  currency  showing  at  any  particular moment  the  same  interest  rate, 
expectations  and  quality.  This  is due  to  the  difference  in  size of  the 
national  economies  and  a  certain stickiness  in  currency  preference  for  the 
dollar,  due  to  its established position.  A part  of  the  demand  is "locked  in" 
in  the dollar,  coming  for  example  from  institutional  reserve  holders  (Central 
banks)  who  cannot  switch  their total  reserves  at  short  notice  from  the  dollar 
to  another  currency,  and  also  some  special  users  Like  the  receivers  of  oil 
revenues  who  show  a  reluctance  to  switch  to  another  currency  for  the 
denomination  of  oil prices  and  so  also  in part  for  the  placement  of  these 
revenues.  This  reluctance  to  change  is due  to  a  Lack  of  alternative which 
would  offer  the  same  advantages  from  their own  point  of  view  as  the dollar. 
Thus,  the  US  has  the  position of  an  independent  oligopolist  on  the  world 
currency  market  that  can  set  the  price  of  its good,  the dollar,  independently 
from  the  other  countries,  the  dependent  oligopolists.  The  other  countries, 
the  EC  Member  States  among  them,  can  only  wait  for  the  US  actions  and  only 
then  react.  It  is  clear  from  past  experience  that  even  correct  reaction  is 
less  advantageous  for  the  EC  Member  States  than  if they  had  the  possibility of 
independent  action.  But  it  could  even  be  that  cooperation,  e.g.  a  kind  of 
joint profit  maximisation  of  profits  (profits  being  the  seigneurage  accruing 
to  a  national  economy  from  the  international  use  of  its currency)  could  be 
better under  certain  assumptions  both  for  the  US  and  the  EC  Me~ber States. 
The  political prospects  for  some  kind  of  coordination of  policies  and  also of 
the  introduction of  cooperation  in  the  international  monetary  field  have 
improved  after the  G-5  September  1985  agreement.  In  this,  the  finance 
ninisters  of  the  US,  Germany,  France,  Japan  and  the  UK  agreed  to  cooperate  to 
prodtJce  an  "orderly appreciation  of  the  main  non-dollar  currencies  against  the 
dollar".  It seems  that  the  US  administration  has  moved  from  the  position it 
had  so  far,  of  non-intervention  in  the  exchange  market  and  neglecting  (or 
ignoring)  the  external  effects of  its policies.  On  the  other  hand,  the 
longer-term  aspects  of  the  G-5  arc  unclear,  because  the  ministers  agreed  on  a 
- 23  -target,  but  said almost  nothing  about  how  policies  should  be  implemented  in 
the  future  in  pursuit  of  that  target.  The  G-5  agreement  could  thus  initiate 
an  era  of  increased  cooperation,  but  could  also  remain  an  isolated  case  of 
ad-hoc  agreement. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  G-5  agreement  provided  important  signals  about  future 
policies  in  the  USS  and  this  seemed  to be  sufficient  to bringabout  a  10%  trade 
weighted  depreciation  of  the dollar  in  the  two  months  following.  The  signal 
is,  that  the  US  committed  itself to tie its monetary  policy  in  part  to  an 
exchange  rate target,  rather  than  to  a  strict money  growth  rule,  while  Japan 
committed  itself to tighter monetary  policy,  thus  helping  the  Yen's 
appreciation vis-a-vis  the dollar.  The  result  has  been  some  convergence  in 
short-term  and  long-term  interest  rates  in  the  major  economies  follo\Jing  the 
agreement28• 
- 24  -III.  THE  EXTERNAL  RELATIO~S OF  THE  E~S 
Undoubtedly  most  of  the  European  efforts  towards  joint  exchange  arrangements 
express  their  response  to  the  very  unstable  environment  which  has  been  created 
since  the  end  of  the  Bretton  ~loads  system.  The  recent  European  exchange  rate 
arrangement,  the  EMS,  which  aims  to  create  a  "zone of  ~onetary and  exchange 
rate stability"  in  Europe  by  enhancing  the  intra-coherence  of  the  EMS 
currencies,  is  the  response  of  the  EEC  to  the  bad  experience of  the 
independent  floating  exchange  rates  of  certain major  currencies  and  to  the 
undisputed  recognition  that  such  a  monetary  situation negatively affects 
European  integration  and  European  economic  recovery. 
However,  the viability of  the  above  ''zone"  depends  not  only  on  the  efficiency 
of  the  mechanism  which  provides  intra-EMS  cohesion  and  credibility,  but  also 
on  the  existence  and  the  efficiency of  an  "outuard-looking  mech~nis~" Yhich 
can  protect  this  intra-EMS  cohesion  from  external  disturbances originated  from 
third  currencies,  and  in particular,  the  US  dollar. 
In  fact  the  cohesion  of  the  system  has  very  often  been  exposed  to  the  sudden 
and  erratic  changes  in  US  interest  rates  and  the dollar exchange  rates.  In 
particular after the decision  of  the  Regan  administration  for  non-intervention 
in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  the  above  risk  has  been  further  increased 
since  most  of  the  Community's  central  banks  have  shown  an  inability to  control 
the  value  of  the dollar;  and  the dollar  interventions,  taken  individually, 
have  been  proved,  among  other  things,  ineffective  and  uneconomical  to  the 
extent  that  larger  and  larger  amounts  of  foreign  reserves  are  required.  Thus 
it  is  clear  that  the viability of  the  system  requires  a  shared  view  of,  and 
attitude to,  the  dollar,  that  was  explicitly called for  in all the  exchange 
rate  arr~ngements in  Europe  and  in particular  in  the  Bremmen  annex  and  the 
Grussels  resolution.29 
- 25  -Consequently  the  role of  the  above  mentioned  "outwards-looking  mechanism"  is 
to  provide  an  external stability of  the  EMS  exchange  rates  by  allowing  a 
coordination  of  the  exchange  rate policies of  the  EMS  member  states with 
regard  to third  currencies  or  a  common  European  exchange  rate policy vis-a-vis 
third currencies,  and  in particular,  the  US  dollar. 
In  spite of  the  growing  necessity  for  a  common  European  strategy vis-a-vis  the 
US  dollar,  and  the  despairing calls  for  a  common  attitude to third currencies, 
the  Community  still has  no  definite  common  policy towards  major  non-EMS 
currencies. 
On  the  contrary,  an  indirect  European  policy vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar  has  been 
developed,  according  to  which  the  Bundesbank  has  determined  for  the  most  part 
the  snake's  and  the  EMS  dollar  policy. 
The  following  deals  with  the  reasons  which  have  led  the  OM  towards  a  de  facto 
reference  standard  for  monetary  coordination  between  the  Community  and  the  USA 
and  the  function  and  weakness  of  that  system.  However,  the  study of  the 
OM/Dollar  will  be  more  complete  if firstly  we  analyse  the  main  reasons  for  the 
Lack  of  a  common  European  dollar  policy  which  has  caused  the  Community's 
inability to  play  the  role  asked  of  it as  one  of  the  poles  of  a  multiple 
reserve  currency  system. 
A.  The  reasons  for  the  Lack  of  a  common  EC-Dollar  Policy 
The  most  important  reasons  for  a  non-defined  common  European  attitude 
towards  the  US  dollar  are  : 
1.  By  comparing  the  importance  of  each  of  the  EMS  countries  as  export  or 
import  suppliers  in  manufacturing  relative to  the  main  non-member 
competitors,  and  in  particular the  US,  it can  be  concluded  (by  looking  at 
the  US  competitive  weight)  that  the  competitive  position of  each  of  the 
EMS  members  is affected differentially by  a  change  in the dollar value. 
According  to  Tables  1  and  2,  the  US's  weight  in  measuring  export  and 
import  in  manufacturing  vis-a-vis  each  EMS  country,  ranking  between  11.5 
for  the  Netherlands  and  22.3  for  Ireland on  the  export  side,  and  7.6 for 
Denmark  and  15.1  for  the  United  Kingdom  on  the  import  side.  The  fact  that 
- 26  -"the effective exchange  rates,  and  hence  the  competitive positions,  are 
affected differentially,  within  the  EMS  according  to  the  importance  of  the 
dollar  area  in  the  trade  in  goods  and  services",  it can  also  be  concluded 
by  Looking  at  the effective  exchange  rates  and  specifically at  the  MERM30 
weight  of  the dollar vis-a-vis  each  of  the  EMS  currencies - see  Table  3. 
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8.:i Table  3  Weights  derived  from  the Multilateral 
Exchange  rate  Model  MERM 
I  USA  I  USA 
l1972-basedl1977-based 
Belgium  0,1716  0,1624 
Denmark  0,1497  0,2398 
France  0,2497  0,2267 
Germany  0,2558  0,2164 
Italy  0,2590  0,2071 
Netherlands  0,1248  0,1934 
United  Kingdom  0,3277  0,2463 
Japan  0,5713  0,4974 
Source:  IFS,  Supplement  on  Exchange  Rates,  1985. 
For  all  these  cases,  a  change  in  the  value of  the dollar  has  different 
implications  on  the effective  exchange  rates  and  competitive  position  for 
each  EMS  member.  Consequently,  although  the  upward  and  downward  swings  of 
the  dollar affect  the effective  rates  of  the  EMS  members  in  the  same 
direction,  the  degree  for  losses  or  gains  in  the  competitiveness  is not 
the  same  for  all  the  members31 •  Therefore,  in  the  short-term the  EMS 
members  do  not  share  a  co~~on degree  of  interest vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar 
as  far  as  their  competitiveness  is  concerned.  However,  in  the  long-term, 
the  member  states are  aware  that  such  a  situation negatively affects  the 
convergence  of  their economic  and  monetary  performance.  These  tendencies 
for  further  divergence  of their economies  may  expose  the  monetary  and 
exchange  rate stability which  they  found  as  a  necessary  instrument  for 
their  economic  recovery  and  integration.  Therefore,  potentially a  common 
degree  of  interest  for  a  common  or  a  coordinated policy, vis-a-vis  the 
USA,  can  be  concluded. 
- 30  -2.  An  other  reason  which  can  explain  the  Lack  of  a  common  European  dollar 
policy  is derived  by  the  observation that  the dollar  exposure  varies  from 
one  EMS  currency  to another  according  to the  share  of  the dollar  in 
foreign  trade.  By  Looking  at  Table  4A  (Imports)  this  share  varies  from 
504  for  Italy to 10.5%  for  Ireland  and  (Exports)  varies  from  31.6%  for 
Italy to  7.2%  to  West  Germany. 
Table  4(A):  Invoicing  currencies  as  a 
percentage  in  the  share  of 
nine  countries'  Export 
Invoicing  currencies  as  a 
percentage  in  the  share  of 
nine  countries'  Import 
Year  Dollar  D~~  Sterling  Own  I  Dollar  Dr·1  Sterling  Own  I 
I  I 
Belgium  1979  12,5  17,9  2,6  42,41  23,4  18,3  9,9  28,41 
I  I 
Denmark  1979  16  12  8  51  I  27  17  5  27  I 
I  I 
France  1979  11,6  10,2  3,2  62,41  28,7  14,1  3,8  35,81 
I  I 
Germany  1980  7,2  1,5  82,31  33,1  3,1  42,81 
I  I 
Ireland  1981  21,6  1,5  '·0  23,51  10,5  3,8  53,4  26,91 
I  I 
Italy  1976  31,6  21,5  2,7  31,31  50,6  20,2  5,1  9,11 
I  I 
Netherlands  1980  16,5  21,7  4,2  43,51  29,4  22,9  4,7  27,91 
!  I 
United  Kingdom  1979  17  3  76  I  29  9  38  I 
I  I 
United  States  Estimated  - 1  1  98  I  4,1  1,5  85  I 
I  I 
- 31  -Table  4(8):  The  dollar  share  in  the  export  invoicing 
practices  of  5  European  countries 
1971  1972 
Belgium  14,5  11,9 
Denmark  22  16 
France  10,3 
Netherlands  16,7  13,2 
W.  Germany  6,5 
Source:  Table  4<A>  and  Table(B) 
S.A.B.  Page  (1977)  (1981) 
1973  1974  1975 
9,7  8,2  10 
15  14  13 
8,7  8,8  8,2 
10,1  13,2  15 
5,3  3,8  4,4 
"Currency  of  invoicing  in  Merchandilise  Trade" 
National  Institute  Economic  Review. 
1976 
11,4 
14 
9,4 
13 
5 
Consequently,  changes  in  the dollar  value  have  different  short-term 
effects,  in  size,  on  the  net  trade  balance  of  the  EMS  members,  which  also 
means  that  hedging  against  the  dollla~ exposure  is  not  equally  important 
to  every  member.  In  so  far  as  dollar  hedging  is  not  free  of  charge,  a 
stability and  predictability of  the  dollar  <which  could  be  the  outcome  of 
a  common  European  dollar  policy)  is  always  desired  by  the  EMS  members, 
especially  by  those  countries  whose  imports  and  exports  are  more  exposed 
to  the  US  dollar volatility. 
3.  Another,  and  even  the  most  important  reason  for  the  Lack  of  a  common 
European  dollar  policy,  is  the  differential  financial  implication of  a 
change  in  the  dollar  value  on  the  component  currencies  of  private and 
official portfolios. 
According  to  the  currency  substitution models  a  demand  ior  any  one 
currency  is tied  to  the  demand  for  all other portfolio currencies  by  the 
investor•s desire  to diversify  the  risk. 
- 32  -Whenever  the  demand  for  one  currency  changes  - ~nd consequently  its 
expected  exchange  rate  - the  demand  for,  and  the  exchange  rate of,  the 
rest  of  the  portfolio currencies  will  change  as  well.  Because  of  this 
interdependence,  a  depreciation  of  one  currency  may  cause  an  appreciation 
of  a  second  and  a  depreciation of  a  third. 
For  reasons  which  will  be  explained  Later,  the  DM  has  been  considered  as 
the  most  substituted  currency  (reserve  currency  and  transaction  currency) 
to  the  US  dolllar,  relative to  the  rest  of  the  EMS  currencies.  Therefore, 
a  decline  in  the  demand  and  consequently  an  expected  depreciation of  the 
US  dollar  will  induce  an  increasing  demand  and  an  expected  appreciation  of 
the  DM  which  is particularly sensitive  to  changes  in  the  demand  for 
dollars. 
In  so  far  as  the  rest  of  the  EMS  currencies  are  not  substituted  among 
themselves  and  to  the  D~l,  or  do  not  share  the  same  high  degree  of 
substitutability,  as  the  DM  does  to  the  US  dollar;  the  DM  will  strengthen 
its position  not  only  vis-~-vis the  US  dollar  but  also  vis-~-vis the  rest 
of  the  EMS  currencies,  since  it takes  most  or  even  the  total  of  changes  in 
currencies  compositions  betHeen  the  dollar  and  the  Community  currencies. 
Therefore,  the  financial  implications  of  a  weakening  of  the  US  dollar will 
be  more  critical  to  the  DM  than  to  the  rest  of  the  Community  currencies 
and  the  dilemma  between  revaluations  (realignments  in  the  central  rates) 
or  inflation will  affect  the  Bundesbank  decision-makers  more  than  the 
other  EMS  monetary  authorities. 
Consequently,  as  Long  as  the  EMS  currencies  are  not  perfect  substitutes, 
the  need  for  a  dollar policy during  the  downward  swings  of  the  US  dollar 
will  be  more  necessary  and  beneficial  to  the  DM  than  to  the  rest  of  the 
currencies  in  the  group. 
Another  reason  which  can  explain  the  lack  of  a  coordinated or  common 
European  policy  vis-~-vis the  US  dollar  is  derived  from  the  fact  that  each 
Er1S  member  state is  highly  vulnerable  and  interdependent  vis-a-vis  the  us. 
A state  is  vulnerably  interdependent,  if it  is  unable  to  reverse  the 
influence  of  outside  events  except  at  a  very  high  cost  to  itself. 
- 33  -A highly  vulnerable  and  interdependent  Member  State vis-a-vis another 
lacks  the  "state power",  or  the  ability to  control  or  to  influence  the 
behaviour  of  the  other32 •  Its  power  of  overriding  the  effects of  events 
occuring  elsewhere  is  a  function  of  all  the  country's  resources  (military, 
industry,  population,  natural  resources,  financial  and  diplomatic  skill, 
etc.)  relative to  the  other  countries  resources.  It  can  be  argued  that 
the  ability of  each  EMS  member  state,  taken  separately,  to  persuade  or  to 
force  the  Reagan  administration to  abandon  the  decision of 
non-intervention  in  the  foreign  exchange  market,  and  to  keep  the  real 
interest  rate  down,  is  rather  low.  This  is true  to the  extent  that,  the 
defense  of  the  Community  Members  is still dependent  on  American  military 
and  advanced-technology  industry,  and  on  the  fact  that  since  Reagan's 
presidency,  East-West  relations  have  substantially deteriorated. 
Each  EMS  member  state  is  aware  of  this  and  it has,  together  with  their 
domestic,  economic  and  political  capabilities, affected their political 
calculations.  These  political  calculations  have  affected their behaviour 
which  in  turn  affects  the  world  economic  and  monetary  issues.33 
It  seems  that  these  political  calculations differ  substantially among  the 
governments  of  the  European  Member  States34•  There  are  contradictions 
within  governments  on  a  number  of  political events,  (such  as  the 
Afghanistan  invasion,  the  crisis  in  Poland,  the  Persian  Gulf,  East-West 
relations)  with  the  British ministers  inclined more  towards  the  American 
position.  It  seems  that  the  EC  Member  States  have  not  abandoned  their 
role  of  the  traditional nation-state  with  their  loyalties,  prestige  and 
autonomy.  In  spite of  their potential  attitude  to  increase their 
bargaining  power  collcvtively vis-a-vis  the  US  and  thus  to facilitate and 
accelerate  an  international  monetary  reform  which  they  could  not  realise 
acting  alone  and  to  face  together  the  transatlantic  misunderstanding  and 
mistrust  which  has  been  enhanced  since  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system 
their  governments  still behave  as  the  short-run  maximises  do  in 
oligopolistic  models. 
- 34  -B.  The  OM-Dollar  policy 
As  has  been  mentioned,  the  DM  has  been  a  de  facto  reference  standard  for 
monetary  coordination  between  the  Community  and  the  USA  since  the  end  of 
the  Bretton  Woods  system  and  the  Bundesbank  has  determined  by  far  the 
greatest  part  of  the  snake  and  the  EMS  dollar policy. 
The  following  deals  with  three  reasons  which  have  assigned  an  indirect 
European  policy vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar  with  the  DM  in  the  centre of 
gravity. 
These  reasons  are: 
1)  The  better "quality"  of  the  DM  relative to  the  rest  of  European 
currencies; 
2)  The  expanding  role  of  the  DM  as  an  international  reserve  currency  in 
spite of  the  efforts  of  the  Bundesbank  to forestall  such  a  development; 
3)  The  transmission  of  monetary  disturbances  from  the  US  to  the  Community 
members,  via  W.  Germany,  since  1979,  and  the  response  of  German 
monetary  policy  to  these  monetary  shocks. 
ALL  the  above  reasons  are  derived  from  efforts  to  explain  the 
international  monetary  interdependence  under  a  floating  exchange  rate 
regime. 
1)  The  quality of  the  DM  and  its substitutability for  the  US  dollar 
It  will  be  argued  that  the  better price  performance  in  w.  Germany 
relative to  the  rest  of  the  Community  countries  has  made  the  DM  a  high 
"quality"  currency  in  Europe  and  elsewhere  and  that  this  factor  of  the 
- 35  -"quality"  has  paved  the  way  for  the  OM  to expand  its international  use 
in  the  private and  official  portfolios  and  also,  it  has  contributed  to 
making  this  currency  the  best  and  probably  the  exclusive alternative 
to  the  US  dollar. 
Since  the  second  half  of  the  70s,  efforts to explain  international 
monetary  Interdependence  through  the  theory  of  the  currency 
b  .  .  h  . dl  35  su  st1tut1on  ave  grown  rap1  y. 
As  was  already  mentioned,  the  currency  substitution theory  presumed 
interdependence  of  the  demand  for  money  in different  countries.  In 
particular,  changes  in  the  demand  for  a  currency  and  its expected 
exchange  rates  affect  the  demand  and  the  exchange  rate of  another 
currency,  other  things  being  equal  and  regardless  of  the  exchange  rate 
regime.  High  substitutability between  domestic  and  foreign  assets  in 
the  private  and  official  portfolios  has  the  following  outcome  on  the 
.  l  .  l'  .  36  nat1ona  macroeconom1c  po  1c1es  • 
First,  high  asset  substitutability  reduces  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary  policies  in  small  and  medium  open  economies  regardless  of  the 
exchange  rate  regime37•  Under  the  extreme  of  the  perfect  currency 
substitution38,  monetary  authorities are  unable  to  change  the  real 
yield  of  the  above  assets  in  the  long-run,  because  their demand  curve 
will  be  horizontal. 
Second,  high  assets  and  currency substitutability under  a  floating 
exchange  rate  regime  make  a  change  in the  exchange  rate,  in  reponse  to 
a  change  in  monetary  policy,  more  excessive  than  ~1ould  be  allowed  by  a 
current  account  position,  because  in  the  aggregate  portfolios weaker 
currencies  tend  to  be  replaced  by  the  stronger  currencies,  in  the 
absence  of  capital  controls  and  other  restrictions39• 
Third,  high  asset  and  currency substitutability  reduces  the 
effectiveness of  the  flexible  exchange  rates  to  insul~te the  home 
economy  against  some  types  of  foreign  disturbances40• 
- 36  .• Models  of  the  open  economy  hnve  shown  that  domestic  prices  are  also 
affected  by  world  variables  - under  certain  assumptions  domestic  and 
world  money  is determinant  of  domestic  output  and  prices  - which 
implies  that  monetary  authorities,  in spite of  their autonomy  which 
has  been  allowed  by  the  floating  exchange  rates,  cannot  fully  control 
national  prices  and  output.  The  governments  who  consider  the  exchange 
rate  as  the  outcome  of  national  macroeconomic  policies  and  who  also 
recognise  that  the  reduction  in  the  effectiveness of  their monetary 
policies  and  their  inability to  insulate fully their economies  against 
external  disturbances  is due  - at  lenst  partly - to  their  close 
currency  substitution,  have  to  do  something,  if they  really want  such 
an  insulation  and  a  more  effective monetary  policy. 
They  will  require  stable fiscal  and  monetary  policies  and  also  a 
better  coordination  and  convergence  of  their  macroeconomic  policies 
including  the  use  of  exchange  market  intervention,  in their belief 
that  such  an  option  will  stabilise expectations  about  exchange  rates, 
to  the  extent  that  the  Latter  is  influenced  by  recent  and  past  policy 
behaviour. 
In  so  far  as  monetary  interdependence  among  countries  is explained  by 
their  currency  substitution,  the  substitutability of  the  DM  vis-A-vis 
the  US  dollar41  is  one  of  the  re~sons why  the  Bundesbank  has  supported 
proposals  for  further  coordination  and  convergence  of  W.  Germany 
macroeconomic  policies  with  the  US  and  it has  participated more  than 
any  other  European  central  bank  in  the  exchange  market  interventions 
vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar. 
The  concept  of  the  "quality''  of  a  currency  in  relation to  the  price 
performance  of  the  issuing  country  has  already  been  mentioned  by 
d  .  d  f  .  l  .  42  aca  em1c  an  pro  ess1ona  econom1sts  • 
Recently  Padoa-Schioppa  and  Francesco  Papadia43,  by  equating  the 
quality  of  a  currency to its predictability  (predictability defined  as 
the  discrepancy  between  realised  and  expected  values  of  the  price of 
money- and  this  in  turn  to  its stability- the  latter being 
accompanied  by  the  stability in all other  real  variables  as  real  rate 
of  interest  and  exchange  rates)  have  concluded  the  following: 
- 37  -a)  The  average  rate  of  inflation seems  for  the  countries and  the 
period  concerned  a  good  substitute for  the  overall  "quality" of  the 
various  currencies.  Countries  with  a  low  average  inflation  rate 
over  the  period  have  shown  a  tendency  towards  lesser volatility in 
all variables  examined.  This  fact  has  been  interpreted by  the 
social-political  argument  according  to  which  a  monetary  authority 
which  is  capable  of  keeping  the  rate of  inflation constant  and  is 
willing  to  do  so,  is also  capable  of  keeping  it  low. 
b)  There  is a  strong positive  correlation between  the  international 
use  of  a  currency  both  for  financial  and  trade  purposes,  and  its 
"quality".  Over  and  above  the  use  implied  by  the  size of  the 
issuing  country,  high  quality  currencies  are  over-used  and  low 
quality ones  are  under-used.  There  are  several  arguments  to 
interpret  this  conclusion. 
First,  the  demand  for  non-interest  bearing  monetary  assets, will  go 
down  if the  opportunity  cost  of  holding  those  balances  - in  terms 
of  lost  interest  rates  - increases.  This  presupposes  that  nominal 
interest  rates  will  rise  due  to  inflation.  According  to  the  above, 
a  rational  investor  will  use  or  demand  less  the  currencies  with  a 
high  opportunity cost,  that  is  currencies  where  the  issuing 
countries  have  bad  inflationary  performance  and  he  will  tend  to  use 
more  "cheap"  currencies  with  a  lower  opportunity  cost,  ceteris 
"b  44  par1  us  • 
Second,  it has  been  argued  that  the  contribution that  money  gives 
to welfare,  through  ''greasing"  the  economic  activity depends  on  the 
currency quality45 •  The  higher  the  quality of  ~  currency,  the 
larger  is the  share  of  assets  denominated  in  this  currency - which 
will  be  used  as  arguments  of  the  production of  the  consumption 
function. 
Third,  the  low  level  of  the  inflation and/or  the  high 
predictability of  the  inflation of  a  country  makes  one  unit  of  its 
real  money  more  effective  in  producing  monetary  services.  This 
will  tend  to  increase  its demand46• 
- 38  -Fourth,  the  higher  the  "quality''  of  a  currency  (the  Lower  the  Level 
of  the  average  inflation or  the  more  predictable  the  inflation of 
the  issuing  country)  the  greater  the  use  of  that  currency  as  a 
"unit  of  account"  by  the  international  transactors will  be,  since 
this  currency  can  increase  the overall  economic  efficiency by 
Lowering  the  transaction  costs. 
Taking  into  account  the  above,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  investigate 
the  "quality" of  the  OM. 
In  particular,  by  employing  the  "average  Level  of  inflation"  the  "SD 
of  inflation"  and  the  "SD  of  expected  inflation"47  as  proxy  variables 
of  the  overall  quality of  a  currency,  we  can  compare  the  overall 
quality of  the  OM  to  the  quality  of  other  European  currencies  and  the 
dollar. 
Next,  we  will  investigate  the  contribution of  the quality of  the  OM  in 
its  international  financial  use.  Particularly,  by  using  regression 
analysis,  we  will  test  whether  the  factor  of  the quality of  the  DM  can 
explain first  its high  share  in  the  external  Liabilities of  Reporting 
European  Banks  to  SIS  and  second,  its higher  share  in  the  external 
liabilities of  Reporting  European  Banks,  relative  to  the  share  in 
other  currencies  (Pounds  sterling  French  Francs  and  HFL). 
Table  CS)  shows  the  higher  "quality"  of  the  DM  over  the quality of 
other  European  currencies  and  the  US  dollar,  regardless  which  proxy 
variable  and  period  is  concerned.  For  the  period  1972(1)  - 1984CIV), 
W.  Germany  had  the  lower  average  inflation,C4,7840).  Also,  during  the 
same  period  the  variability of  the  German  inflation as  well  as  the 
variability of  the  GerMan  expected  inflation  had  been  relatively  Low 
at  the  levels of  1,6016  and  1,4610  respectively.  The  United  Kingdom 
and  Italy  had  the  highest  average  inflation and  the  highest 
variabilities  in their actual  and  expected  inflation.  France  followed 
with  an  average  inflation of  9,333  and  with  a  variability of actual 
and  expected  inflation of  2,8184  and  2,3910  respectively.  The  average 
inflation  and  the variability of  the  actual  inflation for  the  Benelux 
countries  is  clearly better  than  that  of  France  but  still is far  from 
- 39  -Table  5 
the  level  of  w.  Germany.  The  US  has  a  higher  average  inflation and  a 
higher  variability of  actual  and  expected  inflation than  that  of  W. 
Germany.  Consequently  the overall  quality of  the  US  dollar  is  Lower 
than  the  quality of  the  DM  but  clearly  higher  than  the quality of  the 
other  currencies,  as  set  out  in  Table  5. 
Private  Final  Consumption  Price:  Quarterly  Data  -----------------------------------------------
1972(I)-1984(IV>*  1979(!)-1985(!)
0 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (1)  (2)  (3) 
W.  Germany  4,784  1,6016  1,4610  4,292  1,4305  1,3270 
France  9,333  2,8184 I  2,3910  10,7541  I  2,2055  1,9073 
Italy  14,957 I  5,1717  4,5912  116,2250 I  I 
Netherland  7,61301  2,2830 I  2,2003 I  5,8384 I  1,4801 I  1,3289 
Belgium  7,38571  2,7235 I  2,6038 I  6,6388 I  1,8840 I  1,7581 
U.K.  12,27751  5,6307 I  5,2349 I  9,8840 I  4,6047 I  4,1962 
USA  6,59231  2,4152 I  I  6,7875 I  2,7855 I 
*  For  Netherland  1972(1)-1982(1) 
*  For  Belgium  1973(!)-1983(V) 
°For  Netherland  1972(1)-1982(1) 
°For  Belgium  1979(1)-1983(11) 
(1)  Average  Inflation 
(2)  Standard  Deviation of  Inflation 
(3)  Standard  Deviation of  Expected  Inflation 
~~~rE~=  Eurostatistics:  data  for  short-term  e,:onomic  analysis. 
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During  the  period  1979(1)  - 1985(1),  the  DM  had  the  highest  quality  in 
the  sample,  in  spite of  the  relative  improvement  in  the  price 
performance  of  the  United  Kingdom,  Belgium  and  the  Netherlands. 
During  the  above  period  the  price  performance  of  the  US  deteriorated, 
but  taking  into  account  the  period  1981(1)  - 1985(1),  it  improved 
substantially. 
The  contribution of  the  quality of  the  OM  in  its  international 
financial  use  will  be  investigated  by  regressing  the  log  of  the 
external  liabilities of  reporting  European  banks  to  B1S  denominated  in 
DM,  on  the  log  of  the quality of  the  DM  and  on  the  log  of  a  second 
variable  which  expresses  the  log  of  W.  Germany's  export  in  the  world 
export  market  weighted  by  the  share  of  W.  Germany's  export  in  its own 
currency. 
Also  the  contribution of  the quality of  the  OM  in  its international 
financial  use,  will  be  investigated  by  regressing  the  log  ratio of  the 
external  liabilities of  reporting  European  Banks  to  B1S,  denominated 
in  DM,  to  the  external  Liabilities  in  pounds,  French  Francs  and 
Florins  respectively,  on  the  log  of  the  relative quality of  the 
currencies  which  are  concerned  and  on  the  log  of  a  second  independent 
variable  which  expresses  the  relative  larger  share  of  W.  Germany's 
export  in  the  world  export  market. 
The  log-Linear  equations  1  to  4  summarize  the  above: 
= a  +  a1  Log  PDM  +  a2  Log  S~IGEWG  0  (1) 
r-1D~·i  p£  s~JG  EWG  Log -- = a  +  a1  Log  P  +  a2  Log  11£  0  (2) 
Di·1  5GB  EGB 
Log 
~~OM  p  FF  5WG  E#G 
MFF 
=  a  +  a1  log--+ a2  log  0  PDM  5FR  EFR 
(3) 
1~or1  p  5WG  EWG  log--= a  +  a1  log~  a2  Log  1 '1 HFL  0  PDr•l  5HOL  EHOL 
(4) 
- 41  -where  MDM'  M£,  MFF  and  MHFL  is the  external  liabilities of  Reporting  European 
Banks  to  BIS  denominated  in  OM,  Sterling Pounds,  FF  and  HFL  respectively.  PDM' 
P£  ,  PFF  and  PHFL  is  a  proxy  variable  of  the  quality of  the  corresponding 
currency.  Notice  that  'DM'  P£  ,  PFF  and  PHFL  is a  smoothing  average  of  the 
period  which  is examined:  1972(!)  - 1981(IV). 
SWG '  SGB '  S  FR'  ~OL  is 
And  EWS,  E  G3' 
Germany,  the  United 
the  share  of  each  country's  export  in its own  currency. 
~R'  ~ is the total export  in  the  world  market  of  W. 
Kingdom,  France  and  the  Netherlands  respectively. 
It  is very  important  to notice  that  the  above  test will  be  approximate, 
b  P  d  h.  d  d.  48  h  .  d  f.  h  .  ecause  as  a  oa  Sc  10ppa  an  S.  Papa  1a  ave  ment1one  ,  1st  t  ere  1s  not  a 
particular  reason  to  assume  a  linear specification,  and  second  there are  many 
factors  other  than  size or  export  shares  and  quality which  influence  the 
international  use  of  a  currency. 
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!Dependent  Variable  Variable 
I 
I Log  of  external  Liabilities of 
I of  Rer:;ortirg  Eurc:pean  Banks  to 
I BIS,  dercminated  in  Di·l 
I Log  of  the ratio of  the ex-
l ternal  LiabiLities of  Re-
I portirg Eurc:pear1  Banks  to BIS, 
1  I d:raninated in  Df1  to the  Log 
~I of  external  LiabiLities of 
1  I Rer:;ortirg  Eurq:Jecm  Banks  to 
I BIS,  deroninated  in sterl  irg 
I  rnros 
Constant I 
-5,578 
(-7,640) 
0,205  I 
(2,113)1 
~~2CQ1~i~~-~i_!b~_ii~~~£i~l-~~~-~i_!b~-Q~ 
v 
"1 
-0,0873 
(-1,  141) 
x2 
1,462 
(24, 74) 
x3  x4 
2 
R1 
0,9540 
R 2 
2  DW1 
1,199 
I  I  I  I  I  I 
0,2928 
(5,175) 
1,7111 
(6,207) 
I  I  I  - I 
0,6328 
0142 
1,205 
x1  =  The  Log  of  the quality of  the  DM,  that  is the  Log  of  a  smoothing  average  of  the  private  final  consumption  price 
in  W.  Germany. 
x2 
x3 
x4 
=  The  Log  of  W.  Germany's  export  in  the  world  export  market,  weighted  by  the  share of  W.  Germany's  export  in its 
own  currency. 
= 
= 
The  Log  of  the  ratio of  the quality  of  the  Sterling Pound  to  the  quality of  the  DM. 
The  Log  of  the  ratio of  the  weighted  by  the  share  of  W.  Germany's  export  in  its own  currency,  Germany's  export  in 
the  world  market  to  the  weighted  by  the  share of Great  Britain's export  in its own  currency,  Great  Britain's export 
in the  world  market. 
"t"  statistics in  parentheses.  ALL  variables  refer  to 1972-1981  quarterly  data. 
The  external  Liabilities of  Reporting  European  Banks  to BIS,  denominated  in  DM,  £,  as  well  as  W.Germany's  and  Great  Britain's 
exports  in  the  world  market  are  expressed  in  SDR. As  it is derived  from  Table  6,  <first  equation>,  the quality of  the 
DM,  and  the  size of  w.  Germany's  exports  in  the  world  export  market 
explains  by  95,4%,  the  international  financial  use  of  that  currency, 
the  latter being  the  external  liabilities of  reporting  European  banks 
to  BIS,  denominated  in  DM. 
As  far  the  variable  of  the  "quality of  the  DM"  is  concerned  the 
negative  sign  is consistent  with  the  above  mentioned  theory.  It 
implies  that  as  the  smoothing  average  inflation  in  W.  Germany  becomes 
lower,  the  higher  are  the  external  liabilities of  the  European  banks 
denominated  in  OMs.  This  variable  is  also statisticallly significant. 
The  size of  W.  Germany's  exports  in  the  world  export  is also  a 
statistically significant  explanatory variable  of  the  international 
financial  use  of  the  OM.  Its  interpretation is quite  simple.  As  W. 
Germany  expands  its exports  in  the  world  and  it  invoices  a  high 
percentage  of  those  exports  in  DM  importers  will  tend  to  increase 
their deposits  in  DM  in  order  to  meet  their transactions.  Also,  it 
can  be  argued  that  as  the  DM  is  a  high  quality currency it is also  an 
attractive quotation  currency  for  other non  German  exporters,  and  this 
forces  importers  to  hold  balances  in  this  currency. 
According  to  the  second  equation  the  relative  higher  quality of  the  DM 
to  the  Sterling  Pound  and  the  relative  larger  share  of  W.  Germany's 
export  in  the  world  market  to  the  share  of  Great  Britain's export  in 
the  world  market  explains  by  63,281.  the  higher  international  financial 
use  of  the  DM  over  that  of  the  Sterling  Pound. 
The  positive  sign  of  both  the  independent  variables  is  consistent  with 
the  hypothesis.  Both  variables  are  also statistical significant. 
However,  the  results  of  the  attempt  to  investigate  the  contribution of 
the  relative quality of  the  FF  to the  DM  and  the quality of  the  HFL  to 
the  DM  on  the  higher  financial  use  of  the  OM  over  the  FF  and  that  of 
the  DM  over  the  HFL  are  not  satisfactory.  As  it has  been  found,  both 
signs  are  negative  and  thus,  the  hypothesis  is  violated. 
Paradoxically,  both  variables  had  been  found  statistical  significant. 
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Since  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  the  DM  has  started to 
expand  its  role  as  a  reserve  asset,  in  private and  official 
portfolios,  and  after 1975  the  DM  replaced  Sterling as  the  ~orld's 
second  reserve  currency after the  US  dollar.  Many  reasons  have 
contributed  to  the  speed  of  the  above  development. 
Apart  from  the  high  quality of  the  DM49,  the  recent  large  share of 
German  exports  in  the  world  exports  and  the efficient  network  of 
financial  facilities  in  w.  Germany50  which  are  the  basic  conditions 
that  make  for  the  emergence  of  a  country  as  a  reserve  centre, other 
short-run  market  reasons  have  contributed directly  in  making  the  DM 
the  second  international  currency  in  a  period  of  less  than  ten  years. 
The  most  important  of  these  reasons  is the  desire of  the  private 
financial  agencies  and  to  a  minor  extent,  the  monetary  authorities,  of 
countries  to diversify part  of  their dollar  reserve  into a  portfolio 
of  other  currencies,  of  which  the  DM  has  played  the  predominant  role. 
This  shift  away  from  the  dollar  was  the  response  of  the  private 
financial  agencies  and  central  banks  to  reduce  the  risk  which  has  been 
increased  by  the  end  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system  and  to  improve  the 
returns  in  so  far  as  a  somewhat  higher  interest  rate  could  be  obtained 
in  Euro-deposits51 •  For  the  monetary  authorities  there  are  some 
additional  reasons,  among  which  are  the  anonymity  afforded  by  such 
deposits,  and  the  assessment  that  chances  of  Euro-deposits  being 
frozen  would  be  smaller  than  that  of dollars  held  in  the  United 
States52 •  The  diversification out  of  the  US  dollar and  towards  the 
DM,  the  Yen,  the  SF  etc  has  been  described  as  the  evolution of  a 
multi-currency  reserve  system  and  in  the  beginning,  it  has  been 
considered  as  inherently unstable. 
The  growing  role  of  the  DM  as  an  international  currency  - as  far  as 
its store  of  value  function  is  concerned  - in  the diversified 
portfolios  of  private  and  official  agencies  has  certain disruptive 
effects  on  German  domestic  monetary  conditions,  as  well  as  the 
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more  on  the  OM  than  on  the  other  European  currencies  with  the  result 
of  pushing  the  OM  to its  limits  with  respect  to  currencies of  the 
other  members  whenever  a  growing  trust  (mistrust)  of  the  US  dollar  has 
been  developed. 
While  it is  more  the  movements  "out"  of  the dollar which  may  cause 
conflicts  with  policy objectives  in  W.  Germany- the  authorities 
cannot  simultaneously maintain  the  exchange  rate,  control  monetary 
growth  and  achieve  external  balance  - movements  "in"  the dollar  not 
only  modify  the  inherent  strength  of  the  OM  within  the  EMS  and 
consequently  improve  the  competitiveness  of  W.  Germany  in  Europe,  but 
also  contribute  to permitting  more  liberal  monetary  and  fiscal 
policies  and  relax  temporarily  the  German  monetary  authorities  from 
their  inherent  dilemma. 
The  German  monetary  authorities  have  very often manifested their 
opposition  to  the  growing  reserve  role  of  the  OM53•  They  have  argued 
that  the  OM  lacks  the  main  characteristics of  a  real  fully  fledged 
reserve  currency.  Its  functions  as  an  intervention  currency 
transaction  currency,  unit  of  account  and  quotation  currency,  in third 
countries  are  very  small  in  size,  and  that  the  German  money  market, 
does  not  have  the  depth  to  absorb  sizeable  sales or  purchase  without 
disruption.  Also,  they  argued,  that  the  Federal  Reserve  cannot 
directly offset  the  effects of  changes  in  foreign  reserves  holdings  on 
the  American  financial  system,  because  the  Bundesbank  has  not  a 
developed  policy  instrument,  similar to  the  US  of  open-market 
transactions  in  government  securities. 
The  negative  response  of  the  Bundesbank  to  the  growth  of  OM  as  an 
international  currency  is thus  realistic and,  if somewhat 
conservative,  is fully  understandable. 
During  the  70s,  the  Bundesbank  has  imposed  certain  restrictions 
especially on  non-residents  acquiring  OM  assets  in  Germany  with 
short-maturity and  also,  it has  attempted  to  limit  the  holding  of 
liquid  DM  assets  on  the  Euromarket. 
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restricting  foreign  (official  and  private)  holdings  of  OM  assets  in 
Germany,  placings  of  Euro-deposits  denominated  in  OMs  increased 
rapidly,  without  the  German  authorities  being  able  to do  anything 
against  this  development. 
According  to  Kruse54:  "The  growth  of  the  OM  is thus  a  process  over 
which  the  Bundesbank  and  other  community  central  banks  have  little 
control.  The  Bundesbank  may  be  able  to  restrict  DM  holdings  in 
Germany,  but  this will  only  channel  funds  into the  Euro-OM  assets. 
Furthermore,  the  major  factor  affecting the  rate of  reserve 
diversification  into  DM,  namely  the  relative attractiveness of 
alternative assets  depends  mainly  on  the  relative economic  performance 
and  policies of  the  United  States.  In  other  words,  the  magnitude  of 
upward  pressure  on  the  OM  and  hence  the  degree  of  strain on  exchange 
rates  in  the  EMS  caused  by  a  growth  in  foreign  official  OM  holdings 
will  be  determined  in  large  part  by  forces  external  to  the  Community." 
As  it can  be  concluded  from  table  (7),  the  share  of official 
investments  of  exchange  reserves  in national  markets,  other  than that 
which  has  been  identified with  banks  held  in  USA  is  relatively  low, 
for  the  whole  period  under  review.  Particularly the  share  of 
investments  of  exchange  reserves  in  W.  Germany,  although  the  largest 
in  size after the  investment  in  the  US,  is  considerably  lower,  if it 
is  compared  with  the official  investments  of  foreign  exchange  reserves 
in  the  Euro-market,  where  still the  Euro-DM  is  the  second  currency 
after the  Euro-dollar.  One  of  the  reasons  which  can  explain  the 
difference  in  the  share  of official  investment  of  foreign  exchange 
between  national  and  Euro-market,  and  especially between  the  domestic 
DM,  and  the  Euro-DM,  is that  the  Bundesbank  has  succeeded  in 
controlling  and  restricting official  OM  holdings  in  Germany,  but  not 
in  the  Euro-market. 
- 47  -~ 
C'( 
The  Pattern of  Investment  of  Exchange  Reserves 
1977  1978  1979  1980 
1.cur~y composition of official 
deposits  with  banks  in  Europe,  in 
Canada  and  Japan  and  with  certain 
offshore  markets.  In  r. 
1A)  In  National  Markets.  In  r.  9,15  9,77  6,76  12,08 
D11  2,65  3,25  2,61  3,29 
SF  1,56  0,63  0,46  1,10 
Yen  1,08  2,83  0,6'7  3,15 
Sterling  1,  92  1,26  1,46  2,06 
FF  -- -- -- --
I 
Cther·  Currer::~~3  1,  92  1,78  1, s:  2,47 
I I  ;;l)  In  Euro-:'Jr'.c~.  In  ;~  05,54  34,22  88,!.5  84,05 
-- 63,851  55,52  56, 1Sj  54,53  US.DolLJr:; 
I 
I  c.,  14,45  17,661 10,s:\ 16,32  !  ____  ·:: - ---- - ------ ·---
\ 
2:F  - -~~- 4,83-1  4,61  5,49 
i 
~,03  z,3i 1  3,231  1,s1  I 
Yr.:"l 
I 
---------+---
Stcrlin']  1  0,36  0,731  ,,:sl  1,51 
L__ 
l 
FF  I -- I  -- c=t  -- -
I  Other  Cu~~~ncies  ~~3,  1sT  4,5:  4,18 
1C)  Deposits  uith  cert3in  ~:o  5,99,t,,9c.  3,84  offshore  riJrkets.  In  % 
1A+19+1C  1CO  .100  11C·J  CO 
2A)  =  of  excharge  reserves  identified 
with  banks  held  in  USA,  to total 
foreign  reserves  60,28  62,27  47  ,3~  47,25 
28)  r.  of  Eurodollars  to the  tot3l 
foreign  exchange  reserves  25,35  20,94  25,6<::  25,06 
11CD 
---1-
2A  +  28  +  other = Total  foreign  exchange  reserves  100  100  100 
----- -------~--
Annual  data,  at  the  end  of  Dece~ber. 
Source:  SIS  Annual  Report. 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
12,95  13,44  12,31  11,86 
2,62  2,52  1,69  1,16 
2,14  1,47  1,12  0,87 
4,26  3,18  5,31  6,12 
1,  74  2,52  2,48  2,52 
-- 0,52  0,56  0,48 
2,14  1,15  1,12  0,63  i 
33,061  83,19  33,95  83,36 I 
56,0-'. 1 60,13  57,C5  57,291 
15,18~31  1~70_.1,_~~~.~ 
5,481  ,,,o9j  4,C6  /  3,so 
1,74--1,47 I  2,32  l 2,82. 
0,37  0,52  0,45  f 0,48 
-- 0,42  0,33  I 
0,38 
3,731  3,67  3,50  2,62 
3,971  3,36  3,72  4,76 
1CO  100  100  ~00 
50,85  61,33  58,53  62,09 
23,22  22,37  8,06  21,21 
100  10D  100  100 +'  -o 
Table  ~ 
External  Liabilities of  Reporting  European  Banks  in  foreign  currency 
<Eurodollar  and  other  currencies) 
In  % 
I 
I  1969  I  1970  I  1971  I  1972  I  1973  I  1974  I  1975  I  1976  I  1977  I  1978  I  1979  I  1980  I  1981  I  1982*1  1983*1 
lus.z  I  81,2  I  77,9  I  70,2  I  73,3  I  68,3  I  70,5  I  73,2  I  74,051  73,2  I  68,2  I  65,5  I  68,5  I  71,071  77,7  I  78,171 
I 
I  Dt·1  I  8,1  I  12,9  I  14,5  I  14,8  I  16,6  I  15,5  I  15,4  I  15,2  I  17,3  I  18,2  I  19,2  I  15,6  I  13,191  9,3  I  8,681 
I  I 
ISF  I  7,0  l  7,5  I  7,7  I  6,6  I  8,9  I  8,2  I  5,9  I  5,1  I  5,7  I  5,2  I  6,1  I  6,441  7,661  4,9  I  4,801 
I  I 
!Sterling!  1,4  I  1,2  I  2,0  I  1,6  I  2,3  I  1,6  I  1,2  I  1,2  I  1,7  i  2,021  2,271  2,971  2,061  1,291  4,801 
I  I 
IHFL  I  0,6  I  0,7  I  0,851  1,031  1,1  I  1,2  I  1,3  I  1,1  I  1,2  I  1,4  I  1,321  1,031  -- I  0,861  0,891 
I  I 
IFF  I  -- I  0,5  I  0,431  0,81 I  1,1  I  1,2  I  1,2  I  1,031  1,2  I  1,4  I  1,701  1,801  -- I  0,801  0,871 
I  I 
!Yen  I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  0,671  1,  21  I  1,551  1,401  1,821  1,361  1,641 
I  I 
!Other  I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  -- I  3,571  3,861 
I  I 
I  1100,001  100,011DO,DDI10D,ODI10D,DOI100,0011DO,DOI100,001100,0DI10D,ODI10D,DDI1DO,DDI1DD,DDI100,0011DD,ODI 
*  External  Liabilities of  Reporting  G.I.S.  Banks<Eurodollars  and  other  currencies) 
~Q~r£~: B.I.S.  Annual  Report Table  (8)  shows  the  share  of  the  OM  in  the  Euro-market.  For  the  whole 
period,  the  OM  is  the  second  Euro-currency after  the  Eurodollar.  The 
expansion,  and  the  large  size of  the  OM  in  Euro-market  is  due  to the 
attractiveness  of  the  OM,  as  a  store of  value,  combined  ~ith its 
appreciation vis-i-vis  the  US  dollar until  1980. 
The  expansion  of  the  Euro-OM  is also  due  to  the  attitude of  certain 
oil exporting  countries,  ~hich during  the  weakness  of  the  US  dollar, 
have  invested  a  part  of  their outstanding dollars  in  the  Euro-market 
and  particularly in  Euro-OMs.  By  the  end  of  the  70s  and  with  the 
strength of  the  US  dollor  vis-a-vis other  currencies  the  share  of  the 
official deposits  in  national  markets  other  than  in  the  United  States 
declined.  Exceptions  were  the  yen  and  the  pound. 
The  increase  in official  placements  in  the  non-dollar  sector of  the 
Euromarket  was  limited to  Euro-OM  and  to  Euro-Yen  deposits. 
The  share  of  the  OM  in  the  external  liabilities  in  foreign  currencies 
of  reporting  European  banks  to  DIS,  has  been  declining,  but  it is 
still very  large  in  relation to the  share  of  other  non-dollar 
currencies. 
The  relatively  large  size of  the  OM  after the  US  dollar  and  Eurodollar 
in  private  and  official  portfolios  reflects  among  other things  the 
preference of  investors  towards  an  attractive  "store-of-value" 
currency.  As  has  been  mentioned,  changes  in  their preferences  lead 
towards  substantial  shifts  in  such  holding,  and  this  can  cause  serious 
disturbances  in  so  far  as  these  changes  influence  flows  and  reserves 
stocks. 
How  can  German  monetary  authorities deal  with  this  problem55?  First, 
as  it  has  been  mentioned,  their attempt  to  counteract  such  a 
development  by  imposing  restrictions on  non-residents etc,  has  not 
been  successful  to  the  extent  that  they  can  not  influence  the 
Euro-market.  Perhaps,  they  could  promote  an  orderly  investment  of 
funds  in  secondary  reserve  currencies  by  offering special  investment 
.  .  f  .  l  b  k  56  .  h  opportun1t1es  to  ore1gn  centra  an  s  ensur1ng  t  at  such 
transactions  do  not  pass  through  the  foreign  exchange  market.  At  the 
- 50  -same  time  they  could  develop  a  bilateral understanding  between  them 
and  large  reserve  holders,  under  which  the  l~tter supply  information 
to the  former  of  their  intentions  and  thus  make  it possible  for  the 
Bundesbank  to take off  setting actions,  if this  is  considered 
necessary.  But  still, it is doubted  that  such  an  option  can  influence 
the  private  Euro-currency  market. 
Alternatively,  they  could  promote  the  establishment  of  an  attractive, 
artificial currency,  which  could  influence  the  diversification process 
acting  as  a  substitution account.  The  SDR  and/or  the  ECU  can  be  the 
two  candidates  which  can  absorb  any  existing dollar  overhang. 
However,  the  SDR  is still not  significant  in  private  and  official 
businesses  and  the  ECU  is still  Limited  by  a  regional  role,  although 
since  1983  it  has  appeared  as  a  currency  in  its own  right,  and  it has 
started being  used  in  settlements  with  third countries. 
Finally if monetary  authorities  in  the  US  refuse  to  do  anything 
against  monetary  disturbances  which  have  originated  in  their  country  -
to  follow  sound  and  confident  domestic  financial  policies  and  be 
responsive  to  the  rest  of  the  world  and  thus  to  iron  out  the 
disturbances  at  the  source  or  to  forestall  the  spreading  of  these 
disturbances  - then  the  rest  of  the  world  and  in particular  W. 
Germany,  have  to  undertake  active  policies  against  the  above 
disturbances,  including  large  exchange  market  interventions.  This  is 
because  the  large  size  of  the  DM  in  the  private  and  official 
portfolios  makes  W.  Germany  more  vulnerable  and  sensitive to  external 
disturbances  than  any  other  country. 
3)  The  role  of  W.  Germany  in  the  transmission  of  monetary  disturbances 
from  the  US  and  the  response  of  the  Bundesbank. 
The  role  of  W.  Germany  in  the  transmission of  monetary  disturbances  to 
Europe  from  the  US  and  the  response  of  the  Bundesbank  to  external 
monetary  shocks,  since  the  transition to  floating  and  especially since 
- 51  -the  inception of  the  EMS,  is  another  reason  which  can  explain  why  the 
OM  has  become  a  de  facto  reference  standard  for  monetary  coordination 
between  USA  and  Europe. 
As  it has  been  shown  from  several  studies57  the  economic  and  monetary 
linkages  between  the  two  sides  of  the  Atlantic  and  among  European 
countries  have  not  eroded  since  1973.  Although  there  is a  decoupling 
of  several  important  economic  variables,  short-term monetary 
interdependence  has  not  diminished.  New  channels  of  monetary 
transmission  which  co-exist  with  a  floating  exchange-rate  regime  make 
the  insulation  properties  of  that  system  less  effective. 
Since  1980,  a  new  external  US  interest  rate  constraint on  Europe  has 
emerged.  Padoa-Schioppa  and  Stefano Micossi  in their  influential 
empirical  work58  have  found  a  strong  and  significant  contribution of 
US  interest  rates  to the  predictive performance  of  German  and  French 
interest  rate equations,  while  little influence  is detected  for  the 
United  Kingdom  and  Italy.  They  also  have  found  that  the  German 
interest  rate  improves  the  performance  of  Italy and  French  interest 
rate equations  and  when  the  German  interest  rate is  included as  an 
explanatory  variable  together  with  the  US  interest  rate,  the  latter 
becomes  insignificant.  See  table  (9)  and  its explanatory  footnotes. 
This  table  summarises  the  result of  the  estimation of  various  vector 
autoregression models  of  money  market  interest  rates  in  selected 
.  59  countr1es  • 
- 52  -Table  9 
dep.  var. 
(I) 
RUS 
RGE 
RtR 
RIT 
VECTOR  AUTOREGRESSION  ~ODELS Of  INTEREST  RATES 
I~  SELECTED  COU"TRIES 
period  of  estimate:  14.11.1979- 28.3.1984 
(weekly  data) 
independent  (lagged)  var.s 
( 2) 
FP£ 
AR 
(3) 
FPE 
FlY 
I 
I  RUS( 2) 
I 
I  II 
I 
I  RUK ( 13) 
I 
I  II 
I 
I  RGE ( 18) 
I 
I 
I 
I  II 
I 
I  RtR( 4) 
I 
I  II 
I  II 
I  II 
I 
I  RJ T( 7) 
I  II 
I  II 
I  II 
I 
I 
I 
RGE (I) 
RUK(2) 
RGE (I) 
RUS(I) 
RGE (I) 
RUS( I) 
RUS( I) 
R  UK (I) 
RFR(I) 
RUS(2) 
RUS(2) 
RUS(4) 
RUK( 10) 
RGE(20) 
RUS(4) 
RUS(4) 
RUS( I) 
RUK(2) 
RG£(5) 
RUS(3) 
flUS (I) 
R  US (I) 
RUK( I) 
RGE( I) 
RUK(I) 
RFR ( 1} 
RUK( I) 
RGE (I) 
RUK(2) 
RGE(5) 
RF R  (I) 
.925 
II 
II 
.343 
II 
II 
.207 
II 
II 
II 
.115 
II 
II 
.021 
II 
II 
II 
.965 
.921 
.924 
.344 
• 341 
.344 
.200 
.206 
.207 
.1 94 
.197 
.113 
.115 
.105 
.112 
.114 
.021 
• 021 
.020 
.021 
.020 
• 021 
1.9 
5.1 
1.3/4.5 
0.8 
3.2 
0.1/2.5 
g,]O 
3.7 
2.2 
16.2°/8.3* 
14.5°/5.1* 
12.7* 
71.0° 
15.5*/2.9 
9.2/0.3 
o. 7 
7. 7* 
I 9. I 0 
4. 8/8. 1" 
1.8/20.2° 
0.3/2.5 
',·, ,. r' (  ,, ;  Servizio  Studi  della  Banca  d'Italia.  Temi  di  Discussione,  Agosto  1984, 
1 I •  Na!c••l  !ogarithm  of  •oney  mdrket  rates  respectively  in  the  US,  the  U~.  Germany,  trance  and  Italy. 
(,I  In  parenthrses  the  number  of  lagged  values  included  for  each  variable.  (3)  FPE 
[(T.md)S<;!;f( 1-m-l)T]x!OO,  where  T  is  the  number  of  ob,ervations,  m is  the  number  of  lagged  variables 
.tr•d  ~SH  the  q;m  of  squ.,red  rrsiduals.  The  subscripts  AR  and  HV  refer  respectively  to  the 
,,u:nr-rqrt•:.·.ivc  Jnd  multivariate  models.  (4)  Under  the  null  hr?zothesis,  the  log-likelihood  ratio  of  the 
~est  ~.v  dod  AR  equation  residuals  -- L  •  -2ln(SSR  /SSR  )  -- is  asymptotically  distributed  as  a 
centrJl  X~  with  degrees  of  freedom  equal  to  the  nMuVmber  A:f  restrictions.  *  indicates  rejection  of  the 
~.uil  hypothesis  (that  the  additional  variable  or  variables  do  r.ot  improve  fPE)  aJ;  a  5  per  cent 
significance  level;  indicates  rejection  at  a  I  per  cent  Gignificance  level.  for  trivariate 
2 
equations,  the  X  values  refer  to  the  variables  in  column  (2)  in  the  same  order. 
53-
No  33. These  results  have  two  important  implications: 
a)  Interest  rates  in  Europe  were  to  an  extent  "uncoupled"  from  those  in  the  US 
by  letting the  exchange  rate take  up  the balance of  adjustment. 
See  chart  <1). 
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- 54  -Also,  this  is verified by  the  evidence  that  the  variability of  the  European 
interest  rates  were  lower  during  the  1979-83  period  and  this  was  not  the  case 
for  the  US  interest  rates.  See  Table  (10).  Also,  according  to  the  same 
table, it becomes  clear that  the  European  countries  response  to  the  US 
interest  rate variability  has  been  reflected  in  the  dollar  exchange  rates. 
For  the  period 1980-83,  dollar bilateral  exchange  rates  are  strongly 
associated with  interest  rates  in  the  US  rather  than  to  the  foreign  markets. 
TC!ble  10 
VARIABILITY  Of  MONEY  MARKET  INTEREST  RATES  AND  Of 
EXCHANGE  RATES  IN  SELECTED  COUNTRIES  (1) 
I  I  I  I 
I  1973-83  I  1973-79  I  1980-83  I  1983 
I  I  I  I 
I  I  I  I 
variability  of  •on~y  I  I  I  I 
aarket  interest  rat~s  I  I  I  I 
- United  States  I  1. 13  I  o. 74  I  I.  fl1  I  0.48 
- Joited  Kir.c,do"  I  I.  44  I  I.  57  I  I.  22  I  0.67 
Gf'"~-1~Y  I  1.02  I  1.10  I  0.87  I  0.39 
~  ;  ..  -~,.. r f·  I  I.  25  I  ! • 31  1.15  I  0.21 
1  t J lv  I  I.  50  I  1. 93  o. 75  I  0.60 
I  I  I 
correlation  co~ffici~nt between  I  I  I 
exchange  rates  and  •oney  I  I  I 
eark~t  interest  rates  ( 2)  I  I  I 
- $  effcc~ivc  (a)  I  0.335  I  0.097  0.371  I  0.392 
- £/$  (a)  I  0.010  I  0. t !3  -0.326  I  o. 217 
(h)  I  0. Ill  I  · 0. I ."•  (1 •.  \OJ  I  0. ltH 
(1M I$  (a)  I  0. OF.'I  I  -0. ll'·2  0.0)6  I  0,01.1 
(b)  I  O.JC~  I  O.GIR  o  .. 1n  I  0. 427 
r r 1  i  ( .. )  I  l). ;';J  I  O.G44  o  .on  I  -0 • .l1/ 
(h)  I  0.3?5  I  -0.01~  0. 3? I  I  0.250 
L  i t /$  (a)  I  0.139  I  -0.076  0.037'  I  -0.220 
(b)  I  0.238  I  -0. 153  0.391  I  0.495 
I  I  I 
Source:  IFS. 
(1)  Variability  is  measured  by  He  standard  deviation  of  monthly  percentage  changes.  (2)  (3) 
Correlation  with  natio,al  interest  rates.  (b)  Correlation  with  US  interest  rates. 
- 55  -b)  The  "information"  stemming  from  US  interest  rate  is  conveyed  to  France  and 
Italy via  the  German  interest  rates.  In  the  EMS  external  monetary  shocks 
tend  to be  transmitted  via  W.  Germany.  This  can  be  seen  in  Table  (11). 
According  to this  table  interest  rate  correlations  are  stronger  between  W. 
Germany  and  the  USA  and  between  German  and  either  France  or  Italy,  than 
they are  between  USA  and  either  France  or  Italy. 
Table  11 
us 
UK 
GE 
FR 
us 
UK 
GE 
FR 
us 
UK 
GE 
FR 
- . 
CORRELATION  COEFFICIENTS  BETWEEN  INTEREST  RATES  IH  SELECTED  COU~TRIES 
(a)  1960  I-1972  I  (b)  1972  II-1979  I  (c)  1979  II-1903  IV 
Ger•any  France  Italy  United  Kingdo• 
(a)  (b)  (c)  (a)  (b)  (c)  (a)  (b)  (c)  (a)  (b)  (c) 
no•inal  interest rates 
• 77  .40  .52  .63  .62  .S9  .92  .58  .44  .56  -.21  .27 
.46  • 24  .57  .73  • 52  .04  .39  . 1  i  -.  2; 
.64  .49  .• 57  .67  -. 72  • 41 
.61  .08  .88 
real  interest rates  ( 1) 
• 44  • 76  .72  .15  .59  .31 ...  • 20  .64  .75  -.18  .43  .80 
.30  .57  -.27  .25  .51  .73  .oo  .35  .83 
• 65  .71  .06  .39  -.29  .03 
.62  -.03  .78 
in,terest rate  innovations  (2) 
.13  .03  .oo  .14  .27  •  '44  .38  .18  .60  .09  .36  .41 
.10  -.24  -.30  .14  .12  .12  .08  .23  -.29 
.05  -.10  .00  .27  -.14  .12 
.14  • 38  .78 
Source:  IFS 
(1)  Nominal  interest  rates  deflated with  the  CPI  growth  rates  in  the  four 
quarters  up  to  and  including  the  reference quarter.  (2)  Innovations  for  each 
subperiod  are  the  residuals  from  regressing  (nominal)  interest  rates  on  a 
constant,  a  time  trend,  three  seasonal  dummies  and  four  lagged  values  of  the 
dependent  variable  it= a  +t+a1x1+a2x2+a  x  +a  i  1+a  i  +a  i- +4 
0  3  3  4  - 5 -2  3  3 
- 56  -In  so  far  as  W.  Germany  is  the  channel  of  monetary  disturbances  from 
the  USA  to  the  EMS  countries,  it can  be  concluded  that  deliberate  and 
responsible  policies of  W.  Germany  vis-a-vis  the  US  may  smooth  out  the 
intensity of  those  disturbances  in  the  Community  Member  States,  and 
consequently  may  contribute to the  external  stability of  the  EMS. 
This  could  be  one  reason  why  other  EMS  countries  have  "allowed"  W. 
Germany  to  determine,  to  a  Large  extent,  the  European  policy vis-a-vis 
the  US. 
However,  the  Bundesbank  has  another  reason,  to  seek  to  coordinate  its 
monetary  policy vis-a-vis  the  US. 
As  it has  been  mentioned  above,  information  stemming  from  the  US 
reaches  W.  Germany  Long  before  it  reaches  other  EMS  me~bers. 
Consequently,  in  the  absence  of  continuous  consultations  by  the 
Bundesbank  with  other  EMS  central  banks  the policy  response  of  W. 
Germany  to  forestall  capital  outflows  during  the  strength of  the  US 
dollar  may  lead  to  an  upward  pressure  on  the  OM  relative to other  EMS 
currencies,  and  this  could  reduce  the  benefits already derived  from 
the  appreciation of  the  US  dollar,  that  is  by  the  improvement  of 
G  .  .  .  - •  h  60  erman  compet1t1veness  v1s-a-v1s  t  e  US  • 
Since  the  breakdown  of  the  Bretton  Woods  system,  the  European  versus 
dollar  policies  have  passed  through  three  phases: 
The  first  phase  spanned  the  period  1973-1979  and  was  characterized  by 
a  prolonged  dollar  weakness  and  the  consequent  strenth of  the  OM.  The 
second  phase  covered  the  period  from  January  1980  to  October  1980. 
During  that  time  the  performance  of  the  US  dollar  was  mixed.  The 
third  phase  has  been  marked  by  the  pronounced  dollar  strength and  it 
covers  the  period  between  November  1981  to September  1985. 
The  first  phase  of  the  European-Dollar  policy:  1973-1979 
Generally  speaking,  during  the  whole  period  of  the first  phase  the  US 
dollar  was  under  severe  downwards  pressure,  except  for  an  8-month 
period of  teight  months,  between  April  1975-November  1976,  which  is 
- 57  -considered  as  a  calm  period  for  the dollar exchange  market.  The  first 
phase  may  be  divided  into three parts.  The  first  covers  the  period 
until  March  1975,  the  second  covers  the  above-mentioned  calm  period, 
and  the third  covers  to the  period  between  Dec.1976-Dec.1979.  During 
the  first  part  of  the  first  phase,  the  US  dollar weakened  sharply 
vis-a-vis other  currencies.  In  February  1975,  the  market  rate of  the 
OM  per  US  dollar  was  2,2845,  i.e.  the  US  dollar  had  devalued  against 
the  OM  by  38,2~, since  January  1973  by  16,7~ since  February  1974,  and 
by  11,8~ since  October  1974  (see  Chart  A1  and  A2  in  Appendix>.  This 
weakness  of  the  US  dollar  was  mainly  due  to the  uncoordinated  and 
unsynchronized  monetary  and  fiscal  policies of  the  US  vis-a-vis  the 
rest  of  the  industrialised countries,  to  the  impact  of oil  imports  on 
the  US  balance  of  trade,  and  to  the desire of  private  and  also 
official  investors,  especially  from  OPEC  countries  to diversify part 
of  their  reserve  holdings  towards  currencies  other  than  the  US  dollar 
and  pound  sterling. 
In  particular the  decline  in  the  interest  rate differential against 
the  US  rates  since  mid-1974,  the  widening  of  the  inflation gap  bet~1een 
US  and  its main  industrial  competitors  in  favour  of  the  Latter  (see 
Chart  D in  Appendix>,  the  increasing pessimism  about  the  US  balance  of 
payments  position  and  decline  in  the  industrial  production of  the  US 
since  the  end  of  1974,  at  Levels  Lower  than  in  Europe,  had  affected 
expectations  about  dollar  exchange  rates  and  had  resulted  in  making 
the  US  dollar-denominated assets  less  attractive for  OPEC  and  other 
investors.  Shifts  ••out"  of  the dollar  and  towards  other  currencies  in 
particular the  OM,  had  intensified  tensions  in  the  exchange  markets 
and  affected expectations  for  certain  important  European  currencies. 
These  expectations  had  been  further  reinforced,  when,  in  January  1975, 
and  in  an  atmosphere  of anti-inflation announcement,  statistics showed 
that  Germany•s  current  account  surplus  for  1974  had  been  impressive. 
After  a  calm  period,  from  April  1975  until  November  1976;  the  US 
dollar  had  begun  to weaken  vis-a-vis other  currencies.  During  the 
whole  of  the  third part  of  the first  phase,  the  US  dollar  had  followed 
a  sharp  downward  trend.  By  the  end  of  December  1979,  the  US  dollar 
had  plunged  38,8%  against  the  DM,  36,7%  against  the S.Fr.,  26,3% 
- 58  -against  the  HFL,  25,16%  against  the  BF,  20,8%  against  the  FF,  14,16~ 
against  the  Dkr  and  9,17%  against  the  Italian Lira,  from  its highs  of 
25  months  before  (see  Chart  A in  Appendix). 
Effectively,  in  December  1979  the  US  dollar  had  been  devalued  by  9,85% 
from  its  levels  of  November  1977  (see  Chart  8  in  Appendix).  The  main 
reasons  for  the  new,  severe dollar  weakness  were  the  emergence  of  a  US 
current  account  deficit  as  the  result  of  the  rapid  expansion  of  the  US 
imports  due  to  the  continuous  recovery of  the  US  economy,  the  heavy 
short-run  capital  outflows  and  the  fears  for  a  further  deterioration 
of  the  US  inflation differential  with  other  countries. 
By  late 1977,  unlike  to  W.  Germany  and  Japan,  the  US  current  account 
was  again  in deficit, after a  surplus of  4,4 billion dollars  in  1976. 
An  increase  in  the  US  demand  for  oil and  manufactured  imports  was  the 
natural  consequence  of  rapid  US  growth  and  in  spite of  the  efforts of 
the  US  administration  to  reduce  the oil  imports  by  new  energy 
programmes,  the  US  trade deficit  had  swollen  by  42  billion dollars  at 
the  end  of  1977. 
Interest  rates  in  the  US  increased,  but  at  levels  below  those  in 
earlier postwar  recoveries  and  the  European  interest  rates  remained 
nearly  the  same  until  the  end  of  1978,  so  that  the  interest  rate 
differential  favouring  the  US  dollar  was  not  able  to attract 
short-term capital  in  the  US  and  thus  to  finance  the  ongoing  US 
current  account  deficit. 
Expectations  for  a  sizeable depreciation of  the  US  dollar and 
appreciation  of  a  number  of  European  and  non-European  currencies,  in 
particular the  DM  and  the  yen,  had  prevailed  in  the  market,  with 
resulting  in  a  reduction  in  confidence  in  the  US  dollar.  Therefore, 
capital  continued  to  flow  out  of  the  US  dollar  denominated  assets  and 
the  dollar  continued  to depreciate  progressively against  other 
currencies deteriorating  inflationary performance  in  the  US  at  a  time 
when  other  industrial  countries  had  succeeded  in  curbing  their 
inflations.  Additionally,  the  second  oil  shock  aggravated  the  severe 
inflation problem  in  the  United  States. 
- 59  -Therefore,  during  the  third part  of  the first  phase,  there were 
increasing expectations  among  the  market  participants about  major 
realignments  in  the  exchange  rates,  which  made  the  US  dollar 
denominated  assets  even  less attractive. 
In  particular,  the  persistent  huge  current  account  deficit  in  the  US, 
the difficulties  in  financing  it, the  faster  pace  of  inflation  in  the 
US  than  that  of  other  industrialised countries  coupled  with  the  market 
participants doubts  that  Carter's administration  could  curb 
effectively the accelerating  inflation,  the  inability of  US  interest 
rates  to  halt  capital  outflows  and  the  prevailing attitude  in the 
exchange  markets  from  mid-1977  to  late 1978  that  the  United  States 
would  welcome  a  sizeable depreciation of  the  US  dollar,  were  the  main 
reasons  affecting expectations  of  a  depreciation of  the  US  dollar,  and 
made  US  dollar denominated  assets  Less  attractive to  investors.  At 
the  same  time,  the  huge  current  account  surpluses  of  W.  Germany  and 
Japan,  coupled  with  an  OECD  statement  in  Late  June  1977  that  countries 
with  current  account  surpluses  should  allow their  currencies  to 
appreciate,  the  adherence  of  the  us  to this decision  as  a  means  of 
rectifying trade  imbalances,  the  success  of  certain  European  countries 
in  controlling their  inflation,  and  the  increasing  real  interest  rate 
differential  between  the  United  States  and  W.  Germany  in  favour  of 
the  latter,  influenced expectation  for  appreciation of  certain 
European  and  non-European  currencies,  and  in  particular the  DM,  and 
made  assets denominated  in  that  currency  unusually attractive. 
Since  the  transition to the  floating  exchange  rate  system  and  the  end 
of  the  efforts  of  the  Community  countries  to maintain  fixed  margins 
against  the  US  dollar,  West  Germany  has  mostly  determined  the  momentum 
of  the  currencies  of  certain small  and  open  European  countries, 
vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar.  At  the  same  time,  Great  Britain,  Italy and 
in  certain periods  France,  have  chosen  to  manage  individually their 
exchange  rates  vis-a-vis  European  currencies  and  the  US  dollar61 • 
So  far,  the  exchange  rates  of  the  pound  sterling,  Italian Lira  and  the 
French  Franc  were  determined  by  market  forces  or  by  an  individually 
managed  floating  system,  and  as  a  result  the  comprehensiveness  of  the 
- 60  -European  exchange  rate  system  was  under  severe  threat.  There  were 
several  efforts  to  enhance  the  comprehensiveness  of  this arrangement. 
The  most  important  ones  are:  a)  The  Fourcade  Plan;  b)  The  Duisenberg 
Plan  and  c)  The  Commission  and  ECOFIN  Plan. 
While  all  these  attempts  are  reffered  as  intra-exchange  rate 
arrangements  by  introducing  some  reference  standard  or  target  zones 
for  intrapolicy coordination,  it was  only the  Fourcade  Plan  which 
foreshadowed  a  joint-dollar policy  by  introducing  a  crawling  tunnel 
for  the  Community  exchange  rate  level  to the dollar,  and  also positive 
intervention obligations.  The  Fourcade  Plan  was  submitted  in  May  1975 
but  it met  little positive  response  from  countries  participating  in 
the  arrangement  and  from  European  individual  floaters. 
European  policy vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar  rather  relied on  a  bilateral 
basis,  during  that  period,  except  on  three  occasions:  First,  in early 
July  1973,  a  joint  Community  operation with  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank 
of  New  York,  in  the  form  of  an  extended  swap  arrangement,  took  place 
in  order  to  halt  the  downwards  swings  of  the  US  dollar.  Second,  in 
March  1975,  a  decision  was  taken  to  limit  the daily movements  in  the 
dollar  rate of  EC  currency  to  0,75%  or  11..  And,  the  third,  on 
November  1,  1978,  where  the  US  administration,  in  cooperation  with  the 
Governments  of  W.  Germany,  Japan  and  Switzerland,  announced  measures 
designed  to  correct  the  excessive  exchange  rate movements,  which  were 
not  justified by  fundamental  economic  forces. 
As  mentioned  above,  the  favourable  price  performance  of  W.  Germany  and 
consequently  the  high  overall  quality of  the  DM,  the  expanding 
international  role  of  that  currency,  and  the  role  of  W.  Germany  in  the 
transmission  of  monetary  disturbances  from  USA  to  Europe,  made  this 
country  a  natural  candidate  for  the  system's  nth  currency  country  and 
the  DM  a  reference  standard  for  monetary  coordination  between  the  two 
sides  of  the  Atlantic. 
- 61  -On  the  other  hand,  the  main  reasons  which  led  the  above  small  and  open 
European  countries  to tie their  currencies  to the  strong  and 
appreciating  OM,  and  thus  to float  jointly against  the  weak  dollar, 
losing  in  the  short-run part  of  their  freedom  to  increase growth  and 
employment  are: 
a)  The  strong  currency option62•  The  governments  of  the  above 
countries  wished  to  chose  an  inflation target  with  great  precision 
and  high  credibility.  In  the  context  of  a  floating  exchange  rate 
regime,  and  world  monetary  instability,  W.  ~ermany's price 
performance  could  guarantee  such  a  target.  The  strong  currency 
option of  the  small  and  open  European  economies  during  the  relevant 
period  is  fully  consistent  with  the discipline  hypothesis:  Under 
fixed  exchange  rates63,  a  country  that  inflates at  a  rate  higher 
than  its trading  partners will, ceteris paribus,  suffer a 
deterioration  in  its balance of  payments,  i.e.  a  loss  in 
international  reserves.  Since  a  devaluation will  be  regarded  as  an 
indication of  the  failure  of  government  policies,  the  high 
inflation country will  have  to discipline itself by  restraining 
aggregate  demand  so  as  to  bring its inflation rate  into  line  with 
those  of  its trading  partners64• 
b)  According  to  Thyggesen65  membership  in  the  above  exchange  rate 
arrangement  has  yielded double  benefits to  the  participant  small 
and  open  European  countries.  These  benefits, which  have  offset  the 
deflationary  impact  of  keeping  their  currencies externally stronger 
through  linkages  to  the  OM,  are: 
"Relief  from  short-term nervousness  about  exchange  market 
developments,  because  the  resources  for  intervention were  adequate 
to  the  task,  and  avoidance  of  a  deterioration  in  the 
creditworthiness  which  would  probably  have  set  in otherwise,  given 
the  persistent  current  account  deficits.  The  greater  freedom  of 
action  has  been  used  to  keep  real  demand  and  cr.ployment  higher  than 
would  otherwise  have  been  feasible." 
- 62  -Although,  during  the  first  phase  all  European  central  banks  intervened 
in  the  dollar  foreign  exchange  market,  in order  to  dampen  fluctuations 
in  the  exchange  rate of  that  currency  against  their currencies,  W. 
Germany,  Japan,  Switzerland  and  the  United  States,  had  undertaken  the 
bulk  of  the  intervention operations.These  interventions  had  been 
further  reinforced  by  opening  and  extending  swap  credit  lines  among 
the  central  banks  of  the  above  countries.  W.  Germany,  apart  from  the 
intervention  in  snake  currencies,  had  carried out  the  largest 
proportion  of  the  Community  intervention vis-a-vis the  US  dollar. 
Table  12  shows  the  interventions  of  the  Bundesbank  to correct 
disorderly  markets.The  third  column  especially  shows  the  interventions 
of  the  Bundesbank  in  the  US  dollar.  The  net  increase  in its foreign 
assets  implies  the  purchase  of  US  dollars,  Yhenever  the  German 
monetary  authorities  found  that  the  OM/US  dollar  exchange  rate 
downward  fluctuations  were  excessively  large  or erratic.  As  the  table 
shows,  the  Bundesbank  had  intervened  heavily  in  the  US  dollar market 
to  support  this  currency  and  less  in  the  snake  currencies,  except  in 
1976,  which  was  a  calm  period  for  the  US  dollar. 
During  the  first  phase,  the  Bundesbank,  together  with  the  National 
Bank  of  Switzerland  and  the  Bank  of  Japan,  intervened  heavily  to 
stabilize expectations  about  exchange  rates  of  their  currencies 
vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar.  Also,  during  the  same  period  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  in particular the  Foreign  Exchange  Trading  Desk  (The  Desk) 
acted  several  times  to  check  sharp  rate  declines  on  individual  days 
but  not  to alter the dollar's overal  trend. 
See  Table  13. 
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Changes  In  the  Bunde,bank'a  net external  position 
)'eriod  Toto!  Juh·r·Jclltions  Oth"r  forci~11 
in  tho  ~onnl.o  j•),clnw~ 1  IIIP\i'IIIVIJI  .... 
-----·--
!Ill  l1i)IJ1)11 
1!17:1  Jatuu•ry·Mard•  ......................................  + 19.\1  O.G  + 20.ii 
April-May  .....................................  o.u  1.5  +  O.ti 
,Jnnu-.J nl,v  ·············································  +  8.5  +  5.8  +  '!..7 
AugttHl·f'··pluttl"·'  ··································  +  :>. '1  +  -1.3  0,\) 
Uct.ol>t• r·lh-et·tul~<·r  ...................................  4.5  1.1  :1.1 
J anunry-lleet·lll  Ler  ..................................  + 2G.4  +  G.8  + H!.G 
]\17-1  ,lanuar~'  ················································ 
~L 5  +  0.2  '!..8 
Ft"lli'III\T~'·.liiiJr  ·······································  +  5. ·1  +  4.1  +  1.3 
.T ni~··S<'pte111 her  ·······································  G.·l  3.5  '!..9 
Odol,er-lleet'tlllwl  ···································  +  l.G  0.7  +  '2.3 
.lnnuur)'·  llt•t:t'llllwr  ..................................  1.()  +  0.2  2.1 
l\li5  Januar)'·11nrch  .......................................  +  ii.O  +  5.0 
April-Septcntbcr  ....................................  G.G  1.8  4.8 
October-December  .................................  O.G  O.G 
.  lnnullry-lkc~mbcJ  ..................................  2.2  1.8  0.4 
Hl7li  .Tnnuary  ................................................  +  0.1  +  0.1 
Pebruary-~1  nrch  ·····································  +  9.7  +  8.7  +  1.0 
April-.Tuly  .............................................  4.G  1.4  3.2 
Au gus t-1nid -Octobt-·r  .................................  +  7.7  +  8.0  0.4 
1\!id-Oetobcr-Deccmber  .............................  4.1  3.5  0.6 
J anuary·December  ..................................  +  8.8  + ll.U  3.1 
J\177  J anuary-Junc  ........................................  0.8  1.5  +  0.7 
July  ····················································  +  2.0  +  0.0  +  2.0 
Aut;ust -St·pt.l'lldwt  ...................................  ';!,()  O.:J  l.7 
l )dober·l!cectulll'l"  ...................................  + ll.:J  +  3.1  +  il" 
J anuary·lJle• 'Ill hl'r  ..................................  + w.c;  +  1.3  +  9.1 
1\178  Janunry·Mnreh  ......................................  +  {.5  0.7  +  5.2 
The  following data,  from  April  1978  until  June  1979,  is approximate  and  has  been  estimated 
by  M.  L.  Greene  research  studies.  It reflects active  intervention of  the  Bundesbank  to 
counter  disorderly dollar  market. 
1978  April-July  +2.07  approx. 
August-October  +3.81 
November-December  +3.30 
1979  January-June  14  -5.99 
The  column  "Other  foreign  exchange  movements"  reflects  interventions 
in  the  US  dollar  exchange  market. 
A(+)  sign signifies  a  net  increase  in  foreign  assets. 
A(-)  sign signifies  a  net  decrease  in  foreign assets. 
~Q~~£~:  Annual  Report,  Deutsche  Bundesbank  and  M.L.Gre~ne:  US  eKperience  with  exchftnge 
market  interventions,  Sep.  1977-Dec.  1979.  Staff  Studies  128. 
Board  of  Governors  of  the  federal  Reserve  System.  August  1984. 
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Table  13: 
~~-i~!~r~~~!i2~-i~-2~l££!~~-£~rr~~£i~2 
~~~~~r~-~~-l~Z2_:_Q~£~~e~r-~l~-l~Z~ 
I  QQ~r~!i2~2-!Q_£Q~~!~r_9i22r9~rl~-~~r~~!2  I  QQ~r~!i2Q2_!Q_r~Q~l-~~r~~!_r~l~!~9_9~e! 
j3_n~L.!~~..9!l..?J:JJ:~J:~-.!~..?~.!.Y~2. 
In  the  market  and  from  customers  In  the market  and  from  central  bank  of  issue 
Dr~  I  SF  J  HFL  I  BF  I  YEN  DN  I  SF  I  HFL  I  BF  I  YEN 
Jan.  2  - Mar.  31 
I  I  I  I  I 
1975  -7o5,3  I  -157,51  -49  I  -16,7•  -
I  -
I  -
I  -
I  -
I  -
I  I  I 
Sep.30  - Dec.  31 
1977  I 
-857  I  - I  - I  - I  - I  +2,2  1  +382!1 
I  -
I  -
I  -
Jan.  3  - Mar.  31 
1978 
1
-2  063,8  I  -70  I  - I  - I  - I  +68!3  1  +401!2  I  -
I  - -
Apr.  1  - Jul.  31 
1978  I  -247,3 j__  - -32,11  - I  - I  - l-2  251,1  I  +612,4  I  -
I  -
I  - I I  Aug.  1  - Oct.  31 
1978 
1
-2  zo5,8 I  -294,11  - I  - I  - I 
+11!6Q.I  +486,5  I  -
I  - '  -
Nov.  1  - Dec.  29 
1978  ,-5 7054  -734,71  - I  - I  -207!41  +419,7  I  +566,7  I  - I  - 1~4 
Jan.  1  - Jun.  6 
1979  +3  395  +71,1  - - +334,41+3  2}8~l:! 325  I  -
I  - -
Jun.15- Aug.29  - I  +8  817  '~- +6 7,1  •  1979  -5  545,5  -117,9  - - -
I  - '  -
Aug.30  - Dec.31 
-4 642,2 I  - I  +1  523  +46,4  I  1979  -44,2  - - -
I  - '  -
In  million of dollars equivalent.  A minus  sign signifies 
a  net  sale of  the  designated  currency or  a  purchase of dollar. 
~Q~r£~:  M.  L.  Greene,  ''US  experience  with  exchange  market  intervention, 
January-March  1975  and  September  1977-December  1979. 
Staff Studies  127,  128.  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System,  August  1984. In  the  face  of  the  downward  swings  of  the  US  dollar and  the excessive 
strength of  its currency,  the Bundesbank  bought  a  large  amount  of  US 
dollars  which  resulted  in  an  increase  in its net  foreign  assets  by  7,3 
billion of  DM  during  the  period of  October  1973-March  1975  and  by 
14,49 billion  DM  during  the  period  of  January  1977-March  1978.  See 
Table  12. 
Moreover,  by  the  end  of  July  1978,  when  expectations  for  sizeable 
depreciations of  the  US  dollar and  appreciations  of  the  DM  ~nd yen  had 
prevailed and  had  been  reinforced  in the market,  the  Bundesbank, 
together  with  the  central  banks  of  Switzerland,  Japan  and  the  Bank  of 
England,  bought  sizeable amounts  of  dollars.  According  to  Tcble  12, 
from  April  1978  until  December  1978,  the  Bundesbank  had  bought  9,29 
billion  US  dollar  equivalent  in  OM.  At  the  same  ti~e the  Desk 
intervened  by  selling 8  158,9 million  DM  equivalent  in  US  dollars. 
The  Bundesbank  had  attempted to  coordinate  its active  intervention 
policy  (to  correct  the  disorderly  US  dollar market)  with  the  Federal 
Reserve  and  with  other  major  central  banks,  either  by  continuous 
consultations  among  their officials or  by  opening  credit  swap  lines, 
in particular  to  the  Federal  Reserve. 
According  to  M.  L.  Grcene66,  in  1973,  German  monetary  authorities 
opened  a  swap  line  to  the  Federal  Reserve.  In  mid-1978  they doubled 
this  line.  On  January  27,  1975,  an  agreement  had  been  reached,  that 
the  Bundesbank  should  intervene  heavily  in  Frankfurt,  and  the  Desk 
should  move  quickly  to  prevent  a  further decline  in  the  US  dollar/OM 
rate  in  New  York  by  selling  large  amounts  of  DM  in  the  market. 
Also,  on  February  1-2,  1975  officials of  the  Federal  Reserve, 
Bundesbank  and  Swiss  National  Bank  met  in  London  and  agreed  to 
coordinate  their  intervention policies. 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  on  1  November  1978,  Pr~sident Carter  and  the 
FED  announced  various  actions  to  correct  the  excessive decline  in  the 
dollar.  The  programme  featured  a  further  tightening of  monetary 
policy  and  a  30  billion dollar  package  of  foreign  currency  resources 
to  finance  US  participation  in  coordinated  intervention  in the 
- 66  -exchange  market.  Of  these  $30  billion,$6 billions  concerned  swap 
arrangements  of  the  Federal  Reserve  with  W.  Germany,  5 billion with 
Bank  of  Japan  and  $4  billion with  the  Swiss  National  Bank. 
Announcement  of  this  programme  resulted  in  an  improvement  of  the 
position of  the  US  dollar vis-a-vis  the  yen  and  SFr  immediately,  and 
the  DM  Later. 
In  1979,  the  US  dollar  was  under  recovery.  In  addition to President 
Carter's  programme  to  correct  the decline  in  the  United  States dollar, 
the  oil  shortage  caused  by  the  political  upheaval  in  Iran  was 
temporarily  helping  the  dollar.  The  rise  in oil prices  increased  the 
demand  for  the  US  dollar  by  oil  importers.  Al~o,  interest  rate 
differential  between  US  dollar  and  W.  Germany  favoured  the  US  dollar. 
According  to  Table  12,  during  1979,  the  Bundesbank  intervened  in  the 
dollar  market  by  selling  $5,99  bn  dollars  in  DM,  in  order  to  limit  thE 
decline  of  its currency  and  to  absorb  some  of  the  Liquidity  created  b) 
earlier  interventions. 
However,  after mid-June  1979,  expectations  of  a  new  decline  of  the  US 
dollar  had  grown  substantially.  During  that  period  the  German  and 
S~1iss  central  banks  and  the  Desk  intervened  forcefully  and  quickly. 
According  to  Table  13,  the  Desk  intervened  heavily  during  the  period 
of  June  15,  1979- December  31,  1979.  They  bought  10  187,7 million 
dollars  equivalent  in  OM  and  162,1  million dollars  equivalent  in  SF, 
and  finally  they  succeeded  in  stabilising the  US  dollar.  See  also 
Table  14. 
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Table  14: 
~~-~~9-~~-§~r~~~l-~~l~£!~9_i~!~rY~~!i2~~~-Q£!~_!L_l~~Q-=-~~e~-~QL_!~~1 
US  and  German  operations  to  counter 
disorderly  markets 
US  and  German  operations  to  repay 
market  related debt  and 
reconstitute  reserves 
I 
I  I  I 
1 
U.S. 
1 
~G~m:r'y  _  J  U.S. 
1 
W.  Germany 
~- ----- -, 
1oct.  1,  1980-Feb.  19,  1981  I  2  459  1  2  269 
1  4  358  I 
I 
-1  353 
I  -~-,-- ~ 
:Feb.  19,  1981- Mar.  31,19811  4  I  171  I  25  I  -100  . 
I 
Apr.  1,  1981  -Aug.  12,  1981  I  - I  5  601  I  - I  -320 
1--------------------~------------~--------------~--------------r--------------; 
1Aug.13,  1981  - Sep.  30,1981  1  - !  41  1  - 1  41  I 
I  I  I  I  .  I 
I  Both  countries  1  Both  countries 
1------------------------------------------------~-----------------------------------------~ 
!Oct.  1,  1980- Feb.  19,  1981  I  4  728  I  +3  ODS 
I 
1Feb.19,  1981- Mar.  31,  1981  ,  175  -75 
IApr.11,  1981- Aug.  12,  1981 
1  5  601 
I  -320 
I 
1Aug.13,  1981- Sep.  30,  1981  I  41  I  41 
In million of dollars.  A positive number 
indicates a  purchase of  marks  or  a  sale of  dollars. 
Source:  M.  L.  Greene  :  US  experience  with  exchange  market  interventions. 
Oct.  1980- Sep.  1981.  Staff  Studies  129.  Board  of  Governors 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  August  1984. The  second  phase:  January  1980  - October  1980 
During  the  second  phase,  the  US  dollar  had  followed  a  different 
pattern  than  that  of  the  first  phase.  As  mentioned  above,  after  a 
relative  improvement  in  the  first  half  of  1979,  the dollar weakened 
again,  but  thanks  to  sizeable  coordinated  intervention by  the  Federal 
Reserve,  the  Bundesbank  and  other  central  banks,  the dollar  had  been 
stabilized,  however  at  historically  Low  levels. 
During  the  second  phase,  i.e.  between  January  1980-0ctober  1980,  the 
US  dollar  had  fluctuated  widely,  but  it showed  a  tendency  to 
appreciate  against  other  currencies. 
Dollar  rates  during  that  time  reflected political uncertainties 
arising  out  of  the  Iranian  and  Afganistan  situations,  coupled  with 
severe  adverse  shifts  in  trade  and  current  account  balances  of  other 
countries  and  in particular  W.  Germany. 
During  the  second  phase,  inflation  reached  its peak  in  the  United 
States,  increasing  the  inflationary gap  with  W.  Germany  and  other 
industrialized countries,  which  also suffered  from  inflationary 
pressures  due  mainly  to  the  second  oil  shock.  The  monetary  and  fiscal 
policy  of  President  Carter  during  that  time  resulted  in an  increase  in 
short-term  interest  rates,  but  the  interest  rate differential  which 
had  been  favourable  to  the  US,  hardly explained these  foreign  exchange 
developments.  Industrial  production  declined  sharply  in  the  United 
States  but  relatively  tess  than  in other  countries,  while  the  current 
account  balance  of  W.  Germany  shifted to  a  sizeable deficit  of  13 
billion dollars  during  the  first  half  of  1980.  As  inflationary 
pressures  grew  in  Europe,  coupled  with  tendencies  for  the  US  dollar  to 
appreciate,  the oil bill  increased  and  European  countries  and  in 
particular  W.  Germany  reacted  by  increasing  the  interest  rate,  in 
order  to  halt  inflationary pressures  and  also  to  finance  the  ongoing 
current  deficits. 
- 69  -During  the  first  half  of  1980,  the  Bundesbank  made  a  massive 
intervention  in  the  exchange  market,  in order  to moderate  a  temporary 
- as  they  thought  - but  significant  tendency  for  the dollar  to 
appreciate  against  the  DM  and  to  curb  the  upsurge  in  interest  rates, 
in  W.  Germany  and  in  the  Community  in general. 
According  to  Table  <15)  and  Chart  (2),  the  EMS  countries  had  sold 
approximately  12  billion dollars  in  the  market  during  the first  half 
of  1980.  A large  part  of this  intervention  had  been  undertaken  by  the 
Bundesbank.  Also,  the  Desk  during  that  time,  in coordination with  the 
Bundesbank  and  other  major  central  banks,  intervened  heavily  in  the 
market  to  stabilise the  unusually  fluctuating  US  dollar exchange  rate. 
- 70  -Table  15 
Intervention  by  the  EMS  central  banks 
Semester 
1979  I 
II 
1980  I 
II 
1981  I 
II 
1982  I 
II 
1983  I 
II 
1984  I 
:  .Net  doll~r 
1  1ntervent1on 
I(USD  '000 million) 
I 
1.6 
1.  0 
12.0 
2.0 
15.8 
10.0 
14.9 
11 . 0 
3.0 
7.0 
4.5 
:Gross  intervention  in  Community! 
currencies  (000  million  ECU)  I 
TotaL  :Of  which:  rotified : 
I  to  FEC0'1  I 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
7.0 
6.0 
22.0 
7.0 
10.0 
I  I 
I  1.0  I 
I  2.0  I 
I  2.2  I 
I  2.3  I 
I  7.6  I 
I  2.3  I 
I  1.  9  I 
I  0.5  I 
I  5.3  I 
I  1 • 1  I 
I  2.1  I 
Source:  FECm~,  "The  EMS",  J.van  Ypersele  de  Strihou/J.C.  Koeune, 
COM  45.298/~ 1984. 
Up  to a  point  the  comparison  between  dollar  intervention and 
intervention  in  Community  currencies  which  this  table  shows  can 
be  misleading.  Indeed,  the  amounts  of  dollar  intervention  Listed 
represent  net  interventions.  Gross  sales  of  dollars  were  more 
important:  for  the  period  April  1979  through  June  1981  they 
might  have  reached  USD  50.000  million,  as  against  32.400 million 
for  net  sales.  The  amounts  Listed  for  intervention  in  Community 
currencies  represent  gross  intervention:  thus  they  include,  among 
others,  the  operations  by  which  central  banks  repurchase  their 
creditors'  currencies  in  order  to  settle debts  arising  from  inter-
ventions  carried out  previously. 
Chart  C2) 
6  US  Dollar intervention' by EMS ccntr•l h•nks 
(net  a:~le5) 
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79  80  Kl 
Source:  European  Economy.  Annual  Economic  Report  1981-1982,  No  10,  Nov.  1981. The  third  Phase  November  1980  - September  1985 
By  the  end  of  the  second  phase,  the  US  dollar  resumed  a  continuous 
upwards  trend,  which  lasted until  the  third quarter of  1985. 
The  main  reasons  for  the  strengthening of  the  US  dollar against  other 
currencies  and  in particular the  OM,  has  already  been  mentioned. 
As  is  known,  during  that  time,  the  US  followed  a  policy-mix  of 
expansionary  fiscal  policies  (expansionary  tax  and  expenditure 
policies)  and  a  tight  monetary  policy by  giving  more  emphasis  to  bank 
reserves  than  to  interest  rates  as  a  means  of  controlling  the  growth 
of  money  and  credit  aggregates.  The  result  was  an  increase  in  the 
nominal  and  real  interest  rates  in  the  United  States,  whjch  attracted 
investments  leading  to capital  inflows  and  since  the  exchange  rate was 
set  in  the  short  to  medium  run  in  the  asset  market,  it also  led  to 
appreciation  (see  Chart  C in  Appendix). 
The  strength of  the  US  dollar  had  been  further  reinforced  by  several 
other  factors,  of  which  the  following  are  the  most  significant: 
a)  The  current  account  of  the  US  was  pushed  into surplus  by  the  end  of 
the  second  quarter of  1980,  while  the  current  account  of  the  major 
industrialised  countries  turned  into sizeable deficits,  in 
particular  in  W.  Germany  (see  Table  A in  Appendix). 
The  main  reasons  for  this development  were: 
i)  The  different  effects of  the  second  oil  shock  on  the  current 
account  of  the  US,  W.  Germany  and  Japan  <the  US  had  succeeded 
in  reducing  the  percentage of  its  consu~ption of  energy  to 
GNP); 
ii)  US  non-oil  trade  had  been  improved  substantially vis-a-vis  EC 
and  non-oil  producing  developing  countries. 
As  this  situation  in  the  US  current  account  had  been  backed  by  the 
announcement  of  a  fiscal  expansion  in  terms  of  an  expansionary tax 
expenditure  policies,  anticipations  of  an  increase  in  current  and 
future  demand  for  US  goods  was  further  intensified.  This  fact  gave 
- 72  -further  impetus  to the  strengthening of  the  US  dollar,  to the 
extent  that  forward  looking  assets  and  exchange  markets  led  to an 
increase  in  current  Long  rates  and  exchange  rates. 
b)  Several  OPEC  countries  and  other  international  financial  investors 
who  had  been  diversifying  out  of  the  US  dollar,  found  that  they 
had  to  liquidate  their  holdings  in  other  currencies  and  in 
particular  in  the  US  dollar.  Also  international  financial 
investors  tended  to  favour  this  currency  as  they  found  the  US  the 
most  free  capital  market,  with  the  most  efficient  banking  system, 
and  found  the  new  administration  to  be  very  stable.  At  the  same 
time,  oil  importers  increased  their demand  for  US  dollars,  in order 
to  pay  their  ongoing  oil bills,  also  the  result  of  the  second oil 
shock. 
c)  Inflation  in  the  US  began  to decline  from  its peak  of  1978  and  at 
the  same  time  theEuropean  countries,  including  the  low  inflation 
countries,  suffered  from  severe  inflationary pressures,  rising 
unemployment  and  a  decline  in  industrial  production  <see  Chart  D in 
Appendix). 
As  mentioned  before,  US  dollar appreciation  has  several  repercussions 
on  capital  movements,  interest  rates,  investments,  inflation and  trade 
flows  to  the  rest  of  the  world  and  consequently  on  Europe.  In  this 
sense,  each  Community  country  has  derived  certain advantages  and 
disadvantages  from  the  appreciated dollar.  Therefore,  as  the  system 
has  no  common  policy  towards  major  non-EMS  currencies,  and  in 
particular  towards  the  US  dollar,  each  member  organises  its dollar 
policy on  a  cost-benefit  analysis.  Generally,  since  the  inception  of 
the  EMS  all  the  members  have  allowed  their exchange  rates  vis-A-vis 
the  US  dollar  to  absorb  a  part  of  their  real  interest  rate 
differential  with  the  US- the  degree  of  which  differed  from  country 
to  country  - and  thus  they  had  the  opportunity to ease  their monetary 
policies.  However,  EMS  countries  have  coupled  their  interest  rates 
with  that  of  W.  Germany  which,  by  applying  a  more  'autonomous' 
monetary  policy,  determined  to extend their monetary  policies  and  for 
reasons  which  have  already  been  mentioned,  a  part  of  the  external 
position of  their  currencies vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar. 
- 73  -Also,  EMS  members  intervened  heavily  in  the  foreign  exchange  market  by 
purchasing  their  currencies  against  the  US  dollar.  According  to  Table 
15,  from  the  second  half  of  1980  until  the  end  of  the  first  half of 
1984,  the  EMS  central  banks  had  intervened  by  selling 68,2 billion 
dollars  - net  dollar  intervention.  A large portion of this 
intervention  was  undertaken  by  the  Bundesbank.  From  Nove~ber 1979 
until  June  1981  the  Bundesbank's  net  dollar  interventions totalled 
18.700 million  US  dollars,  that  is around  2,3~ of  Ger~any's 1980  GOP. 
According  to  Table  14,  from  October  1980  until  March  1981,  W.  Germany 
intervened  by  selling 2  440  million dollars,  in order to counter 
disorderly markets,  while  the  US  sold  2  463  million  US  dollars.  At 
the  same  time  the  Bundesbank  bought  1  453  million dollars  to 
reconstruct  reserves  etc  while  the  US  sold  4  383  million dollars  to 
repay  market  debts  etc. 
In  May  1981,  the  US  administration officially confirmed  that  apart 
from  exceptional  circumstances  they  no  longer  intended  to  intervene on 
foreign  exchange  markets.  Although  in  the  Versailles  Summit,  in  July 
1982,  American  attitude, as  far  as  the  intervention operations 
concerned,  was  quite different,the Bundesbank  carried out  the  bulk  of 
the  interventions,  sometimes  in  coordination with  other  European 
central  banks  and  Japan. 
The  reasons  for  the  US  authorities'  unwillingeness  to  intervene  in  the 
exchange  markets  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  the  exchange  rate 
produced  by  market  forces  must  constitute the economically desirable 
rate.  Contrary,  in  Europe  and  elsewhere,  the  willingness  to  intervene 
rests on  the  assumption  that  market  participants are  unable  or 
unwilling  to  assess  properly  the  equilibrium value  of  exchange  rates. 
Far  from  these  theoretical  and  also  ideological  differences,  Americans 
objected to  foreign  exchange  interventions  for  the  following  three 
reasons  67 
a)  US  resources  to  finance  interventions  were  regarded  as  limited. 
Federal  Reserve  had  to borrow  through  swap  arrangements  all 
currencies it sold  in  the  exchange  market. 
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banks  and  also  required  repayment  within  3-6 months. 
c)  As  long  as  there  is  no  any  common  policy vis-a-vis  the  US  dollar, 
the different  bank  approaches  to  intervention  may  reflect different 
and  possibly  conflicting objectives.  Thus  the  effectiveness of  the 
intervention  is  undermined. 
From  these  three objectives  the  first  two  concern  the  period  when  the 
dollar  was  weak,  while  the  third emphasizes  the  period of  the dollar 
weakness  and  strength. 
The  ineffectiveness  of  the dollar  intervention  has  also  been 
emphasized  by  Europeans  and  others.  It  has  also been  pointed out  that 
the  efficiency of  intervention will  be  increased,  if the discretionary 
operations  are  replaced  by  a  mechanical  rule,  an  indicator,  which  will 
give  signals,  when  and  to  what  extent  central  banks  should  intervene. 
Thus  central  banks  will  exert  a  stabilizing  influence  in  the  market, 
as  long  as  they  do  not  try to  go  against  fundemental  market  trends, 
and  to  the  extent  that  the  above  indicator  is  consistent  to  an 
exchange  rate  'norm'. 
A part  from  the  'automaticity'  as  an  organ1z1ng  principle on  the 
d  ll  .  .  t h  h  h  E  C  .  ·  6S  o  ar  1ntervent1ons,  o  ers,  sue  as  t  e  uropean  omm1ss1on 
proposed  the  following  action  in  response  to  increasing  demand  for  a 
common  attitude  to  the  US  dollar. 
(a)  Reinforcing  the  regular  consultations  should  be  proposed  to  the  US 
and  Japanese  authorities.  The  various  Community  bodies  (Council, 
Commission  and  specialist  committees)  should  take  part  in  these 
consultations,  which  would  provide  a  regular  forum,  with 
periodicity to  be  decided,  for  an  exchange  of  views  on  financial 
and  monetary  problems  of  common  interest.  The  procedure  should 
also  be  able  to  be  used  when  the  situation on  the  foreign  exchange 
market  appeared  to  be  unrelated to  the  underlying  economic  data  -
i.e.  manifestly  outside  the  limits  that  economic  likelihood would 
- 75  -suggest  - or  when  interest  rate differentials  caused  excessive  and 
undesirable strains on  the  Community's  money  and  financial 
markets. 
(b)  The  Community  monetary  authorities  should  encourage  American  and 
Japanese  monetary  authorities to participate  in  meaningful 
cooperation  on  exchange  and  interest  rates.  The  US  authorities  in 
particular should  be  invited to  abandon  their  laisser-aller 
exchange  rate and  interest  rate  policy.  Also,  discussions  with 
the  US  authorities  should  be  started with  a  view  to  replacing  the 
existing network  of  swaps  between  certain  Community  central  banks 
and  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  New  York  by  a  single  credit  line 
between  the  latter and  the  EMCF.  This  would  provide  tangible 
evidence  of  European  determination  to  avoid  appearing disunited 
from  the  United  States  point  of  view. 
(c)  The  coordination  of  Community  central  banks'  interventions  in 
third  currencies  should  be  improved.  The  central  banks  should 
make  regular  and  frequent  common  assessments  of  the  ECU's  exchange 
relationships,  paying  attention to  the  average  level  of  interest 
rates desirable  in  the  Community.  Their  intervention policy 
should  be  based  on  this assessment. 
Cd)  With  the  same  objective  in  view,  it is  important  to organize  the 
use  of  Community  currencies  in  intra-marginal  interventions.  At 
present,  a  central  bank's  use  of  a  Community  currency  for 
intervention  inside  the  margins  is  subject  to  the  good  will  of  the 
central  bank  whose  currency  is  requested.  Interventions  are 
instead made  in dollars  and  this often  has  the effect  of 
emphasizing  an  undesirable  movement  of  the  US  currency or  of 
undermining  the  coherence  of  the participating central  banks' 
attitudes  towards  that  currency.  Alternatively,  if no 
intervention  is  made  inside  the  margins,  the  currency under  threat 
slides until  it  reaches  its bilateral margin,  at  which  point  the 
intervention amounts  may  be  far  greater  than  those  that  would 
earlier have  been  necessary  to  reverse  the  trend. 
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have  improved  as  central  banks  are  in  touch  round  the  clock  with 
exchange  information.  Concerted  action  has  taken  place  on  specific 
occasions  as  part  of  the  day-to-day  management  of  exchange  markets, 
and  more  recently  thorough  discussions  have  been  held  in  the 
appropriate  committees  on  common  approaches  in  response  to actual  or 
foreseeable  disturbing  international  developments  in  interest  rates 
69  and  exchange  rates  • 
Specifically the  Bundesbank  consults  the  other  EMS  members  about 
actual  developments  in  DM/US  dollar  exchange  rates,  and  nominal 
interest  rates.  The  result  of  this  continuous  consultation  and 
negotiation  among  the  Bundesbank  and  the  other  central  banks  of  the 
EMS  members  make  the  policies  in  the  region  more  predictable,  and  thus 
alternative policies  which  can  lead  to  a  misallocation of  resources 
are  avoided.  This  promotes  the  economic  efficiency of  the  system,  but 
it  can  also  increase  its consistency,  that  is  the  minimising  of  policy 
conflicts  among  the  members  if the  outcome  of  these  negotations  and 
consultations  lead  to  a  better understanding  among  the participants,  a 
shared  responsibility  and  decision-making  for all, and  finally  towards 
a  better distribution of  the  adjustment  cost  among  the  members  of  the 
Community. 
At  the  time  of  writing,  a  new  development  took  place  in  US  dollar 
exchange  rates,  which  h~s been  considered as  chronically overvalued. 
After  the  earthquake  in  liexico,  the threat  to the  US  banking  system 
from  the  ongoing  debt  of  the  third  world,  due  mainly  to the overvalued 
dollar  and  the  incre~sing disappointment  of  American  farmers  and 
exporters,  due  to  the  continuously  appreciated dollar,  forced 
President  Reagan  to  authorize  Mr.  J.  Baker,  US  Treasure  Secretary  in 
New  York,  on  September  22,  1985,  to try to  improve  the  coordination  of 
economic  policies decision  among  the  five  leading  industrial  countries 
- The  Group  of  Five  -
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to work  towards  lowering  the  value  of the dollar  by  closer 
coordination  of their macroeconomic  policies.  At  the  same  time 
President  Reagan  launched  the  second  plan of  his  two  pronged  strategy 
to  head  off  protectionism. 
On  the  day  following  this  announcement,  foreign  exchange  dealers  sold 
dollars  and  sold  them  quickly.  As  the  foreign  exchange  market  did  not 
wait  for  the  intervention,  the dollar fell  to its  lowest  point,  since 
June  1984. 
However,  the  success  of  this operation depends  on  the  strength of  the 
US  commitment  to  concerted  intervention.  On  the  same  day,  the  White 
House  said it might  be  ready  to  intervene  in  foreign  exchange  markets 
in  cases  other  than  when  those  markets  were  disorderly.  Also,  the 
success  of  those  interventions  is dependant  upon  whether  interventions 
are  followed  by  consistent  policies.  "Interventions  can  be  useful 
only  when  are  supported  by  other policies",  had  been  said during  the 
Williamsburg  meeting. 
However,  no  indication exists of  a  reduction  in the  US  budget  deficit. 
Also,  there  are  some  suspicions  that  massive  intervention by  the  US 
authorities  would  boost  the  US  money  supply  and  could  increase 
inflationary pressures  in  the  economy.  This  concern  is very  much  on 
the  mind  of  Mr.  Paul  Volcker,  the  Fed  Chairman. 
These  two  factors  have  made  foreign  exchange  managers  in other 
countries,  sceptical  of  President  Reagan's  initiative. 
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ORDER  AfJD  TilE  POSITim!  OF  TilE  cmmUrJITY 
A.  Options  for  an  Intcrnntional r:onctary Order 
Before  proceeding  to  some  proposals  of  our  own  for  a  reorganization of  the 
international  monetary  order  that  take  into account  an  increased  role  that 
the  Community  as  such  could  play,  it is useful  to  review  the  main 
proposals  already  put  forward.  These  proposals  fall  into the  follo~ing 
main  categories:  1)  Return  to  fixed  exchange  rates;  2)  Exchange  rate 
formulas;  3)  Adjustable  exchange  rates;  4)  Capital  controls;  5) 
Convergence  of  domestic  macroeconomic  policies;  6)  Establishment  of 
target  zones;  7>  Combinations  of  two  or  more  of  the  above  mentioned. 
1.  Fixed  exchange  rates: 
The  advantages  to be  expected  from  this option are:  a)  There  is 
already a  significant  convergence  of  inflation  rates  that  would 
facilitate  the  maintenance  of  fixed  exchange  rates, at  Least  among  the 
largest  industrialised countries.  The  establishment  of  fixed  rates 
among  them  would  give  considerable  impetus  to  the discipline  necessary 
to  coordinate  policies  among  the  other  countries.  b)  The  Lo£s  of 
policy  autonomy  should  not  weigh  much  since it is  largely  illusory 
also  under  floating.  c)  Even  a  partial, i.e.  infrequently adjustable, 
rate  would  have  a  strong  positive effect  on  domestic  stability and  the 
resumption  of  world  trade  growth. 
On  the  other  hand,  some  important  arguments  can  be  brought  to bear 
aaainst  a  reintroduction  of  fixed  exchange  rates:  a)  The  major 
countries  would  be  unwilling  to  completely  subordinate monetary  policy 
to  the  dictates  of  a  fixed  exchange  rate.  b)  Even  though  there  has 
been  some  convergence  of  inflation,  structural differences  among 
countries  are  large  enough  to preclude  the  emergence  of  a  common  rate 
- 79  -of  inflation,  so  that  realignments  would  be  both  frequent  and 
sizeable.  c)  Real  exchange  rate  adjustments  would  be  needed  to 
reflect  changes  in  comparative  advantage.  d)  Prices  and  wages  are  too 
sticky,  in particular downwards,  to obtain  the  requisite  real  exchange 
rate  movements  without  changes  in  nominal  exchange  rates.  e)  In  a 
system  of  fixed  exchange  rates  the  problem  of  the  nth  currency  that 
will  take  on  the  function  of  numeraire  is much  more  important  than 
under  flexible  exchange  rates.  At  present,  there  seems  to be  an 
absence  of  a  willing  or  readily acceptable  candidate  for  the  central 
currency  in  the  system. 
For  these  reasons  a  return  to a  fixed  exchange  rate  system  like  the 
Bretton  Woods  system  is  not  seriously  contemplated at present. 
2)  Exchange  rate  formulas: 
These  are  trying to  give  an  answer  to the  following  questions:  If 
nominal  exchange  rates  need  to  be  adjusted to reflect  fundamental 
changes,  is  there  any  rule or  formula  that  could  help determine  the 
right  structure  of  rates?  How  useful  are  "presumptive  indicators"  for 
indicating the  need  for  adjustment? 
The  main  advantage  of  establishing  a  set  of  multiple  indicators  is 
that  they  could  help  to detect  problems  at  an  early stage  and  induce  a 
more  timely  and  symmetrical  pattern of  adjustment  than  would  otherwise 
occur.  They  could  trigger discussions  of  policy among  countries that 
make  coordinated  surveillance workable.  Opposition  to  them  is usually 
based  on  the  arguments  that  there  is no  simple  indicator that  will 
consistently transmit  reliable  adjustment  signals,  and  that  even  if 
one  existed,  practical  problems  over  its precise definition, 
measurement  and  monitoring  would  limit  its applicability.  Still, 
criticism against  the  use  of  indicators  seem  to be  mainly  technical  in 
nature,  and  not  a  criticism of  the  principle of  introducing  indicators 
as  such.  Being  technical  in nature,  the  counter-criticism argues  that 
technical  solutions  can  be  found  for  a  technical  problem.  The 
difficulty of  identifying good  indicators  is not  an  argument  against 
their use,  but  rather  an  argument  for  trying  to  develop  better and 
more  reliable sets of  indicators. 
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legacy  that  rules  are better  than  ~d hoc  policy  measures  and 
intervention  because  they  permit  ste~dy development  in  economic 
variables,  the  build up  of  correct  long-term  expectations  uhich  in 
their turn exercise  a  stabilising influence.  Furthermore,  they  are 
seen  as  representing  a  reasonable  middle  ground  between  the  excessive 
rigidity of  fixed  exchange  rates  and  the  excessive variability of 
floating  exchange  rates.  The  main  counter  argument  is that  the 
factors  calling  for  change  or  which  are  symptoms  of  maladjustment  are 
too  varied,  too  unpredictable  and  too  unstable  to  be  contained  ex  ante 
within  any  formula  or  rule.  Another  problem  is that,  unlike 
indicators,  which  are  less  restrictive because  they  do  not  specify 
which  combination  of  adjustment  measures  a  country  should  adopt,  but 
only  indicate  a  necessity  for  adjustment,  rule£  are  more  restrictive 
as  they  imply  a  certain policy  which  must  be  adhered  to.  In  this 
sense  monetary,  and  in great  part  fiscal,  policy  is  no  more 
independent  under  rules  than it would  be  under  fixed  exchange  rates. 
Due  to this,  together  with  the  lack  of  an  international  method  of 
supervising  their application and  imposing  efficient  sanctions  in  case 
of  non-application,  in  some  situations  countries  may  have  a  strong 
incentive  to  cheat,  particularly if they  are  convinced  of  the  strong 
commitment  of  the other  countries  to their application. 
Sachs70  has  pointed  out  that  any  reforms  of  the  international  monetary 
system  introducing  rules  must  take  into account  the  sources  of 
monetary  instability.  Different  types  of  shock  are  not  neutral  on 
their effects  on  different  types  of  rules.  Any  rules  or  new  system 
should  also  help  to  accommodate  the  major  exogenous  (non-policy) 
shocks  that  the  system  is  likely to face,  whether  they  are  of  the 
portfolio  switching  sort  or  of  other types,  like policy mistakes  or 
oil  shocks. 
The  most  articulated proposal  in this  sense  has  been  put  forward  by 
Ronald  McKinnon71  •  McKinnon's  central  position  is that  world  and 
national  inflation does  not  depend  on  national  money  growth,  but  is 
the  sum  of  money  growth  in  some  key  industrialised countries,  mainly 
the  USA,  Germany  and  Japan.  "World  money"  is  the  sum  of transactions 
balances  in  hard  currency  countries.  The  exchange  rate  is a  highly 
- 81  -sensitive  indicator  and  can  be  used  as  such  by  the  central  banks. 
Information  provided  by  the  exchange  rate  can  be  harnessed  to  increase 
the  efficiency of  domestic  monetary  policy. 
To  mitigate  the  cycles  of  worldwide  inflation and  deflation the  proper 
coordination of  monetary  policies  has  two  complementary  aspects: 
1>  In  response  to  continual  and  unpredictable shifts  in  international 
portfolio preferences,  nations  can  adjust  their domestic  money 
supplies  to  stabilise exchange  rates.  In  particular the  US  should 
alter its  long  standing  postwar  tradition of  paying  Little or  no 
attention to  the  foreign  exchanges  in  formulating  its monetary  policy. 
Orienting  national  money  growth  toward  the exchange  rate  can  be  a 
powerful  instrument  for  securing  stability and  a  better balance  of  the 
national  money  supply  with  the direct  and  indirect  demand  for  it. 
Surprise  inflations or deflations  of  a  purely national origin would  be 
dampened. 
2)  Cyclical  fluctuations  in  "world  money"  must  also  be  avoided.  The 
Federal  Reserve  needs  to make  US  monetary  policy more  symmetrical  with 
respect  to other  important  hard  currency  countries  such  as  Germany  and 
Japan.  Instead of  being  synchronised  with  money  growth  in  the  rest  of 
the  world,  US  M1  should  vary  in  an  offsetting  fashion  through  mutual 
agreement.  Growth  in  "world  money"  would  then  be  stabilized. 
The  monetary  authorities  in  the  hard  currency  countries  should  be 
prepared  to  deviate  symmetrically  from  their medium-term 
non-inflationary monetary  target,  in order to  allow  interest  rates, 
rather than  exchange  rates  to  play a  greater  role  in  coping  with 
shifts in  international  portfolio preferences.  Money  growth  in  the 
industrial  world  should  be  concentrated  in  that  bard  currency  country 
whose  currency  is unduly  strong  in  the  foreign  exchanges. 
A target  for  joint  money  growth,  based  on  normal  money  growth  in  each 
of  the  three  countries,  can  be  introduced  before  specifying  some 
method  of  varying  money  supplies  in  each  country  io secure better 
exchange  stability.  Controlling  growth  in  world  money  is necessary  in 
order  to stabilise the  joint price  level.  The  international  rule  is 
of  the  form: 
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with  a  dot  over  a  variable  denoting  percentage  change  on  an  annual 
basis. 
The  simplest  and  Least  structur~L  format  for  any  tripartite monetary 
agreement  then  suggests  itself: 
Each  central  bank  would  deviate  from  normal  ~oney growth  according  to 
whether  its currency  was  strong or  weak  in  the  foreign  exchanges. 
These  deviations  in  national  money  growth  rates  would  be  subject  to 
the  constraint  that  world  money  be  kept  within  its target  range.  If 
one  central  bank  is  substantially above  its normal  money  growth  path, 
at  least  one  other  should  be  symmetrically  below. 
From  McKinnon's  previous  empirical  ~natysis, the  demand  for  world 
money  - the  joint  money  supply  of  the  three  reserve-currency  countries 
- is  more  stable  than  the  demand  for  ~ny one  of  them.  This  remains 
true  in  the  absence  of  exchange  controls  or other  undesirable 
impediments  to  international  capital. 
The  adoption of  his  proposal  necessitates  the  calculation of  rough 
equilibrium  exchange  rates.  Prices  and  costs  in domestic  commodity 
markets  -largely those  in  the diversified  ~anufacturing sector- should 
be  kept  aligned  across  the  three  countries.  Applying  this  principle 
requires  some  purchasing  power  parity calculation:  An  appropriate 
base  year  must  be  selected  as  well  as  price  or  cost  indices  for 
deflating  subsequent  changes  in  no~inal exchange  rates. 
McKinnon  proposes  the  introduction of  monetary  rules  in  two  stages. 
The  first  stage  would  be  in  the  form  of  "soft" target  zones,  zones  the 
three  countries  are  not  immediatly obligated to achieve.  Stage  one 
offers  some  important  advantages: 
a)  New  exchange  parities within  narrow  margines  are  not  required.  The 
three  central  banks  need  only  respond  to  gross  exchange  rate 
misalignments. 
- 83  -b)  How  each  national  money  supply  is altered  from  its norm  is 
unspecified.  Domestic  open  market  operations  or unsterilized 
intervention  in  the  foreign  exchanges  could  be  used. 
c)  How  Germany  and  Japan  might  best  manage  their dollar exchange 
reserves  -with  possible  implications  for  each  monetary  base- is 
left open. 
d)  Preexisting  monetary  agreements  or  exchange  rate pacts,  such  as 
Germany's  membership  in  the  European  Monetary  System,  are  not 
contravened. 
The  second  stage entails a  more  complete  financial  unification  among 
the  reserve  currency  countries.  Instead of  adjusting purchasing  power 
parities  continuously,  nominal  exchange  rates  would  be  fixed  within 
narrow  hard  margins.  Official  intervention  in  the  foreign  exchanges 
would  be  designed  to eliminate  short-run exchange  and  interest  rate 
volatility for  any  one  country,  to  equalize  interest  rates  across 
countries  and  to  fully  stabilise a  broad  index  of  international 
tradeable  goods  prices.  The  following  rules  would  have  to  be  observed 
under  the  second  stage: 
a)  Recognizing  the  existing  exchange  intervention practices  under  the 
dollar  standard,  the  Bundesbank  and  Bank  of  Japan  would  have  the 
primary  responsibility for  direct  intervention,  whereas  the  Federal 
Reserve  system  would  stay passive on  a  day-to-day or week-to-week 
basis. 
b)  Neither  German  nor  Japanese  interventions would  be  sterilized  in 
their domestic  monetary  consequences. 
c)  Symmetrically,  when  official  intervention occurs,  the  Fed  would 
allow  its monetary  base  to change  in the  opposite direction to that 
of  the  other  two  countries.  To  ensure  th~t this  American  response 
was  automatic,  the  Bundesbank  and  Bank  of  Japan  would  hold  their 
working  exchange  reserves  directly on  deposit  with  the  Federal 
Reserve  Dank  of  New  York  (at  a  market  rate of  interest). 
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into  a  dooestic  nnd  a  foreign  component.  The  domestic  component  would 
grow  according  to  a  prespecified  rule  so  as  to  achieve  the  Long-term 
money  growth  targets,  i.e.  5.5  percent  in  Germany  and  United  States, 
and  8  percent  in  Japan.  Open-market  operations  in  domestic  currency 
bonds  would  be  the  principal  instrument  for  achieving  this  steady 
growth  in  the  domestic  component  of  the  base.  In  contrast,  the 
foreign  component  of  each  country's  monetary  base  would  vary  with  the 
ebb  and  flow  of  the  international  demand  for  each  currency--as 
accommodated  by  official  intervention to stabilize the  two  exchange 
rates. 
In  order  to  apply  the  second  stage,  some  additional  major  conceptual 
problems  must  be  taken  into  account: 
First,  some  broad  mutual  constraint  should  be  negotiated on  the  use  of 
fiscal  policy:  preferably a  balanced  budget  rule  for  each  country over 
some  four- or  six-year  moving  average.  Because  fixed  exchange  rates 
estab~ish a  degree  of  monetary  unity,  central  banks  in  any  one  country 
should  not  be  put  in  the  position of  financing  fiscal  deficits 
elsewhere.  One  government  should  not  be  able  to drain  savings  from 
the  system  on  a  massive  scale  and  generally  increase  interest  rates, 
as  American  fiscal  policy  was  doing  in  1983-84.  Because  the  monetary 
pact  is meant  to  include  only  "hard"  currency  countries,  fiscal 
restraint  is necessary  to discourage  any  one  of  them  from  using  the 
inflation  tax  in  the  future,  which,  of  course,  is  inconsistent  with 
the  very  idea  of  fixed  exchange  rates. 
Secondly,  provision  must  be  made  to tailor "world"  money  growth  to 
secure  full  stability in  the  prices  of  tradeable  goods.  Much 
statistical work  would  have  to  be  done  in  constructing  mutually 
agreeable  prices  indices  for  tradeable  goods,  the  stability of  which 
is  the  ultimate  target  of  the  monetary  triumvirate. 
Although  McKinnon's  proposal  is theoretically attractive it cannot 
avoid  some  serious  criticism. 
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monetarism,  according  to which  inflation is a  purely monetary 
phenomenon  and  so  "world"  inflation depends  on  the  developments  of  the 
money  base  of  some  key  countries.  Although  it cannot  be  denied  that 
inflation depends  on  the development  of  monetary  aggregates,  it is  not 
unanimously  accepted that  it depends  on  them  only.  Inflation is not  a 
purely monetary  phenomenon,  but  depends  also on  structural 
characteristics,  like  rigidities  in  the  labour  and  capital  market.  If 
this is so,  monetary  rules  would  be  not  sufficient  to  keep  "world" 
inflation  in  check  and  so  establish  stable exchange  rates. 
Secondly,  convergence  of  monetary  and  fiscal  policy as  proposed  by 
McKinnon  is  certainly a  necessary  condition  for  establishing stable 
exchange  rates.  But  is it a  sufficient  condition,  or  to  put  the 
question differently,  what  degree  of  convergence  must  be  achieved  in 
order  for  it to  result  in  stable exchange  rates?  Would  it not  be 
possible to  achieve  stable exchange  rates  without  having  first  to wait 
for  a  very  high  degree  of  convergence  which  might  take  a  long  time 
before  it is  realised?  Could  not  more  stable exchange  rates  achieved 
not  through  monetary  rules  but  through  some  kind  of  managment  help to 
bring  about  a  greater degree  of  convergence? 
Thirdly,  is  such  a  clear distinction  between  the domestic  and  the 
foreign  component  of  the  monetary  base  possible,  as  McKinnon 
postulates,  so  that  the  one  varies  in  accordance  to domestic  and  the 
other  to  international  demand?  It  seems  doubtful  that  the  foreign 
component  of  the  monetary  base  could  vary without  affecting the 
domestic  component  and  in this  case  hinder  domestic  economic  policy. 
If the  dichotonomy  in  a  domestic  and  foreign  component  is blurred, 
then  McKinnon's  proposal  becomes  very difficult or  impossible  to apply 
in  practice. 
Fourthly,  from  a  political  point  of  view,  his  proposal  seems 
impossible  to  realise  in  the  near  future,  since  it puts,  at  least  in 
the  second  stage,  a  major  constraint  upon  the  use  of  fiscal  policy, 
requiring  some  broad  mutual  constraint  in its use.  If fixed or 
managed  exchange  rates  imply  a  loss  of  national  autonomy  in  the  field 
of  monetary  policy,  McKinnon's  proposal  implies  a  major  loss of 
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economic  policy  aims  could  thus  be  realised only  through  the 
attainment  of  "international''  nolicy  aims.  Despite  the  fact  that  this 
would  in  the  end  be  iln  advantage  for  the  national  economies,  national 
governments  arc  certainly not  for  the  the  time  being  willing to  face 
such  a  drastic  curtailment  of  their  autonomy,  or to  accept  important 
reductions  in  public  deficits  in  order  to  comply  with  the  monetary 
rules.  The  US  government  would  certainly be  the  first  to  refuse. 
Sachs72  criticises the  McKinnon  proposal  on  the  gound  that  in  each 
case  the  global  money  shifts were  less  inadvertent  than  Me  Kinnon 
portrays.  He  cites  two  cases  (1971-2  and  1977-8)  when  monetary  policy 
in  the  US  was  expansionary  by  design  and  the  tight  monetary  policy of 
the  Volker  era  which  was  part  of  an  explicit anit-inflation program. 
In  these  cases,  the  exchange  rate of  the dollar  changed  not  due  to  an 
autonomous  portfolio adjustment  (the  ~1cKinnon explanation)  but  because 
of  the  public's  accurate  perception  that  US  monetary  policy  had 
substantially  changed.  In  all  of  these  cases  the  FED  designed  a 
strong  movement  in  the  direction that  occured,  although  the  global 
ramifications  of  those  changes  were  underestimated. 
Thyghsen  (1984)  expresses  his  general  sympathy  to  McKinnon's  proposal 
which  gives  to  monetary  policy  an  international orientation,  through  a 
policy  rule  related  to  the  exchange  rate.  However,  he  mentions  that 
an  application of  McKinnon's  proposal  is  not  easy  under  the  present 
situation.  Severe  misalignments  in  the  exchange  rates  around 
sustainable  Levels  and  the  lack  of  understanding  in  the  United  States 
do  not  allow  a  constructive  dialogue  on  monetary  coordination a  La 
McKinnon. 
He  proposed,  that  in  a  world  with  excessive  misalignments  between  the 
dollar  the  European  currencies  and  the  yen  and  the  Lack  of  any 
prospect  for  global  arrangements,  the  following  scenario,  may  be  the 
best  alternative. 
''Maybe  a  market  process  could  bring  the  United  States  and  Europe  to  a 
point  where  monetary  coordination  became  feasible.  The  scenario  I 
have  in  mind  is  the  following:  Assume  a  substantial dollar 
- 87  -depreciation  (at  approximately  parallel  growth  rates  on  the  two  sides 
of  the  Atlantic),  but  no  so  far  as  to  fully  remove  the  present 
overvaluation of  the dollar  in  terms  of  the  European  currencies.  At 
some  point  the  US  interest  in  avoiding  additional  inflation through 
allowing  the  dollar  to  continue  to  slide will  converge  with  European 
interest  in  avoiding  a  further  loss  in  competitiveness  vis-a-vis the 
United  States  through  continued  real  appreciation  and  create  the  basis 
for  some  common  action to stabilize exchange  rates at  a  level  which  is 
seen  by  both  sides  as  sustainable.  There  is an  asymmetry  between 
upward  and  downward  movements  in  the dollar;  the  former  may  be 
criticized on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic,  but  it  is  hard  to  address  in 
a  coordinated manner,  because  it contains  compensating  features  that 
are  attractive to  both:  inflation  fades  in  the  United  States,  and 
export-Led  growth  picks  up  in  Europe.  The  opposite  scenario of  a 
depreciating dollar  is  more  likely to be  met  with  joint alarm  and  a 
certain willingness  to  cooperate.  That  was  in  evidence  in  1978  when 
the  Carter  Administration  cooperated  with  Europe  in  interventions  and 
some  reorientation of  monetary  policy.  That  occured,  however,  at  a 
very  low  level  for  the dollar.  It  is a  major  task  for  policy makers 
in  both  the  United  States  and  Europe  to  respond  jointly the  next  time 
while  the  main  exchange  rates  are  closer  to  a  longer-run  sustainable 
level,  hence  avoiding  a  new  long  cycle of  initially undervaluation  and 
subsequently  renewed  overvaluation  of  the dollar."73 
Williamson  74  has  also  made  a  proposal  to  introduce  rules,  although  he 
later  favoured  managed  exchange  rates  and  in particular the 
establishment  of  target  zones75  •  He  proposed  the deliberate  and 
formal  coordination  of  monetary  policy through  an  agreed  set  of  rules 
governing  domestic  credit  expansion  (DCE)  rather  than  through  control 
of  the  stock  of  reserves,  because  world  money  supply  rises  only  as  a 
result  of  domestic  credit  expansion  in  another  country.  Thus,  a 
uniform  and  consistent  ruling  DCE  would  permit  international  control 
of  world  monetary  growth.  The  following  advantaaes  would  accrue: 
a)  Given  the  large  margin  for  shippage  in  the  reserves  to money  supply 
ratio,  control  could  in  fact  be  far  more  effective if sought  directly 
by  targeting  DCE;  b)  This  approach  would  not  require  the prior 
establishment  of  effective  control  over  international  reseves,  which 
- 88  -seems  to  be  a  lost  cause;  c)  A combination  of  DCE  limits  and 
effectively unlimited  reserves  for  countries  respecting  those  limits 
would  offer  the possibility of  making  the  system  invulnerable  to 
confidence  crises,  thus  removing  the great  doubt  about  the  feasibility 
of  pegged  rate  systems  in  an  era  of  high  capital  mobility. 
The  similarity of  Williamson's  and  McKinnon's  proposals  are  obvious. 
The  same  criticism put  forward  against  McKinnon's  proposal  is  valid 
also  for  Williamson. 
3)  Restrictions  of  capital  flows: 
Such  proposals  were  discussed  in  the  Community  during  1981-84  and  have 
found  some  official  support,  as  for  example  by  the  then  French 
Minister,  Jacques  Delors.  Due  to  the  continuing  recession  it was  felt 
that  the  EEC  countries  should  try to  cut  European  interest  rates  from 
the  increasing  US  interest  rates  in order  to  promote  recovery.  In 
this  case  exchange  rate depreciation  and  inflation would  follow.  In 
order  to  prevent  this,  exchange  rate  controls  should  be  imposed  to 
hinder  capital  outflows  from  the  Community  while  allowing  the 
intra-Community  capital  flows  to  continue. 
Serious  criticisms  can  be  levied against  this  measure. 
a)  The  first  problem  concerns  efficiency and  effectiveness.  Exchange 
rate  controls  cannot  be  imposed  on  non-residents,  yet  non-resident 
capital  is  considered  more  mobile  and  interest-sensitive than 
domestic  capital.  So,  in  this  case,  capital  outflows  would  take 
place  exercising  pressures  on  EEC  currencies  despite  the  existence 
of  exchange  controls.  The  question  then  arises of  the  size of  the 
non-residents  holdings  of  EEC  denominated  assets  relative  to  those 
of  residents.  If  these  are  not  so  large,  then  the  imposition of 
exchange  controls  might  work.  Even  so,  other  serious  disadvantages 
would  remain. 
- 89  -b)  Exchange  controls  tend  to disturb efficiency, particularly if they 
are  maintained  for  long.  There  is  in  fact  no  strong  presumption 
that  the  costs  in  terms  of  resource misallocation  from  impending 
the  international  flows  of  capital  would  be  less  serious  than  those 
arising  from  restrictions  in  the  flows  of  commodities. 
c)  A constant  danger  of  escalation  and  retaliatiopn with  damaging 
spillovers  for  other  international  transactions  would  exist  unless 
uniform  restrictions or  taxes  could  be  negotiated  and  accepted  by 
all parties,  a  totally unlikely possibility for  the  time  being. 
d)  There  is  no  reliable method  of  separating  in  advance  productive 
from  non-productive  capital  flows,  so  as  to  allow  the productive 
ones  and  restrict  purely  speculative  capital  flows. 
e)  Any  tax  on  capital  flows  would  make  it more  difficult  for  a  country 
to  finance  a  current  account  imbalance  because  it would  have  to 
raise  interest  rates  enough  not  only  to  create a  favorable  interest 
rate differential,  but  also to offset  the  cost  of  the tax. 
f)  Experience  with  controls  during  the  early 70s  shows  that  even  tough 
control  programs  often  failed  to  stem  private  capital  flows.  The 
subsequent  development  of  offshore  banking  markets  makes  their 
efficacy today  appear  even  less  likely. 
The  strong  support  of  these  counter-arguments  by  countries  like 
Germany,  the  UK,  the  Netherlands  and  Luxemburg  did  not  allow  an 
introduction  of  common  policy of  exchange  controls,  and  made  countries 
like  France  and  Italy which  were  favorable  to  the  introduction of  such 
measures  decide  against  the unilateral  imposition of  controls  to 
restrict  capital  outflows  from  their own  currencies  to the dollar.  It 
was  appreciated that  unilateral  controls  would  be  hampered  because 
they  could  have  been  circumvented partly through  the  intra-Community 
capital  mobility  for  the  kinds  of  capital  for  w~ich the  free 
circulation of  capital  applies  and  partly through  illegal means. 
- 90  -4)  Stable  domestic  macroeconomic  policies 
According  to  this  view,  greater stability of  exchange  r~tes should  not 
be  sought  in  any  form  of  managed  exchange  rates  but  primarily  in  a 
system  of  floating  rates  with  more  stable domestic  macroeconomic 
policies  and  in better coordination of  these  across  countries. 
Floating  exchange  rates  would  show  less variability if  medium  -and 
long-run private  sector expectations  about  exchange  rates  were  firmer. 
The  case  for  stressing  the  implementation of stable,  credible,  and 
balanced policies is simply that,  quite  apart  from  their favourable 
impact  on  domestic  economic  objectives,  these  policies are  the  single 
most  important  element  in  stabilising expectations  about  exchange 
rates.  Economic  agents  will  have  little basis  upon  which  to  for~ a 
view  of  the  future  exchange  rates  if they  cannot  estimate the 
medium-term  outlook  of  basic  economic  policy  and  if they  Lose 
confidence  that  the  main  economic  objectives  can  be  reconciled  across 
countries  without  either dramatic  shifts  in  policy  mixes  and/or  in 
exchange  rates.  In  such  circumstances,  speculative  "bubbles"  and 
''bandwagon"  effects  become  more  prevalent  because  there  are  no  natural 
bounds  for  the  expectations  of  speculators.  On  the  other  hand,  where 
countries  have  a  history  of  stable  policy behaviour,  thus  allowing 
credible  forecasts  of  policy  intentions,  neither minor  shocks  nor 
short-term deviations  of  policies  from  targets  are  likely to be 
translated  into  Large  exchange  rate  movements,  because  Longer  term 
expectations  about  them  will  not  be  greatly affected. 
Better  conduct  is  widely  recognised  as  improving  the  functioning  of 
any  exchange  rate  regime  so  that  there  is no  case  against  better 
macroeconomic  policies.  The  case  for  better  coordination  and 
convergence  of  macroeconomic  policy both  within  the  Community  and 
externally  towards  the  dollar  is  supported  very  strongly  in  Germany 
both  in  academic  and  official  cycles  in  particular  by  the  Bundesbank 
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According  to  this  policy option  the  exchange  rate  is a  result  of 
coordination  and  convergence,  not  a  policy objective.  Although  few 
would  deny  the  need  for  better  coordination,  and  increased 
77  convergence  and  the  advantages  accruing  from  it, there  are  doubts 
- 91  -about  its practical  feasibility  in  the  form  suggested.  In  order  to 
bring  about  coordination  and  convergence  a  consensus  on  policy 
objectives  and  priorities as  well  as  of  means  and  economic  policy 
measures  is  necessary.  Furthermore,  appropriate  indicators  to  measure 
convergence  must  be  agreed  upon.  Differences  among  countries 
concerning  the  order  of  objectives  coupled  uith different  economic 
structures  make  the  coordination of  economic  policies  in this  form 
difficult.  The  political  consensus  for  this option does  not  seem  to 
be  forthcoming.  This  is  what  makes  a  strong  case  for  some  sort  of 
managed  exchange  rates.  Exchange  rates  arc  an  appropri~te indicator 
and  at  the  same  time  a  policy aim  to  be  followed  on  ~hich to orient 
and  measure  the  convergence  of  economic  policies.  Vicucd  thus, 
managed  exchanged  rates  and  coordination  are  no  longer  mutually 
exclusive,  but  mutually  reinforcing  and  complementary. 
5)  Adjustable  exchange  rates  with  narrow  margins: 
This  option  has  similarities to  the  fixed  exchange  rates  but 
introduces  some  measure  of  flexibility  through  its margins. 
Critics of  fixed  exchange  rates  argue that  adjustable  exchange  rates 
would  also not  be  sufficient  to  withstand  the  pressures  that  destroyed 
the  Bretton  Woods  System.  Large  and  suddenly  changing  interest  rate 
differentials  would  still arise because  of  the  failure  to  harmonize 
monetary  and  fiscal  policies  across  countries.  Rumours  of  imminent 
parity  changes  due  to  a  whole  host  of  circumstances  would  still 
circulate.  The  resources  of  central  banks  could still prove  to  be 
inadequate  to  cope  with  the  larger  resources  of  private  speculators. 
Because  liberalization measures  and  technological  advances  have 
combined  to  render  capital  much  more  mobile  than  during  the  50s  and 
60s,  if  such  an  option  could  work  at all, it  uo~ld need  both  wider 
margins  and  some  mechanism  to ensure  prompt  adjustment  of  exchange 
rates. 
Defenders  of  this  policy  scheme  maintain  that  the  intractability of 
the  above  problems  is exaggerated  and  that  such  a  system  is  feasible 
given  sufficient political  commitment,  generous  supporting  mechanisms 
- 92  -for  riding  out  balance  of  payments  difficulties,  active  exchange 
market  intervention,  a  presumptive  <or  a  system  of)  indicator  for 
adjustment  and  the  acceptance  for  occasional,  and  sometimes  even 
Large,  realignments  of  the  central  rates  whenever  needed.  It  is clear 
that  this  scheme  has  strong affinity with  the  actual  mechanisms  of  the 
European  Monetary  System. 
6)  Establishment  of  target  zones  for  exchange  rates: 
Criticism against  this option  rests on  the  following: 
a)  Given  stable macroeconomic  policies,  there  is  no  need  for  an 
additional  anchor  for  exchange  rate expectations;  b)  The  best  guide 
for  domestic  monetary  policy  is price stability while  the  exchange 
rate  can  often  give  false  signals;  c)  Negotiation  of  forecast  rates 
or  zones  and  the  necessary  changes  in  them  would  be  subject  to 
centralised management  delays  that  were  a  ch~racteristic of  the 
Bretton  Woods  system;  d)  Target  zones  would  only  have  credibility if 
they  were  backed  by  broad  coordination  of  macroeconomic  policy.  If 
such  coordination  could  be  achieved,  no  change  from  the present  system 
of  flexible  exchange  rates  would  be  necessary. 
Proponents  of  target  zones  support  this  scheme  on  the  following 
grounds: 
1.  In  their  absence  it is  too difficult for  market  participants to 
have  correct  expectations  about  future  exchange  rates.  Even  where 
policies  are  stable there  are  just  too  many  factors  affecting  an 
exchange  rate  to  make  a  firm  forecast  about  its value  over  a  period of 
six  months  to one  year  ahead. 
2.  Even  when  stable  economic  policies do  exist,  there  is  a  need  for 
exchange  rate  mana~ement because  stable  economic  policies  need  not 
always  be  convergent  so  that  they  might  be  misinterpreted  by  the 
market  participants  giving  rise to  incorrect  speculative  capital  flows 
and  causing  long-term  misalignments.  Misalignments  can  be  caused  by 
misguided  intervention,  market  inefficiency and  macroeconomic  policy. 
To  the  extent  that  market  inefficiency is the  source  of  the  problem, 
- 93  -exchange  rate  management  need  not  involve  any  systematic  sacrifice of 
internal  policy objectives,  but  it will  require  a  willingness  to 
direct  policy  toward  exchange  rate  managenent  rather  than  let  the 
exchange  rate  be  the  residual.  In  situations  where  macroeconomic 
policy  is the  cause  of  misalignment,  governments  may  face  a  real 
choice  between  the  monetary  policies  appropriate  for  internal  versus 
external  objectives.  If the  option  of  target  zones  is  taken,  a 
sufficiently comprehensive  set  of  policy  instruments  is  needed  to 
ensure  that  the  main  internal  objectives  can  still be  attained.  The 
control  of  inflation  remains  the  most  important  among  then.  But  the 
attempt  to  achieve  domestic  and  external  objectives  at  the  same  time 
will  create  pressures  for  a  balanced  policy mix,  which  is  likely  to  be 
beneficial  both  to  a  country's  partners  and  in  the  long-run,  to 
itself. 
3.  Price stability certainly  remains  an  important  objective,  but 
exchange  rate variability can  influence  it negatively,  so  that  greater 
exchange  rate  stability achieved  through  target  zones  reinforces 
internal  stability.  Control  of  inflation and  exchange  rate stability 
are  not  exclusive  but  complementary  objectives. 
4.  The  authorities  would  be  under  sonc  pressure either to  keep  actual 
rates  within  the  target  zone  or  to  explain departures  from  it, so  that 
the  sneed  of  external  adjustment  would  b~ increased.  Without  target 
zones,  authorities  have  insufficient  incentives  for  adjustment,  since 
they  can  always  equate  the  ''right"  rate  with  the  market  rate. 
Moreover,  the  combination  of  target  zones  with  indicators  for 
presumptive  action  on  the  part  of  the authorities  increases  the  speed 
of  adjustment.  These  indicators  could  function  as  warning  signals of 
the  necessity  for  adjustment  or  intervention. 
5.  Target  zones  do  need  some  coordination of  cc~nomic policies to be 
successful,  but  at  the  same  time  they are  an  instrument  to facilitate 
such  coordination  which  might  not  otherwise  be  forthcoming. 
~Jilliamson
78 has  put  forward  a  specific  proposal  for  the  introduction 
of  target  zones  whose  main  elements  are  the  following79: 
- 94  -(1)  Soft  margins,  rather  than  a  commitment  to  prevent  the  rate  from 
straying outside  the  target  zone. 
(2)  A zone  perhaps  20  percent  wide,  outside of  which  rates  would  be 
considered  "clearly wrong". 
(3)  A crawling  zone,  with  the  crawl  reflecting  both differential 
inflation and  any  need  for  balance of  payments  adjustment. 
(4)  Publication of  the  target  zone. 
(5)  The  partial direction of  monetary  policy  (perhaps  in  the  for~ of 
intervention that  is  not  fully  sterilized)  to  discourage  the 
exchange  rate  from  straying outside its target  zone. 
B.  Specific proposals for  the  Co~ounity 
The  need  for  a  common  policy of  the  Community  has  been  perceived  by  the 
EMS  creators,  and  it  is the  main  reason  why  the  EMS  agreement  provided  for 
"co-ordination of  exchange  rate  policies vis-a-vis third  countries  and,  as 
far  as  possible,  a  concertation with  the  money  authorities of  these 
countries
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•  This  need  is still considered  to  be  essential  both  in 
official  cycles  -Like  the  European  Parliament80  and  the  Commission- and 
academic  ones.  Still, no  such  policy  has  yet  been  introduced,  due  to  the 
inability of  the  Council  of  Ministers  to  agree  on  specific measures  to be 
adopted  and  to  the  absence  of  a  European  Monetary  Authority  responsible 
for  the  Community's  monetary  policy. 
Among  others,  the  following  proposals  have  been  put  forward  concerning  the 
Community's  relations  with  the  USA  and  ways  to  influence  the  international 
monetary  order. 
Van  Ypersele81  has  suggested  as  a  feasible  step toward  a  better 
coordination  of  policies  with  regard  to  the dollar,  the  replacement  of 
- 95  -part  or all of  the existing bilateral  swap-agreements  by  a  FECOM  Federal 
Reserve  swap  credit  line.  This  credit  line  could  be  used  in  such  a  way  as 
to  stabilize the  exchange  market  within  the  EMS  instead of  creating 
tensions,  to  the  extent  that  the  currency  used  by  the  FED  for  reimbursing 
the  rECOM  need  not  be  the  same  as  that  borrowed  for  intcrvention82• 
Furthermore,  he  suggests  a  more  active  dollar policy  involving  a  co~mon 
view  of  the  FED  and  the  FECOM  on  a  target  zone  for  the dollar.  US  and  EC 
authorities  would  then  have  to  take  whatever  measures  necessary  for 
staying  within  this target  zone.  This  zone  could  be  modified at  regular 
intervals  and  would  in  no  way  imply  the  automatic  defense  of  a  fixed 
dollar  exchange  rate. 
Baer83  has  suggested  that  the  country  with  the  Lowest  inflation  rate 
should  be  assigned  the  ''nth  currency  status".  This  country  should  be 
allowed  to  follo11  an  independent  monetary  policy  geared  towards  its price 
objective.  All  other  EMS  countries  would  then  have  just  to  adhere  to an 
exchange  rate  target,  as  given  for  example  by  the  EMS  central  rates  (their 
bilateral  parity vis-5-vis  the  nth  currency)  which  would  serve  as  a 
guiding  principle  for  the  short  term  orientation of  their monetary 
policies  and  for  exchange  market  interventions. 
The  nth  currency,  due  to  its  relatively more  favourable  price  performance, 
would  normally  be  expected  to be  in  a  position of  strength vis-5-vis its 
EMS  partner  currencies.  If  intervention  margins  are  reached  in  such  a 
situation,  the  division  of  labour  in  defending  bilateral parities would 
imply  "sterilised" interventions84  on  the  part  of  the  nth  currency,  while 
in  other  countries,  should "sterilised"  interventions  prove  inadequate  to 
ease  exchange  rate pressures,  the  contractionary effect  of  non-sterilised 
interventions  on  the  monetary  base  should  be  allowed  to  take  effect.  If 
these  measures,  possibly  reinforced  by  an  additional  tightening of 
monctnry  policies,  are  insufficient or are  considered  to  be  unacceptable 
to  countries  with  weak  currencies,  a  realignment  of  EMS  parities will  be 
unavoidable.  Conversely,  if the  nth  currency  is  in  a  weak  position 
vis-A-vis  its  EMS  partners,  greater  monetary  restraint  mny  have  to  be 
exercised  in  this  country until  intra-EMS  exchange  trends  again  tend  to 
follow  more  closely  the  movements  in  inflation differentials. 
- 96  -Baer  thus  suggests  an  institutionalisation of  the  policy that  has  been 
more  or  less  followed  up  until  now,  with  the  OM  having  the  nth  currency 
status  inside  the  EMS.  This  approach,  although  very  pragmatic,  has  the 
following  disadvantages.  Firstly,  an  institutionalisation of  the  OM's 
hegemony  might  be  resented  by  the  other  EMS  countries,  even  when  a  de 
facto  hegemony  has  proved  to  be  acceptable.  Secondly,  it is a  solution of 
necessity  which  can  certainly be  improved  upon,  because  it docs  not  go  far 
enough  and  does  not  solve  the  strains that  this  hegemony  puts  on  the  EM. 
Reeh85  stresses  the  importance  of  the  Community  showing  responsiveness  to 
the  USA,  discouraging  a  reputation  for  being  easily exploitable and 
teaching  reciprocity  in general.  He  proposes  action  by  the  EEC  that  \/ould 
lead  to  an  expansion  of  the  US  monetary  base,  even  if the  US  authorities 
are  unwilling  to  do  so.  This  monetary  expansion  in  the  USA  would 
presumably  lower  US  interest  rates,  real  interest differentials,  and  also 
impose  downward  pressure  on  the  dollar's  exchange  rate.  This  could  be 
achieved  if  European  Central  Banks  sold their  US  securities on  a  really 
Large  scale  to  the  FED  and  bought  their  own  and  also other  European 
currencies  in  quotas  agreed  upon  in  advance.  The  FED  can,  of  course,  try 
to sterilise almost  any  large  scale  intervention of  European  Central  Banks 
by  immediately  selling these  US  securities to  the  public.  Hence  either 
the  US  interest  rate  will  come  down,  or  the private  sector will  have  to 
finance  the  US  deficit  to  a  Larger  extent.  In  the  Community  the  domestic 
monetary  base  will  be  decreasing,  this  being  an  unintended  development,  or 
the  interest  rates will  have  to  go  up  if the  Central  Banks  use  the 
currency  to  buy  European  securities to  replace  the  previously  held  US 
securities.  In  order  to offset  the  upward  pressure  on  European  interest 
rates  and  the  contractionary effect  of  the  decreasing  European  monetary 
base,  the  European  Central  Banks  should  consider  countervailing actions, 
Like  Lowering  the  discount  rate  or/and  the  reserve  holding  requirements. 
While  this  proposal  could  have  the  required effect  in  the  short  run,  it 
has  the  disadvantage  of  being  antagonistic  to  the  US,  leaving  open  the 
possibility of  retaliation  in  the  future.  It  is  an  ad  hoc,  and  not  a  Long 
term  solution  which  could  bring  about  more  equilibrated and  equitable 
relations  between  the  US  and  the  Community  on  a  durable  basis. 
In  1932  the  EC  Commission86  also  submitted  some  proposals: 
- 97  -(i)  to organize  regular consultation, on  monetary  problems  of  common 
interest,  between  the  Community  bodies  and  the  liS  and  Jnpnncsc 
authorities.  These  consultations  should also  take  place  at  the 
request  of  one  of  the  parties  when  a  situation out  of  Line  with 
underlying  economic  data  developes  on  the  foreign  exchange  market, 
or  when  interest  rate differentials  cause  excessive  and  undesirable 
strains  on  the  Community's  money  and  financial  markets; 
(ii)  to  set  up  meaningful  cooperation on  matters  of  exchange  rates  and 
interest  rates  with  the  United  States  and  Japan,  by  inviting the  US 
authorities  to  rescind their decision not  to  intervene  on  the 
foreign  exchange  market,  and  by  starting discussions  on  how  to 
establish  a  single credit  line bctcccn the  Feclornl  Reserve  Bnnk  end 
the  FECOR; 
(iii)  to  improve  the  coordination of  Coo~unity central  bank~· 
intervention in third currencies; 
<iv>  to organize  the  usc of  Cor-~unity currencies  <with  access  to  the 
very  short-term  financing)  for  intrn-onrginal  intervention, when  a 
currency  crosses  its divergence  threshold or  when  its bilateral 
rate vis-a-vis another  participating currency deviates  by  more  than 
85%  of  the  authorized  margin.  However,  the  central  banks  issuing 
the  currencies  used  for  intervention  would  have  the  right  to 
suspend  the  continued  use  of  their currencies  if this obstructed 
the  conduct  of  their domestic  monetary  policy; 
(v)  to open  the  EMS  to third  countries,  by  authorizing  central  banks  of 
countries  which  seek  to  have  special  ties with  the  European 
Community  to  acquire  ECU,  either from  the  participating central 
banks  or  by  bringing  reserves  to the  FECOM.  ihe  Bremen  European 
Council  had  already  provided  in  1978  that  'non-me~bcr countries 
with  particularly strong  economic  and  financial  ties  with  the 
Community  may  become  associate  members  of  the  system'. 
These  proposals  were  not  adopted  by  the  Council,  and  the  Commission 
therefore  made  more  modest  proposals  in  198487  under  which  a)  The  ECU 
- 98  -should  be  granted  foreign  currency  status  in all  Member  States  and  b) 
central  banks  of  third countries  could  acquire,  hold  and  use  ECU's  within 
the  framework  of  agreements  of  "third holders"  concluded  with  FECOM. 
- 99  -V.  A PROPOSAL  FOR  A LONG-RUN  EC-US  COOPERATIO~ 
Our  proposal  is a  long-run  scheme  for  EC-US  cooperation  in  the  field of 
monetary  relations  that  could  at  the  same  time  lead  to the  development  of  a 
bipolar  international  monetary  order.  Being  a  long-run  proposal,  interim 
solutions,  such  as  those  mentioned  above,  are  not  excluded,  and  some  elements 
of  previous  proposals  are  also  incorporated. 
Such  an  improved  international  monetary  system  would  offer  the  following 
advantages: 
a)  It  would  enhance  predictability by  allowing  the policy  making  authorities 
in  each  country  to  have  a  better understanding  of  the  likely policy 
reactions  in  other  countries.  Predictability would  again  have  a  dampening 
influence  on  speculative  shocks  due  to shifts of  portfolio holdings. 
b)  Through  the  introduction of  a  system  of  objective  indicators,  the  system 
should  be  able  to  establish clear  rules  for  "good  citizenship"  in  monetary 
and  fiscal  management  and  thus  reduce  the possibilities for  "beggar  thy 
neighbour"  behaviour. 
c)  A system  of  relatively equal  countries  (or  group  of  countries)  in  economic 
and  monetary  strength  would  be  more  Liable  to  be  a  system  where  the  rules 
are  observed  than  one  in  which  there  exists one  hegemonic  power.  In  the 
case  of  near  equality,  the  country  (or  the  politicians)  that  breaks  the 
rules  faces  greater costs due  to  the  reactions  of  the other  countries,  than 
in  the  case  of  a  hegemonic  country,  which  can  to  a  greater or  lesser extent 
ignore  the  reactions  of  the  "dependent"  countries. 
We  believe  that  equality  has  a  built-in  incentive  for  good  (or better) 
international  behaviour. 
Under  this aspect,  the  task  of  the  EC  would  be  to  transform the actual 
asymmetric  situation  in  international  economic  relations  to a  more 
symmetric  one.  This  could  be  done  if the  Member  States  promote  the  role  of 
the  ECU  and  go  along  closer monetary  and  fiscal  cooperation.  The  ideal 
- 100  -would  be  reached  at  the  stage  when  the  Community  enters  the  institutional 
phase  of  the  EMS  with  the  introduction of  a  European  Monetary  Authority 
responsible  for  the  Community's  monetary  policy  coordination  and  the 
external  side of  the  EMs88• 
d)  According  to  Sachs89  any  reforms  of  the  international  monetary  system 
should  also  help  to  accommodate  the  major  exogenous  (non-policy)  shocks 
that  the  system  is  likely  to experience.  This  means  that  any  future  system 
should  be  ahle  to  accommodate  uncertainty better than  the  present  one. 
It  is  very difficult  to  conceive  a  system  so  that  it will  be  able  to 
accommodate  future  unknown  exogenous  shocks.  In  this  respect  it seems  that 
a  system  that  has  developed  greater credibility and  predictability during 
the  past  should  also  be  in a  better position  to  accommodate  uncertainty.  A 
system  ~lith  built-in credibility should  be  in  a  better position  to  face 
unforeseen  external  shocks.  A system  of  managed  exchange  rates  as  we 
propose  should  achieve  such  a  credibility.  The  experience  of  the  EMS  seems 
to  reinforce  this  view.  Accommodation  of  the  EMS  Member  States to the 
second oil  shock  of  1979  was  in  general  more  consistent  than  to  the first, 
although  the  EMS  had  existed only  a  few  months  when  the  second oil  shock 
occured. 
Given  the  US  administration's  past  unwillingness  to envisage  cooperative 
solutions  in  the  field of  monetary  policy,  the  following  questions  have  to  be 
ansered: 
1.  How  can  the  Community  transform this  US  reluctance  into  a  more  cooperative 
attitude? 
2.  Would  cooperation  be  advantageous  to  both  the  EC  and  the  USA,  as  well  as 
to third  countries? 
3.  What  form  could  such  cooperation  take? 
1.  The  transformation  of  the attitude of  the  US  towards  cooperation depends 
upon  the  strengthening of  the  Community  in  the  monetary  field.  This  is 
again  tantamount  to  a  strengthening of  the  EMS  and  the  development  of  the 
ECU  into  a  true  Community  parallel  currency90•  Developing  the  oligopoly 
model  of  the  second  part  of  this study,  the  Community,  by  developing  the 
ECU  into  a  true parallel  currency  would  no  longer  be  seen  on  the  world 
- 101  -currency  market  as  a  number  of  separate dependent  oligopolists,  but  as  one 
oligopolist  of  more  or  less  the  same  size as  the  USA91 •  The  ECU  would 
thus  substitue the  currencies  of  the  Member  States,  while  the  Community  as 
such  would  substitute the  Member  States.  We  do  not  intend to develop  here 
the  conditions  under  which  the  ECU  could  assume  this  function,  since this 
has  already  been  done  both  in  academic  research  and  in  the  Commission's 
and  the  European  Parliament's  proposals.  We  will  instead  focus  on  the 
international  currency  market  and  the  ECUs  position  in it. 
International  demand  for  a  currency  depends  on  various  factors: 
a)  The  economic  size  of  the  country,  as  measured  by  the  GNP  and  its share 
of  world  trade; 
b)  The  return  of  assets  denominated  in the  currency,  as  measured  for 
example  by  real  interest  rate differentials; 
c)  The  expected  inflation  rate of  this  currency  which  determines  its 
expected  future  value,  i.e. appreciation or devaluation; 
d)  The  general  "quality"92  of  the  currency,  which  encompasses  other 
influences  that  are difficult  to measure  as  in  general  future 
expectations  about  the  development  of  the  exchange  rate of  the 
currency,  depending  on  past  performance,  risk, variability,  evaluation 
of  political stability, credibility and  predicability,  the  need  for 
portfolio diversification etc. 
The  international  currency  demand  function  can  be  written as: 
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0 The  currencies  being  competitors  and  substitutes on  the  international 
market,  it  follows  that  if the  interest  rate,  the  GNP,  the  world  trade 
share  and  the  quality of  another  currency  increases,  then  the  demand  for 
currency  i  will  decrease,  and  conversely,  if the  inflation expectation  for 
another  currency  increases  then  demand  for  i  will  also  increase,  and  vice 
versa. 
In  the  actual  situation no  Community  country  alone  can  be  co~pared in  GNP 
and  world  trade  with  the  USA.  Real  interest  rates  are  also  higher  in  the 
USA.  Inflation expectations  are  a  little higher  in  the  USA  than  in  the 
most  stable  Community  countries  like  Germany  and  the  Netherlands,  but 
lower  than  in  most  of  the others,  while  the  quality of  the  DM  could  be 
equivalent  to that  of  the dollar,  both  being  higher  than  the  rest  of  the 
Community's  currencies.  Taking  all  elements  together,  the  demand  for  the 
dollar  is  much  higher  than  for  any  of  the  Community's  currencies,  which 
gives  the  USA  its actual  position  as  the  independent  oligopolist. 
If  the  ECU  develops  into  a  true  European  parallel  currency,  then  demand 
for  it would  be  a  function  of  the  Community's  GNP  and  share  of  world  trade 
that  are,  taken  together,  comparable  to  that  of  the  USA.  The  interest 
rate  of  ECU  assets  might  still be  somewhat  lower,  depending  on  US  and  EC 
economic  policy,  but  on  the  other  hand  inflation expectations  for  the  ECU 
could  be  comparable,  or  even  better  than  those  for  the dollar,  depending 
again  on  economic  and  especially monetary  policies  to  be  followed  by  the 
FED  and  the  European  Monetary  Authority.  The  quality of  the  ECU  could 
become  equal  or  even  stronger  than  the dollar,  since  the  ECU  could  offer 
greater predicability,  lower  variability and  so  lower  risk  and  provide 
better  hedging  possibilities.  Confidence  would  be  built  into a  parallel 
ECU.  The  result  would  be  that  the  ECU  money  demand  function  would  be 
analogous  to  that  of  the  dollar.  The  ECU  would  becc~e a  much  closer 
substitute for  the dollar  than  any  actual  currency  is at  present.  But 
this  would  mean  that  the  Community  would  no  longer  appear  as  a  number  of 
small  dependent  oligopolists,  but  as  an  equal  oligopolist  on  the  world 
currency  market.  From  a  US  domination  on  the  world  currency  market,  a 
- 103  -position of  relative equality and  interdependence  of  the  EC  and  the  US 
would  be  achieved.  The  external  constraint  would  be  greater  for  the  USA 
and  Less  for  the  Community  than  at  present. 
In  a  situation of  interdependence  and  relative equality a  cooperative 
solution  is  easier to  achieve  than  in a  situation of  dominance  where  the 
dominant  power  has  a  strong  incentive to  pursue  independent  actions,  which 
may  be  to  the  detriment  of  the  dependent  powers.  Thus  we  see  the 
strengthening of  the  ECU  and  the  EMS  as  a  way  to  bring  about  greater 
cooperation  in  the  EC-USA  monetary  relations.  The  effects of  such  a 
cooperation  must  be  next  examined. 
2.  First,  cooperation  Leading  to  a  system  of  managed  exchange  rates  would 
result  in  a  reduction of  the  costs  arising out  of  the  high  actual 
variability of  the  exchange  rates.  This  would  be  an  important  advantage 
for  all  concerned. 
Second,  cooperation  by  achieving  more  "correct"  exchange  rates,  however 
these  are  measured,  would  increase  the  competitiveness  of  the  US  economy 
and  lower  protectionist  pressures  in  the  USA.  Such  situations  could  be 
more  easily  avoided  in  future  under  a  system  of  cooperation  than  under 
floating. 
Third,  cooperation  helps  the  following  of  more  prudent  domestic  economic 
policies,  but  also  makes  any  necessary  adjustment  easier,  since  the  burden 
of  adjustment  can  be  shared  to  a  certain extent  between  the  cooperating 
countries,  while  under  floating  it must  be  assumed  entirely by  the 
adjusting  country  alone.  Furthermore,  there  is  no  incompatibility  between 
an  exchange  rate  target  that  would  exist  under  managed  exchange  rates  and 
a  domestic  monetary  aggregate target.  The  existence of  incompatibility 
would  be  a  serious  argument  against  managed  exchange  rates  for  countries 
that  put  a  strong emphasis  on  domestic  stability.  While  in  the  short-run 
there  may  be  some  conflict  between  an  exchange  rate objective  and  a 
monetary  or  credit  aggregate  target  rigidly  pursued,  in  the  medium  to 
Long-run  the  two  are  more  Likely  to  be  mutually  supportive,  provided that 
the  domestic  objective  is  selected carefully and  under  consideration of 
the  external  constraint.  Experience  from  the  EMS  countries  support  this, 
- 104  -while  domestic  targets  have  proven  more  difficult  to  attain  in the  USA  and 
the  UK,  despite  the  high  degree  of  flexibility  for  dollar  and  sterling 
93  exchange  rates  • 
Fourth,  cooperation,  by  lowering  misalignment  cost  and  exercising positive 
influence  on  growth  and  employment  would  increase  welfare.  In  an 
interdependent  world,  policy  makers  in  one  country must  condition their 
actions  according  to the  policies  pursued  in  other  countries  if their 
policy making  is  rational.  It  is  clear then,  that  policy  ~aking has  game 
aspects94•  It  is  a  well-known  result  of  such  policy  games  that  in  the 
absence  of  direct  cooperation  or  side-payments  the  outcome  of  such  games 
are  socially inefficient.  There  exist  alternative policies  that  would,  if 
implemented,  benefit  all parties.  The  reason  why  such  outcomes  are  not 
automatically  forthcoming  is that  policy makers  generally  have  an 
incentive  to  cheat  in  these  Pareto  optimal  outcomes,  and  politically 
sovereign  policy makers  seem  to  have  difficulty achieving  them.  But  this 
means  that  if coordination  is achieved,  and  if a  way  to  control  this 
coordination  is  found  so  as  to  avoid  cheating,  then  the  outcome  of 
coordination  is better than  the  outcome  of  non-coordination  in  the  sense 
of  increasing  welfa~e for all parties  concerned95 • 
Fifth,  cooperation  leading  to  the  establishment  of  a  bipolar  currency 
area,  with  the  ECU  developing  into  a  reserve  currency  complementing  the 
dollar  (and  later possibly  to  a  three  polar  one  with  the  inclusion of  the 
yen)  could  bring  about  greater  international  stability.  The  argument  that 
a  world  with  several  currency  areas  is  less  stable  than  a  world  with  one 
currency  area  is  that  both  private parties  and  official  institutions might 
shift  funds  between  the  financial  centres  in  the  two  currency  areas  when 
interest  rate differentials  are  large  relative to the  anticipated  changes 
in  the  exchange  rates.  Thus,  authorities  in  the  dominant  financial  centre 
in  one  of  the  currency  areas  might  feel  constrained  about  follouing  a  more 
contractive or  a  more  expansive  monetary  policy because  of  the  impacts  on 
losing  or  attracting  reserves  from  the  dominant  financial  centre  in  the 
other  currency  area. 
Tl1is  arnuement  is  misplaced  in  the  actual  situation,  where  the  high 
international  mobility  of  capital  poses  this  problem  for  monetary 
authorities.  The  problem  exists  irrespective of  the existence of  a  one 
- 105  -currency  hegemony  as  at  present  or  a  possible  future  bipolar  currency 
area.  The  question  is if under  a  FED-European  Monetary  Authority 
cooperation this  situation  can  be  better  faced  in  the  future  than  actually 
in  a  situation characterised  by  lack  of  cooperation of  the  FED  with  the 
European  Central  Banks,  mainly  the  Bundesbank.  Moreover,  the  historical 
data  do  not  suggest  that  the  development  of  a  bipolar  currency  area  system 
. ll  l  d  d  .  .  b. l .  .  .  ll 96  w1  ea  to  a  re  uct1on  1n  monetary  sta  1  1ty 1nternat1ona  y  • 
3.  We  have  argued  that  the  strengthening  of  the  EMS  and  the  development  of 
the  ECU  into  a  true  parallel  currency  would  enhance  the  ECU's 
attractiveness  to third users  and  holders  so  that  the  ECU  could  develop 
into  a  competing  reserve  currency  to  the dollar.  The  possibility of 
coordination  is  strengthened  and  so  also  the  development  of  a  bipolar 
world  currency  system.  This  again  would  present  advantages  over  the 
present  system  for  all  cocerned. 
We  propose  the  following  form  of  managed  exchange  rates  in  a  bipolar 
currency  system: 
a)  A target  zone  for  the  dollar-ECU  exchange  rate,  consisting of  a  fixed 
central  dollar-ECU  exchange  rate  and  a  margin  of  fluctuations  around 
the  central  rate.  The  analogy  to  theexchange  rate mechanism  of  the  EMS 
is  obvious.  The  first  problem  to  be  solved  here  would  be  to determine 
an  approximately  correct  exchange  rate  (or  in  the  terminology  of 
Williamson,  near  a  fundamental  equilibrium). 
In  the  long  run  this  may  be  easier  than  it appears,  because  at  the  time 
of  the  introduction of  the  system,  the  dollar-ECU  exchange  rate will 
have  reached  a  relatively  correct  exchange  rate,  which  will  have  been 
brought  about  by  the  increased  competition  of  the  ECU  and  more  evenly 
balanced  capital  flows  towards  both  currencies.  But  even  if the first 
setting of  the  central  exchange  rate  proves  not  to  be  correct,  the 
possibility of  realignment  according  to  some  objective criteria would 
remain  open.  Secondly,  the  margin  of  fluctuations  around  the  central 
rate  must  be  decided  upon.  In  the  beginning this margin  should  be 
relatively wide,  perhaps  +10%,  in  order to  safeguard  the flexibility of 
the  system.  Later,  if the  system  proves  to be  working  well,  the  margin 
can  be  reduced  accordingly. 
- 106  -The  choice  of  the  ECU  as  a  counterpart  of  the dollar  1s  obvious  if the 
ECU  develops  into a  center  of  an  ECU  zone  as  examined  above.  This 
implies  that  the  ECU  would  take  the  place of  the  OM  as  the nth  currency 
inside the  EMS  and  that  the  bilateral  exchange  rates  of  the dollar  to 
the  other  EMS  currencies  will  be  determined  through  their bilateral  ECU 
exchange  rates.  In  this  case  the  tensions  which  have  appeared  due  to 
the  fact  that  the  DM  had  the  nth  currency status  inside  the  EMS  would 
be  much  diminished  or  even  disappear. 
b)  Intervention:  The  FED  and  the  European  Monetary  Authority  CEMA)  would 
have  to  intervene  in  order  to  keep  fluctuations  inside  the  margins. 
c)  Swaps:  A swap  agreement  in  the  lines  suggested  by  Ypersele  could 
complement  and  facilitate  the  interventions  of  the  FED  and  the  European 
Monetary  Authority. 
d)  A credit  mechanism  could  be  established to facilitate  adjustment  when 
long  run  disequilibria appear.  This  mechanism  would  facilitate 
adjustments  and  also  promote  the  willingness  to adjust,  but  is not 
fundamental  for  the  implementation  of  the  system. 
e)  A system  of  indicators  would  complement  the  system.  The  indicators 
should  be  separated  in  monetary  and  real  indicators.  Monetary 
indicators would  give  advance  warning  and  the  presumption  to act  (i.e. 
intervene  in  the  exchange  market)  in  situations  of  purely monetary 
disturbances,  like  waves  of  speculation,  disorderly  conditions etc. 
Real  indicators  on  the  other  hand  would  indicate  when  there  are 
disequilibria  in  real  parameters  which  necessitate  realignments  at  the 
central  rates  and  an  adjustment  of  economic  policy. 
In  situations  where  the  monetary  indicators  give  warning  signals but  the 
real  indicators  do  not,  disturbances  are  due  to disorderly  conditions,  and 
intervention by  the  FED  and  the  EMA  would  be  sufficient to  cope  with  them. 
In  situations  where  the  real  indicators  give  warning  signals,  or  both  the 
monetary  and  the  real  do  so,  interventions  would  not  be  sufficient.  A 
realignment  of  the  central  rate  and  an  adjustment  of  economic  policy  would 
- 107 -be  necessary  here,  which  should  be  brought  about  after consultations that 
would  represent  the  advantage  of  some  measure  of  sharing  of  the  burden  of 
adjustment. 
The  viability of  the  system  depends  on  a  number  of  conditions: 
i)  Credibility of  the  target  zone.  The  credibility of  an  exchange  rate 
committment  like  the  above  would  obviously  be  greatly  increased  by 
the  FED's  and  the  EMA's  mutual  obligation to  intervene  and  would  be 
even  more  strengthened if a  credit  mechanism  ~1ere  also established. 
Awareness  among  potential  speculators of  the  fact  that  the  dollar-ECU 
exchange  rate  cannot  easily be  affected  by  short  term  pressures  in 
the  exchange  markets  bolsters the  system  and  would  result  in  a 
reduction  of  purely  speculative  capital  flows.  The  strong 
committment  to  a  certain target  zone  and  to  interventions to 
safeguard  the  target  zone  would  make  actual  intervention  smaller  and 
less  frequent,  since  it is  in  itself a  strong deterrent  to 
speculation. 
ii)  Moral  hazard.  A problem  with  cooperative  solutions  is that  policy 
makers  have  an  incentive  to  cheat  if they  believe  that  the  other 
policy makers  will  not  do  so,  because  in  this  way  they  can  improve 
upon  the  outcome.  If for  example  the  US  and  the  EC  decide  to  pursue 
under  cooperation  a  more  expansive  policy  than  under  non-cooperation 
(such  an  expansive  policy  improving  the  result  for  both  compared  to 
the  con-cooperative  outcome),  the  US  (and  alternatively also  the  EC) 
has  an  incentive  to  cheat  on  the  agreement  and  run  a  less 
expansionary  policy.  This  is  so  because  the  more  expansionary  policy 
of  the  EC  would  increase  US  employment,  making  it optimal  for  the  US 
to  economize  to  some  extent  on  inflation.  If the  US  did  not  cheat 
and  actually  carried out  the  agreed  policy,  the  outcome  would  appear 
too  inflationary to  a  public  that  did  not  fully  understand  the  nature 
of  the  agreement  and  discounted  the possibility of  foreign 
repercussions  in  response  to  a  tighter  US  monetary  policy.  The 
political pressure  to  cheat  could  well  be  extensive. 
- 108  -The  moral  hazard  implied  by  the  cooperative  solution is  compounded  by 
a  certain difficulty  in  defining  and  verifying  the  outcome  of 
cooperative  agreements.  The  various  OECD  countries  in  general  have 
different  definitions  for  monetary  aggregates  and  different 
procedures  for  implementing  monetary  policy.  Doth  could  be  altered 
in  subtle  ways  allowing  policy-makers  to violate  the spirit, without 
violating  the  letter of  their  committments.  Further,  the effect of  a 
monetary  policy  that  is  well  defined  in  ter~s of  implementation 
procedures  and  aggregates  can  always  be  altered by  changing  the 
regulatory  environment  in  financial  markets. 
The  moral  hazard  problem  can  be  countered  by: 
Using  indicators  prepared  and  agreed  upon  in  common,  in  order  to 
measure  economic  policy effects.  Technical  solutions  can 
certainly be  found  for  this.  These  indicators  will  then  be  used 
also  to  control  the  implementation of  economic  policy measures, 
exposing  policy-makers  who  diverge  from  the  agreement.  Given  the 
possibility of  a  control  over  cheating,  the  moral  hazard  problem 
has  a  solution,  since  the  diverging  policy-maker  would  face  the 
threat  of  retaliation which  would  result  in  a  worse  outcome  than 
the  cooperative  one. 
iii)  Effectiveness  of  intervention:  The  viability of  the  target  zone 
depends  on  the  effectiveness  of  intervention,  i.e.  if intcrvetion 
enforces  credibility, expectations  are  not  greatly  influenced  by  very 
short  term  developments,  and  as  a  rule  private  agents  appear  willing 
to  take  the  intervention  prices  signalled  by  the  monetary  authorities 
as  a  benchmark  for  their operations.  The  question  is  whether 
interventions  by  central  banks,  in  this  case  by  the  FED  and  the  EMA, 
can  exert  a  stabilizing  influence  on  the  markets,  ~s  long  as  they  do 
not  try to  go  against  fundamental  market  trends.  Some  doubts  have 
been  expressed  concerning  this, especially  by  members  of  the  US 
administration  who  have  justified the  present  administration's 
unwillingness  to  intervene  because  intervention  has  been  po~Jcrless to 
alter  the  market's  assessment  of  underlying  policies  and  performance, 
and  thus  could  have  no  lasting  impact  on  exchange  rates97• 
- 109  -It  is  clear that  intervention  cannot  alter situations where  the 
exchange  rate  reflects divergences  in  real  variables.  On  the  other 
hand,  intervention  can  smooth  out  disorderly  conditions  due  to 
speculation or other  short  term  distrurbances. 
According  to  the  Jurgensen  report98: 
a)  Sterilised intervention  has  a  much  smaller  impact  on  exchange 
rates  than  does  unsterilised  intervention. 
b)  Sterlised intervention  can  have  some  short  term  impact  on  exchange 
rates  and  may  therefore  be  effective  in  achieving  some  short-term 
exchange  market  objectives.  This  impact  depends  on  the  assumption 
of  imperfect  substitability between  assets  denominated  in 
different  currencies.  Empirial  evidence  supports  this.  Thus, 
sterilised intervention is  an  independent  policy  instrument  if 
securities denominated  in diferent  currencies  arc  not  perfect 
substitutes.  Since  the effect  of  sterilised intervention depends 
on  the  relative  amounts  of  outstanding  government  securities, 
there  is  a  presumption  that  sterilised interventions  would  have  to 
be  carried out  in  large  amounts  if they  were  to  have  a  significant 
.  h  99  1mpact  on  exc  ange  rates  • 
c)  Sterilised  intervention  does  not  appear  to  have  much  long-run 
impact,  and  its effects  are often  swamped  by  those  of  other 
macroeconomic  policies. 
d)  Coordinated  intervention  is  more  effective  than  intervention by  a 
single  country. 
However,  even  if sterilised intervention  is  not  an  independent  policy 
instrument,  it is a  signaling device,  so  that,  by  conveying  otherwise 
unavailable  information  about  the  future  course  of  monetary  policy it 
may  have  an  indirect  effect  on  the  exchange  rate. 
- 110  -Further,  the  central  banks  have  superior  information that  is not 
available  to private  market  participants  since  they  control  money 
supply  and  thus  know  what  their future  monetary  policy,  and  its 
relationship  to  the  behaviour  of  the  exchange  rate will  be. 
Intervention by  the  central  banks  acts  as  an  insurance  for  the  public 
against  the  moral  hazard  that  the  government  ~1ill  not  be  consistent 
in  followinga  policy  previously announced.  Central  banks  can 
purchase  credibility by  official  intervention  in  the  foreign  exchange 
market100• 
Even  on  the  assumption  that  private market  participants  behave 
rationally and  make  appropriate use  of all  information  relev~nt to 
the  determination  of  the  economically  correct  exchange  rate  (uhich 
seems  to  underly  the  US  reluctance  to  an  intervention  cor.~ittment), 
in  situations of  disorderly  conditions  that  result  from  general 
uncertainties  and  misperceptions  of  the  future  course  of  government 
policy,  the  authorities  have  a  unique  and  substantial  advantage  over 
the  private  market  in  possessing  superior  inside  information.  In 
this  case,  in  the  absence  of  intervention  exchange  rates  would  behave 
like an  exogenous  variable  possibly giving  rise  to  large  swings  in 
countries'  external  positions  and  to circles of  inflation. 
The  conclusion  is  that  intervention is  an  instrument  that  can  be  used 
to  counter  short-run disturbances.  This  and  nothing  more  would  be 
the  task  of  interventions  undertaken  by  the  FED  and  the  EMA  in  the 
framework  of  our  proposal. 
v)  Coordination of  economic  policies:  As  we  have  already  pointed out, 
central  rates  could  remain  stable  over  longer  periods  only  in  the 
case  of  parallel  development  of  real  economic  variables.  This  again 
presupposes  coordination  of  economic  policies,  i.r'.  monetary  but  also 
fiscal  policy.  We  have  already discussed  the  advantages  arising  from 
cooperation  through  the  coordination of  economic  policies.  The 
following  questions  are still relevant: 
- 111  -a)  Is  coordination  likely to  be  achieved  under  present  conditions? 
We  think  that  some  degree  of  coordination  is more  likely to be 
achieved  under  present  conditions  than  it ever  was  since  the 
beginning  of  the  80s.  The  reasons  are  manifold:  After  the  G-5 
meeting,  there  is  manifest  increased political willingness  to  go 
some  way  in discussing  and  possibly  implementing  mesures  of 
economic  coordination,  even  if  they  remain  still ad  hoc.  But  the 
commitment  of  the  Us  administrtion to  an  exchange  rate target  can 
indicate  a  higher  preparedness  to discuss  also more  permanent  ~Jays 
of  coordination,  while  this willingness  existed already  on  the 
European  side  and  seems  to  be  forthcoming  also  from  the  Japanese 
side. 
The  prevailing  economic  situation makes  also  the  coordination  of 
economic  policies easier,  because  constraints  are  easing.  Growth 
rates  between  the  US  and  the  EC  are  more  closely  related  in  1986 
than  before, oil prices  are  falling,  inflation pressure  is  low  and 
while  the  US  budget  deficit  is still  increasing,  it might  start 
decreasing  in  the  next  year,  while  budget  deficits  have  been 
drastically  reduced  in  most  EC  Member  States. 
An  agreement  on  managed  exchange  rates  could  thus  make  possible  a 
joint  reduction  of  interest  rates,  as  Dornbusch  has  proposed101 • 
This  would  induce  faster  growth  at  constant  exchange  rates  (i.e. 
without  competitive depreciation)  without  significant  and 
unacceptable  inflation  risk.  The  inflation  risk  is also  low,  due 
to  wages  becoming  less  sticky than  before.  Wage  aspirations  have 
become  more  moderate  both  in  the  US  and  Europe,  not  only  due  to 
the  high  unemployment  but  also  due  to  changes  in  the  industrial 
structure.  Trade  unions  are  the  strongest  in  traditional  sectors 
of  the  industry  (like textiles,  steel,  shipbuilding  and 
automobile)  that  have  moved  increasingly  from  the  old 
industrialised to  the  new  industrial  countries.  Trade  unions  are 
weaker  in  new  industries  that  become  more  important  in  the  old 
industrial  countries.  This  change  in  the  industrial  structure 
means  that  on  the  whole,  trade  union  power  has  fallen102•  In  the 
- 112  -absence  of oil  induced,  wage  push  and  depreciation  induced 
inflationary pressure,  some  degree  of  coordinated  reflation 
appears  possible  to  be  implemented. 
b)  Is  coordination  of  economic  policy more  Likely  in  the  existence of 
managed  exchange  rates? 
The  answer  is positive,  because  commitment  to an  exchange  rate 
target  brings  in  focus  the  attention of  national  policy-makers  to 
the  external  side  of  the  economy.  This  again  makes  coordination 
more  likely.  The  likelihood  of  achieving  some  degree  of 
coordination  increases  the  more  comprehensive  the  agreement  on 
managed  exchange  rates  is, i.e.  the  more  elaborate  the  supporting 
mechanisms  agreed  upon,  Like  those  proposed  here.  The  experience 
of  the  EMS  also  supports  this  conclusion. 
c)  In  the  absence  of  economic  coordination  arc  managed  exchange  rates 
still attainable  and  an  objective  worth  pursuing? 
In  the  absence  of  coordination,  economic  fundamentrals  will 
presumably  diverge  more,  necessitating  more  often  realignments  of 
central  rates.  Even  in  this  case,  managed  exchange  rates offer 
advantages  over  the  present  situation  in  the  degree  that  they 
achieve  a  reduction  of  misalignments.  Thus,  ~1ithout  coordination, 
managed  exchange  rates  are still worth11hile,  although  their 
achievement  would  be  enhanced  with  economic  coordination.  The 
objective of  reducing  misalignments  would  still be  achieved  on 
condition  that  realignments  of  central  rates  would  not  become  so 
often  and  not  in  a  magnitude  that  would  destroy  the  credibility of 
the  system. 
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A proposal  for  a  Tripolar  Exchange  nate  Agreement  a~ong the  EC,  US  and  Japan 
We  propose  an  exchange  rate  agreement  for  the  EC,  US  and  Japan,  according  to 
~Jhich,  exchange  rates  will  be  managed  in  relation  to  reference  rates  (central 
rates)  that  crawl  on  the  basis  of  the  relative  performance  of  countries 
(areas)  in  terms  of  their effective  wholesale  price  indexes  and  persistent 
deviation  of  their  balances  from  specified targets.  Our  proposal  should  be 
seen  as  an  example  and  a  first  approach  towards  solving  the  problem  of 
coordination  of  intervention and  not  as  a  definite  solution  in  itself. 
In  addition,  this  Annex  deals  with  the  construction of  a  divergence  indicator 
bet~Jeen the  ECU,  the  US  dollar  and  the  Yen,  which  can  show  daily deviations 
from  the  average  of  the  above  currencies.  In  the  absence  of  real  disturbances 
(in  this  proposal  persistent disequilibria  in  the  basic  balances  and/or 
changes  in  competitiveness  and  trade),  certain signals  of  the  divergence 
indicator will  be  considered  as  a  warning  and  a  signal  to  intervene  in  the 
exchange  market  in  order  to  keep  fluctuations  inside  the  margins. 
Our  proposal  for  a  Tripolar  Exchange  Rate  Agreement  between  the  EC,  US  and 
Japan  can  also  be  modified  as  a  bipolar  Exchange  Rate  Agreement  between  the  US 
and  the  EC.  It  can  also  include other  homogenous  countries  or  areas.  The 
above  proposal  for  exchange  rate  realignments  and  intervention  may  be 
completed  by  a  swap  agreement  and  a  credit  mechanism  which  can  increase  the 
credibility,  and  consequently  the  viability, of  the  whole  Exchange  Rate 
Agreement,  but  this  is  not  covered  by  this  Annex.  The  purpose  of  this  Annex 
is  to  outline  in  more  details  the  proposal  for  an  exchange  rate  agreement 
between  the  EC,  US  and  Japan.  The  role  of  intervention would  be  to  smooth  out 
disorderly  conditions  due  to  speculation or  other  short  term  monetary 
disturbances.  If, on  the  other  hand,  disturbances  are  due  to  long  term 
variables,  such  as  differences  in  competitiveness,  inflation,  growth  rates  etc 
then  the  central  rates  should  be  realigned,  preferably after consultation 
between  the  countries  (or  areas)  concerned. 
-115  -The  EC,  us  and  Japan  will  define  a  reference  r~te for  the  ECU,  the  US  Dollar 
and  the  Yen  in  terms  of  an  effective  exchange  rate  uhich  will  be  expressed  in 
a  common  unit  of  account  for  the  purpose  of  standard  measurement. 
This  common  unit  of  account,  which  may  be  c~lled  "Intern~tional Unit  of 
Account''  CIUA),  will  be  defined  in  terms  of  the  following  fixed  quantities  of 
US  Dollars,  ECU  and  Yen.  See  Table  16. 
Participating 
currencies 
US  Dollar 
ECU 
Yen 
T<lble  16 
Currencies  Currencies  \!eights 
Amounts  of  an  IUA.  16  July  19B4 
0.362  0.35 
0.687  0.53 
30.238  0.12 
-------------------------------------------------------
v~lue of  an  IUA  in  each  < 
Central  Rates.  16  July  1984 
1.02661 
1.30612 
The  method  which  has  been  used  to estinatc  currency  a~ounts  in  an  IUA,  the  currency 
weights  and  the  value  of  an  IUA  in  each  currency  on  16  July  1984  is  described  in  the 
Technical  Annex.  The  date  16  July  1984  has  been  chosen  arbitrarily. 
The  FED,  the  EMA  and  the  Bank  of  Japan  arc  to  set  mar~ins around  the  above 
reference  rates  (Central  Rates).  Initially this  m~rgin should  be  relatively 
wide,  +10%  and  -10%,  in  order  to  safeguard  the  flexibility of  the  system.  As 
already  mentioned  in  the  text,  if  the  system  works  well,  the  margins  will  be 
reduced  accordingly.  Table  17  shows  the  IU/\-related  central  rates  and  the 
intervention  limits -a  band  of  20%- as  well  ~s  the  bilateral  rates  and  the  20% 
intervention  limites  among  the  bilnteral  ccntr~L  rJt(s. 
-116  -Table  17 
Related  and  Bilateral  Central  Rates  and  Intervention  Limits  of  a  Tripolar 
Exchange  Rate  System. 
Related  central  Rates  and  Intervention  Limits 
CURRENCY  US  DOLLAR  ECU  YEN 
+  10%  1.12927  1.lt3673  273.98500 
1  IUA  Related  Central 
Rates  1.  02661  1.30612  249.07708 
- 10%  0.92394  1.17551  224.16900 
Bilateral  Central  Rates  and  Intervention  Limits 
CURRENCY 
100  us 
dollars 
100  ECU 
100  Yen 
+  10% 
Bilateral  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
+  10  % 
Bilateral  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
+10% 
Bilateral  Central 
Rates 
- 10% 
US  DOLLAR 
100 
864.600 
758.999 
707.404 
0.453382 
0.412165 
0.370949 
ECU  YEN 
139.950  26683.300 
127.227 
114.504 
100 
0.57681 
0.52438 
0.47194 
24262.093 
21835.900 
20977.000 
19069.999 
17163.000 
100 
A divergence  indicator  (D  I)  between  the  US  dollar,  the  ECU  and  the  Yen  will 
make  it DOSsible  to  trace  the  movements  in  the  exchange  rates of  the  above 
currencies  against  the  average  movement  and  thereby  to  identify any  currency 
deviating  from  the  average.  Exactly  as  happens  in  the  EMS,  the  monetary 
authority  of  a  diverging  currency  which  crosses  its divergence  threshold 
should  take  action. 
-117 -For  the  calculation of  such  a  divergence  indicator  which  can  measure  the 
degree  of  movement  of  a  specific  currency  - in this  proposal  the  US  dollar, 
the  ECU  and  the  Yen  against  a  maximum  divergence  spread  CMOS),  we  need  first 
to  calculate  the  premium  (P)  or  the  Discount  (D)  shown  by  the  market  rate of 
the  IUA  in  terms  of  each  one  of  the  above  currencies  against  their  IUA  related 
central  rates,  and  second,  to  compare  this  result  with  the  corresponding  MDS 
for  each  currency. 
The  MDS  is  the  maximum  percentage  by  which  the  market  rate of  the  IUA  in  terms 
of  a  specific  currency  in  this  basket  can  appreciate  or depreciate against  the 
IUA  related central  rates  of  that  currency,  where  the  latter has  reached  its 
margins  of  fluctuations  of  +  10%  against  all  the  other  currencies  in  the  IUA 
basket. 
For  the  estimation  of  the  MDS  of  each  currency,  the  following  formula  has  been 
used: 
t·1DS$  = + 10%  X  (1-~1$) 
"  r·1DSECU  = + 10%  X  <1-HEcu' 
NOSY  = +  10%  X  (1-Wy  )  en  en 
Where  W shows  the  weights  of  US  dollar,  ECU  and  the  Yen.  See  Table  Annex 
Table  18  below  shows  the  MDS  of  the  component  currencies  of  an  IUA: 
Currency 
US  dollar 
ECU 
Yen 
T<lble  18 
~1DS 
+ 6.50% 
+ 4. 70i: 
+ 8.80% 
1 • 
The  MDS  of  each  currency  will  be  expressed  in  an  index  of  100.  By  assuming  a 
divergence  threshold  of  50%,  a  currency  will  reJch  its divergence  threshold 
when  the  DI  gives  a  figure  of  50. 
We  chose  a  threshold of  SO%  in  order  to ensure  that  a  currency  would  always 
reach  its devergence  threshold  before  one  of  its bilateral  limits.  (In  the 
EMS  the  threshold  indicator  is  75%.  This  has  resulted  in  the  divergenc~ 
indicator  of  the  EMS  not  always  full-filling  its  l.~sk,  i.e.  the bilateral 
limits  of  two  currencies  cnn  be  reached  without  tl10  divergence  indicator 
.  .  t h  .  .  ) 103  l  g1v1ng  e  appropr1atc  warn1ng  •  Cn  culation of  the  above  DI  for  each 
currency  participatinq  in  the  IUA,  is  as  follows: 
-118  -p  ECU  or  0ECU 
PY  or  Dy  en  en 
= 
= 
= 
rur,$ 
oi: 
=  milrket  rate  - IUA"'  centrnl  rnte 
IUA$  central  rute 
=  IUAECU  market  rate  - IUAECU  central 
IUAECU  central  rate 
IUAYen  mnrket  Yen  =  rate - IUA  central 
IUAYen  central  rate 
X  100 
PECU  or  0ECU 
MDSECU 
X  100 
X  100 
X  100 
rnte 
X  100 
rate 
X  100 
Whenever  one  of  the  above  currencies  - $,  ECU,  Yen  - crosses  its threshold 
Limit  -50%  of  the  MDS- the  monetary  authorities of  the  issuing  country will 
be  consulted  to undertake  diversified  interventions  in  order  to  keep 
fluctuations  inside  the  margins.  These  interventions  will  be  based  on  the 
daily  observations  of  the  DI. 
However,  if  the  currency  continues  to deviate  from  its average,  nnd  it  is 
accompanied  by  warning  signals  from  n  system  of  renl  indicators,  the 
diversified  intervention  would  not  be  sufficient  and  a  realignment  of  the 
centrnl  rates  and  /or  an  adjust~ent of  economic  policy  would  be  more 
arnrorriilte  to  restore  equilibrium  in  real  economic  parameters. 
Tf1c  use  of  objective  indicators  as  a  guide  to  changes  in  exchange  rates  h<Js 
been  <J  famili<Jr  subject  among  professional  and  academic  economists,  since  the 
negoti<Jtions  for  the  creation of  the  Bretton  Woods  system.  As  Trevor 
Underwood104  has  said,  the  vnrious  proposals  for  such  an  objective  indicator 
have  been  distinguished  by  n)  ho~1  mand<Jtory,  presumptive  or  permissive  the 
-119  -response  is to  be  b)the  size  of  the  changes  advocated  in  the  exchange  rates 
and  c)  whether  or  not  interference  is  advocated  in  the existing  right  to  make 
changes  in  exchange  rates. 
Two  types  of  indicators  have  been  involved:  price  indicators  relating to 
levels  or  changes  in  spot,  or  forward  or effective exchange  rates,  and 
quantity  indicators  which  depend  on  the  level  or  change  in various  measures  of 
international  reserves  or  the  balance  of  payments. 
In  this  proposal  we  will  connect  realignment  of  the  central  rates  with  price 
indicators  assuming  that  in  the  medium-term,  a  suitable price  index  may  be  a 
significant  variable  in  forecasting  the  balance  of  trade  and  competitiveness. 
The  above  "price  indicator"  will  be  reinforced  by  an  other  indicator  showing 
whether  or  not  a  target  on  the  basic  balance  of  each  country  or  area  has  been 
exceeded.  In  particular,  whenever  a  deficit or  surplus  in  the basic  balance 
of  a  country or  area,  vis-a-vis  the  other  countries  in  the  system  exceeds  the 
0,5%  of  its GOP,  the  monetary  authorities  of that  country or  area,  should 
change  the  central  rate of  its currency,  in order  to  avoid  future  opposing 
flow  imbalances. 
Therefore,  when  the  basic  balance,  which  includes  the  current  account,  the 
longterm  capital  account  and  certain government  capital  transactions  deviates 
persistently  from  its target,  the  monetary  authorities will  be  asked  to  change 
the  central  rate  in  proportion  to  an  effective  PPP  index,  calculated for  each 
participating  currency,  by  dividing  the  issuing  country's  wholesale  price 
index  by  a  weighted  average  of  the  wholesale  price  indices  of  the  other 
issuing  countries  in  the  system,  the  weights  being  the  same  as  these entering 
into  the  formula  of  each  country or  area  participating  in  the  IUA.  The 
decision  to  introduce  a  weighted  PPP  rule  in  our  crawling  system,  relies  on 
conclusions  derived  from  the  OPTICA  Report  (1976)105,  according  to which 
wholesale  price  indices  are  the  most  appropriate  price  indices  for  measuring 
relative  inflation and  that  conformity  of  exchange  rate  changes  to  inflation 
-120 -differential  is  closer  with  a  multilaterally measured  PPP,  that  is  by  means  of 
a  double-weighted  index  of  inflation  trends  in  other  countries  and  of 
effective  exchange  rates,  rather  than  with  a  bilaterally-measured  PPP. 
Calculation  of  the  effective  PPP  index,  P~ 
time  ~is based  on  the  following  formula: 
for  the  country  or  area,  i  ,  in 
- t  p· t 
P.  =  X  100 
1 
L 
p 
n-ij  wn- i •  ~  wn-i 
n-i  n- i 
t 
where  Pi  is  the  wholesale  price  index  of  the  country i, at  time t, and  w are 
the  weights  which  are  given  in table  16. 
We  will  allow  country's  i  related  central  rate  to  change  at  the  end  of  each 
quarter  in  proportion  to  the  change  of  a  moving  average  of  country's 
effective  PPP  index,  the  calculation of  which  is  given  below: 
-t  -t 
Pi  = 0,4Pi 
.:.t-1 
+  0,3Pi 
..:t-2 
+  0,2Pi 
.:.t-3 
+  0,1Pi 
where  (.)means%  changes  from  the  previous  quarter. 
Thus,  country's  i  related  central  rate  <r;  ,IUA)  changes,  wi l L 
formula  below: 
·t  .:.t 
r i,  I UA  =  P.  or 
1 
. t  -t  -t 
·- P.  -.S:.  W  .P  . 
·1  n-1  n-,  n- 1 
foLLow  the 
r i,  I UA 
In  ~  world  with  $,  ECU  and  Yen,  the  related  central  rates  will  follow  t~e 
foLlowin~  crawling central  rate  system: 
.  t  -t  ~  ~t  ~t  J 
r $,  IUA  =  p$  0,53PECU  +  0,12PYen 
.  t  .:.t  [  .  t  't  J 
r ECU, IUA  =  PECU  0,3SP $ +  0,12PYen 
.:.t  r  .:.t  .:.tJ  r  =  p  - 0,53PECU  +  0,35P$  Yen,IUA  Yen 
- 121  -.Also,  the bilateral  central  rates  will  change  as  follows: 
.t  ~t  !.t  G  !.t  !.t  J 
rECU,$  =  PECU  - p$  0,3SP$  - 0,53PECU 
.t  !t  !t  G  ~t  ~t  J  r  =  PECU  - p  - 0,12PYen  - 0,53PECU  ECU,Yen  Yen 
.t  .t.t  ~t  ~  ~t  ~t J  r  =  p$  - p  - ?,12PYen- 0,3SP$  $,Yen  Yen 
- 122  -Technical  Annex 
Estimation  of  Economic  Weights  based  on  the  average  of  1979-1983 
Currency  Issuing  country's  export  Official  holding 
$ 
ECU10 
yen 
of  goods  and  services 
In  bill.  SDR 
177,710 
506,296 
114,156 
of  currency 
167,41 
42,97 
8,89 
We  assume  that  in  December  1983,  1  IUA  =  1  SDR 
Total  Econ.Weights 
345,12  33,92% 
549,24  53,99% 
123,05  12,09% 
------
1.017,41 
Since  in  December  1983,  1  SDR  =  1,29904  ECU  and  since  during  the  IV  quarter  of 
1983,  the  average  value  of  1  unit  of  ECU  is: 
1  ECU  =  0,840  $ 
0,802  SDR 
196,300  yen 
then,  the  average  exchange  rates  of  ECU  per  unit  of  currency  is: 
$ 
1  yen 
1  SDR 
=  1,1905  ECU 
= 0,00509  ECU 
= 1,2469  ECU 
-123  -Estimation of  the  currency amounts  in  the  IUA 
1  2  3  4  5  6  7 
---------- ------ ------- ---------- -------- --------
________ .. _ 
$  33,92  1,1905  0,37013  $  1,2438  0,460367  0,362728  $  0,362 
ECU  53,99  1  0,70135  ECU  1  0,701350  0,687324  ECU  0,687 
Yen  12,09  0,00509  30,85539  Yen  0,00531  0,163842  30,238305  Yen  30,238 
1  Economic  Weights 
2  Average  exchange  Rates  of  ECU,  per  unit  of  currency  (IV  quart.  1983) 
3  Preliminary  Currency  Amounts  (Column  2  X 1,29904)/  col.  3 
4  Exchange  Rates  in  January  1984.  ECU  per unit  of  currency 
5  Preliminary  Currency  Amounts  (Col.  4  X Col.  5) 
6  Precise  Currency  Amounts  Col.  4  X 1,29904 
1,32559 
7  Rounded  Currency  Amounts 
The  estimation of  the  currency  weights  of  an  IVA  and  its value  in  each 
participating  currency  - 16  July  1984  -
Currency  Amounts  16.7.84  ECU 
cxch.  rates 
$  0,362  0,786 
ECU  0,687  1 
Yen  30,238  190,7 
ECU  value  of 
currency  amounts 
0,46056 
0,68700 
0,15856 
1  col.:  2  col. 
1,30612  ECU 
Sources:  1)  European  Economy,  Supplement  A 
Currency 
weights 
0,35 
0,53 
0,12 
3  col: 
16.7.84 value of 
IUA  in  each  cur. 
1,02661 
1,30612 
249,07708 
2  col.  X 
2)  H.  Joly  Dixon;  <1977),  The  European  Unit  of  Account 
Journal  of  Common  Market  Studies 
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1.  According  to  some  projections,  long-term  government  revenues  in  the  USA 
will  average  19.5%  of  GNP  between  1985-89,  while  spending  was  19.8%  of 
GNP  from  1964-1974  and  22%  from  1975-79,  reaching  almost  25%  by  1983. 
See  the  US  Deputy  Secretary to  the  Treasury,  R.T.  McNamar's  expos~ at  a 
symposiu~ in  Amsterdam,  in  USA  mission  to  the  EC,  USAT  85  of  20/11/84. 
By  the  end  of  1984,  the  current  account  deficit  of  the  USA  had  increased 
in  the  order  of  magnitude  of  100,000 million dollars,  corresponding  to 
about  3%  of  GNP. 
2.  The  fact  that  US  trade  and  budget  deficits  have  been  financed  in great 
part  by  capital  inflows  has  been  recognised  openly  by  US  officials  like 
the  Federal  Reserve  Board's  Chairman  Paul  Volcker  at  a  Washington  Post 
Business  Outlook  luncheon  on  10/01/85,  as  reprinted  in  USA  mission  to  the 
EC  USAT  4  of  15/01/85.  Volcker  further  recognised  that  this  situation 
entailed  some  problems  both  for  the  US,  i.e. dependence  on  foreign 
capital  inflow  and  protectionist  pressures  that  built  up,  and  for  the 
economies  of  other  countries  due  to  the  attraction of  their  savings  in 
the  USA  and  the  increasing  debt  burden  due  to  high  interest  rates  for  the 
heavily  indebted  LDC's.  Volcker  welcomed  a  reduction  of  interest  rates. 
For  a  detailed analysis  of  capital  movements,  see  Robert  Triffin  "How  to 
End  the  World  Infession'':  Crisis  Management  or  Fundamental  Reforms"  in 
Rainer  S.  Masera  and  Robert  Triffin "Europe's  Money"  Clarendon  Press, 
Oxford  1984. 
3.  For  the  theoretical  exposition  followed  here,  see  Olivier  Blanchard, 
Rudiger  Dornbusch  "US  Deficits,  the  Dollar  and  Europe",  Center  for 
European  Policy  Studies  CCEPS)  No.  6  January  1984.  For  an  empirical 
analysis  of  the  relationship between  interest  rates  and  exchange  rates, 
see  Susan  Schadler,  ''Interest  rates  and  exchange  rates"  in  "Finance  and 
Development",  June  1984.  According  to this  study  and  as  generally 
accepted  nowadays,  purchasing  power  parity  seems  to  hold  only  over 
relatively  long  periods  of  time,  while  in  the  short  to  medium-term  the 
far  more  volatile asset  markets  tend  to  do~inate  exchange  rate 
movements,  because:  (a)  An  exchange  rate  can  be  seen  as  the  relative 
price of  two  assets  and  so  it  is  one  of  the  main  variables  that  adjusts 
to  balance  the  supply  of  and  demand  for  the  stock  of  assets  denominated 
in  a  currency.  (b)  Capital  markets  arc  capable  of  responding  much  more 
rnpirlly  than  ~oods markets  to  perceived  changes  in  conditions.  The 
primary  factors  in  asset  markets  that  affect  actual  or  potential  capital 
flows  are  changes  in  actual  or  expected  relative  rates  of  return,  arising 
mainly  from  changes  in  actual  or  expected  interest  rate differentials,  in 
expected  movements  of  the  exchange  rate,  and  in  the  relative  risk  of 
holding  various  assets. 
The  study  finds  a  robust,  positive  relationship  between  interest  rates 
and  exchange  rates. 
-126  -4.  R.  Triffin,  <1984),  p.42. 
5.  The  following  statements  are  revealing.  Asked  about  whether  falling 
interest  rates  would  translate  into  a  softer dollar,  Treasury  Secretary 
Donald  Regan  answered  that  " ••• interest  rates,  by  themselves,  are  not 
just  the  cause  of  the  strong dollar.  I  think  there are  about  four 
things,  and  interest  rates  are  probably  in  fourth  place  among  these  four 
things  that  have  caused  the  strong dollar",  the other three  being  the 
dynamism  of  an  economy,  the  degree  of  freedom  of  its capital  market  and 
the  stability of  its government.  Asked  if the  primary  cause  of  slow 
economic  growth  elsewhere  around  the  world  has  been  due  to the  strong 
dollar,  he  answered:  "The  primary  cause?  You've  got  it backwards.  The 
primary  cause  of  slow  growth  around  the  world  has  been  inferior  economic 
policies.  It  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  strong dollar.  The  strong 
dollar  has  been  very  helpful  in  solving  some  of  the  problems  that  others 
have  caused,  because  the  strong dollar  enables  these  nations  to sell 
their goods  to the us.  We've  racked  up  a  150  or  so  thousand  million 
dollar trade deficit  here,  by  buying their products  for  the  first  time  in 
decades".  D.  Regan  at  a  press  conference  September  27,  1984,  reprinted 
in  USA  mission  to  the  EC  USAT  77  of  01/10/85. 
The  US  Deputy  Secretary of  the  Treasury,  R.T.  MacNamar  stated that:  "If 
Europe  is  to  compete  in  a  worldwide  marketplace,  perhaps  it is  time  to 
reconsider  those  EC  and  individual  country  policies that  arc  currently 
hindering  Europe's  initiative, adaption,  and  therefore  economic  growth". 
MacNamara  at  symposium  in  Amsterdam  as  reprinted  in  US  mission  to  the  EC 
USAT  85  of  20/11/84. 
The  US  Under  Secretary of  the  Treasury,  Beryl  Sprinkel  stated that:  "The 
dollar's  foreign  exchange  value  is  what  it is:  exch~nge rates  are 
determined  by  market  forces,  and  if the  market's  assessment  is  that  the 
US  economy  is  stronger  than others  and  US  dollar assets  more  desirable, 
there  is  Little  we  can  do  - short  of  weakening  our  economy  - to  convince 
it otherwise".  He  further  denied  the  existence of  a  strong  Link  between 
interest  rates  and  the dollar's  exchange  rate  naming  the  factors 
mentioned  above  by  D.  Regan  as  responsible  for  the dollar's  strength. 
Sprinkel's  speech  to the  National  Association  of  Wheat  Growers  as 
reprinted  in  US  mission  to  the  EC,  USAD  7  of  31/01/84. 
These  points  have  been  stressed also  by  US  economists  Like  B.  Cohen: 
"From  an  international  perspective,  what  was  most  striking during  this 
period  was  the  way  in  which  policy  was  determined  in almost  total 
disregard  for  the  outside  world.  At  no  time  during  the  administration's 
first  term  was  there  any  serious  attempt  to moderate  the  external  impacts 
of  our  fiscal  dilemma,  via  either collaboration  with  our  industrial 
allies or  intervention  in  the  exchange  market".  Benjamin  J.  Cohen 
"Economic  Relations  with  other  Advanced  Industrial  States". 
6.  Peter  Hooper  "International  Repercussions  of  the  US  Budget  Deficit", 
International  Finance  Discussion  Papers  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System, 
No.  246,  September  1984.  The  paper  analyses  the effects of  the  US  fiscal 
expansion  on  major  industrial  countries  using  primarily  simulations  with 
the  Federal  Reserve  Ooard  staff's Multicountry  Model,  which  is  a  Linked 
system  of  macroeconomic  models  of  5  major  industrial  countries  (USA, 
Canada,  Japan,  Germany  and  the  UK)  plus  abbreviated  sectors  for  OPEC  and 
the  rest  of  the  world.  The  results of  the  simulations  suggest  that 
-127  -although  the  US  fiscal  expansion  has  kept  US  interest  rates  significantly 
higher  than  they otherwise  would  have  been,  it  has  not  had  a 
significantly negative  impact  on  real  GNP  in other  major  industrial 
countries,  on  average.  The  net  effect  on  foreign  GNP  may  have  been 
moderately  positive,  as  the  stimulative effect  of  US  growth  more  than 
offset  the depressive  effects of  higher  interest  rates  in  most  of  these 
countries,  the  depreciation of  their currencies  contributing  to  the 
expansion  of  their exports. 
7.  Paul  Krugman  "Is  the  Strong  Dollar  Sustainable?",  NBER  Working  Paper  No 
1644,  June  1985. 
8.  American  economists  also  point  out  at  this  practice of  the  US 
administration,  like  B.  Cohen  (1986)  who  remarks  in particular:  "By  the 
end  of  the  President's first  term,  ~1ith  the  US  trade deficit  soaring to 
record  heights,  the  flow  of  petitions  for  import  relief  had  become  a 
flood;  in  1985  more  than  300  bills  were  filed  in  Congress  intended  to 
provide  some  form  of  trade  protection for  American  producers.  In effect, 
the  administration  had  created  a  Frankenstein  monster"  and  "A  second 
element  was  a  determined  US  campaign  for  a  new  round  of  unilateral 
negotiations  in  the  GATT  aimed,  in  particular, at  liberalizing the 
movement  of  capital  and  services  such  as  banking,  insurance,  data 
processing  and  telecommunications  - all  fields  in  which  the  US  as  the 
world's  leading  service-industry economy,  could  be  expected  to benefit 
disproportionately.  'Benjamin  J.  Cohen,  "An  explosion  in the  Kitchen?, 
Economic  Relations  with  other  Advanced  Industrial  States''.  In  Ed.  K.  Oye, 
R.  Leiber,  D Rotchild  "Eagle  Defined:  US  Foreign  Policy  in  the  80s", 
Little  Brown,  Boston. 
9.  George  D.  Demopoulos,  "The  influence  of  US  monetary  policy on  the 
Community",  unpublished  paper  of  the  Directorate  General  for  Economic  and 
Financial  Affairs  of  the  EC,  April  1982  and  Klaus  Reeh,  "Educating  the 
Hegemon:  A new  and  urgent  role  for  Europe",  unpublished  paper  of  the  EC 
Commission,  May  1985. 
10.  Morris  GoldstPin,  ''The  Exchange  Rate  System:  Lessons  of  the  Past  and 
Options  for  the  Future",  IMF  Occasional  Paper  No.  30,  1984;  Richard  N. 
Cooper,  "Flexible  Exchange  Rates  1973-80"  in  R.  tl.  Cooper,  P.  B.  Kenen,  et 
al  editors;  ''The  International  Monetary  System  under  Flexible  Exchange 
Rates,  Global,  Regional  and  National",  Essays  in  honour  of  R.  Triffin, 
Ballinger  Publishing  Company,  Cambridge,  Massachusetts,  1982;  Lamberto 
Dini,  "The  EMS  Experience  and  the  International  Monetary  System", 
Conference  organised  by  the  Istituto Bancario  San  Paolo  di  Torino,  Turin, 
r1arch  1984;  Tommaso  Padoa-SchioppCJ,  "Problems  of  interdependence  in  a 
multipolar  world",  Economic  Papers  of  the  EC  Commission,  No.  4,  August 
1981. 
11.  John  Williamson,  "The  Exchange  Rate  System",  Institute for  International 
Economics,  No.  5,  September  1983,  Table  11  on  p.  34. 
12.  Peter  Hooper  and  Steven  ~1.  Kohlhagen,  "The  effect  of  exchange  rate 
uncertainty on  the  prices  and  volumes  of  international  trade",  Journal  of 
International  Economics  8,  1978,  p.  483-511,  David  0.  Cushman,  ''Effects  of 
-128  -real  exchange  rate  risk  on  international  trade",  Journal  of  International 
Economics  15,  1983,  p.  45-63.  The  two  models  differ  in their assumptions, 
the first  assuming  nominal  profit  maximisation  and  uncertain  nominal 
exchange  rates,  the  second  real  profit maximisation  and  uncertain  foreign 
and  domestic  price  levels  in  addition to  uncertain  nominal  exchange  rates. 
13.  Matthew  B.  Canzoneri,  Peter  B.  Clark,  Thomas  c.  Glaessner  and  Michael  P. 
Leahy,  "The  effects of  exchange  rate variability on  output  and 
employment",  International  Finance  Discussion  Papers  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  No.  240,  April  1984.  The  results of  this analysis  suggest 
that  firms  with  any  ability to adjust  to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  can 
gain  from  variability.  Thus  exchange  rate variability may  bring  about 
transfers  of  income  from  those  who  find  adjustment  costly or  impossible, 
to those  who  find  it  less  costly.  The  results  depend  further  on  the 
assumptions  of  the  risk  behaviour  of  firms  (a  risk-averse  firm  produces 
Less  under  uncertainty about  the  exchange  rate),  the  type  of 
wages-indexation,  etc. 
14.  Uilliamson,  (1983),  p.  39. 
15.  Williamson,  (1983),  p.  40-45. 
16.  Nicholas  Kyriazis,  "The  drachma's  adhesion  to  the  EMS:  Possible  Effects" 
in  "Kredit  und  Kapital"  forthcoming. 
17.  Jacques  van  Ypersele  de  Strihou,  "The  European  Monetary  System"  in  R.  N. 
Cooper  et al,  1982. 
1fl.  Roland  Vaubel,  "Coordination  or  Competition  among  National  Macro-Economic 
Policies?''  in  F.  Machlup  et al.  eds.  "Reflections  on  a  Troubled  World 
Economy'',  McMillan  Press,  1984  and  Kenneth  Rogoff  "Productive  and 
Counterproductive  Cooperative  Monetary  Policies"  International  Finance 
Discussion  Paper,  No  233,  Board  of  Governors  of  the  FED,  December  1983. 
19.  The  time  consistency  problem  argues  that  policy makers  are  unable  to 
persevere  with  sensible  economic  policies  because  the  incentives  to 
persevere  change  adversely over  time. 
20.  R.  Dornbusch  expressed this opinion  to the  authors  in  regard  to  Germany's 
leadership  in  the  EMS.  According  to  him,  Germany's  policy,  combined  with 
the  existence of  the  EMS  has  brought  about  a  stronger  deflationary bias  in 
the  EC  than  would  have  been  the  case  without  the  EMS,  and  also  stronger 
than  was  necessary. 
21.  We  owe  this  comment  to  R.  N.  Cooper. 
22.  Jeffrey  D.  Sachs,  "The  Case  for  More  Managed  Exchange  Rates",  paper 
prepared  for  the  Conference  on  the  US  Dollar,  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of 
Kansas  City,  Jackson  Hole,  Wyoming,  August  1985.  This  paper  gives  also  a 
more  extended  presentation of  the  time  inconsistency  problem. 
-129 -23.  ~lilliamson,  (1983),  p.  32.  He  remar!:s  strongly  (p.  33), 
110ne  has  to 
conclude  that  it would  be  quite  wron~ to  accept  macroeconomic  follies  Like 
the  US  budget  deficit  as  exogenous,  and  accommodate  them  without  question. 
On  the  contrary,  a  principal  purpose  of  seeking  a  more  structured exchange 
rate  system  is  precisely  to  expose  such  examples  of  myopic  and 
internationally  inconsistent  national  decision  making.
11 
24.  Triffin,  (1984),  p.  44. 
25.  After  the  announcement  of  the  cancerous  operation  that  the  US  President 
had  in  July  1985  the  US  dollar started a  rapid  decline  that  was  not 
justified by  the  economic  situation at  this particular moment  since  no 
fundamental  changes  in  economic  policy or  the  international  situation  had 
taken  place. 
26.  J.  Sachs  (August  1985) 
27.  For  the  concept  of  the quality of  a  currency  see  Tommaso  Padoa-Schioppa 
and  Francesco  Papadia, 
11Competing  Currencies  and  Monetary  Stability
11  in  R. 
S.  Masera  and  R.  Triffin,  (1984). 
28.  Jeffrey  Sachs,  "The  Uneasy  Case  for  Greater  Exchange  Rate  Coordination", 
American  Economics  Association  Papers  and  Proceedings,  Hay  1986. 
29.  Following  the  discussion  in  Copenhagen,  on  7  April,  the  European  Council, 
on  6  and  7  July  1978,  discussed  the  attached  scheme  for  the  creation of  a 
closer  monetary  cooperation  (European  Monetary  System),  leading  to  a  zone 
of  monetary  stability  in  Europe  which  has  been  introduced  by  members  of 
the  European  Council. 
The  paragraph  3  of  the  Annex  mentions  the  policies of  the  EMS  members 
vis-a-vis  third  countries: 
Participating  countries  will  coordinate their  exchange  rate policies 
vis-a-vis  third  countries.  To  this  end  they  will  intensify the 
consultations  in  the  appropriate  bodies  and  between  central  banks 
participating  in  the  scheme.  Ways  to  coordinate  dollar  interventions 
should  be  sought  which  avoid  simultaneous  reverse  interventions.  Central 
banks  buying  dollars  will  deposit  a  fraction  <say  20%)  and  receive  ECUs  in 
return;  likewise,  central  banks  selling dollars  will  receive  a  fraction 
(say  20%)  against  ECUs. 
In  Brussels  Resolution  of  the  European  Council  of  5  December  1978  on  the 
establishment  of  the  EMS,  paragraph  5,  mention  the  policies of  the  EMS 
members  vis-a-vis  third  countries  and  international  organizations: 
5.1  The  durability of  the  EMS  and  its  international  implications  require 
coordination  of  the  exchange  rate  policies vis-a-vis  third countries 
and,  as  far  as  possible  a  concertation  with  monetary  authorities  of 
those  countries. 
-130  -5.2  European  countries  with  particularly close  economic  and  financial  ties 
with  the  European  Communities  may  participate  in the  exchange  rate and 
intervention mechanisms.  Participation will  be  based  upon  agreements 
between  central  banks;  these  agreements  will  be  communicated  to  the 
Council  and  to  the  Commission  of  the  European  Communities. 
5.3  The  EMS  is  and  will  remain  fully  compatible  with  the  relevant  articles 
of  the  IMF  Agreement. 
For  further  details  see  "The  European  Monetary  System"  in  "European 
Economy". 
30.  The  MERM  developed  in  the  IMF  Research  Department  is a  general  equilibrium 
model  of  trade  among  18  countries  (21  countries  before  1977).  The  model 
focuses  on  the  effects of  exchange  rate  changes  on  trade  flows  classified 
into  four  groups  of  traded  goods. 
Construction  of  MERM  weighted  effective exchange  rate  indices  involves 
three  steps: 
1)  The  computation  of  weights; 
2)  The  computation  of  an  exchange  rate  relative  for  each  currency  based 
on  its  cost  in  terms  of  US  dollars  (series  Ah  in  International 
Financial  Statistics,  IMF)  in  the  base  period  1980,  and 
3)  The  weighting  of  the  exchange  rate  relatives. 
The  Weights,  W(i,j)  are  derived  using  the  framework  of  the  MERM  as 
developed  in  the  Fund's  Research  Department.  A country's  relative 
exchange  rate  is defined as  the  US  dollar  cost  of  one  unit  of  its currency 
relative to  its average  dollar  cost  in  1980.  A country's effective 
exchange  rate  index  is  the  calculated by  dividing its relative  exchange 
rate  by  the  weighted  product  (geometric  average)  of  the  17  other 
countries'  relative  exchange  rate.  The  effective  exchange  rate  index  is 
then  set  equal  to  100  in  the  base  period,  1980.  The  formula  is: 
=  18  (Rz(j)) W(i,j)  X 100 
ME(i)  TT \Rz(i) 
j  =  1 
j  t  i 
where  MEc;)  =  MERM  weighted  effective exchange  rate  index  of  country 
=  The  cost  of  one  unit  of  currency  i  in  terms  of  the  US 
dollar  relative  to  its cost  in  the  base  period,  1980;  that 
is  Rz(i)  =  1  in  1980. 
= a  measure  of  the effect  of  1%  change  in  the  price of 
currency  i  in  terms  of  currency  j, on  the  trade  balance  of 
country i, measured  in  its  own  currency  and  deflated.by 
the  induced  change  in  the  avera9e  of  its export  and  1mport · 
prices  in  its own  currency  (derived  from  MERM). 
31.  See  also  Francesco  Giavazzi,  Alberto  Giovannini  "European  Currency 
Experience",  Economic  Policy  Panel,  November  11  1985  for  similar  results. 
-171  -32.  This  arbitrary definition  has  been  given  by  B.  J.  Cohen  <1977)  "Organizing 
the  World's  Money".  Basic  Books,  Inc.  Publishers,  New  York,  pp  53-54. 
33.  It  is  argued  that  international  economic  relations  have  been  strongly 
influenced  by  politics  and  have  in  turn  had  a  major  impact  on 
international  politics.  See  e.g.F.C.  Bergsten,  R.  Keohane  and  J.S.  Nye, 
1975,  "International  Economics  and  International  Politics:  A Framework  for 
Analysis",  in  F.  c.  Bergsten  and  L.  B.  Krause  eds.  World  Politics  and 
International  Economics.  Brooking,  Washington,  p.  6.  Also  see  A. 
Lindbeck,  1973:  "The  national  state  in  an  Internationalized World 
Economy",  Conjunto  Universitario  Candido  Mendes,  Rio  de  Janeiro;  B.  S. 
Frey  and  F.  Schneider,  1982,  "International  Political  Economy:  An  emerging 
Field",  Seminar  Paper  No  227,  Institute for  International  Economic 
Studies,  University of  Stockholm. 
34.  See  e.g.  William  Wallace,  ''European-American  Relations;  the  Political 
Context'',  in  ''European  Monetary  Union,  Progress  and  Prospects",  edited  by 
M.  T.  Sumner  and  G.  Zis,  1982.  The  MacMillan  Press  Ltd,  pp  248-260. 
Also,  P.  Ludlow  (1981)  "The  Making  of  the  European  Monetary  System", 
London;  Butterworth. 
35.  See  e.g.L.  Girton  and  D.  Roper  (1981)  "Theory  and  Implications  of  Currency 
Substitution",  Journal  of  Money  Credit  and  Banking,  13,  pp  12-30,  M.  Miles 
(1978),  "Currency  Substitution,  Flexible  Exchange  Rates  and  Monetary 
Independence",  American  Economic  Review,  68,  pp  428-436,  R.  Me  Kinnon 
<1982).  "Currency  Substitution  and  Instability  in  the  World  Dollar 
Market",  American  Economic  Review,  72,  pp  302-333. 
36.  Currency  substitution theory  is  based  on  three major  assumptions:  (a)  The 
demand  for  domestic  currency  is highly sensitive to  expected  changes  in 
the  exchange  rate  and  it  is also  subject  to  significant  and  unpredictable 
shifts;  (b)  The  demand  for  world  money  is stable  and  world  Cas  opposed  to 
domestic)  money  is a  better predictor  of  domestic  inflation;  (c) 
Inflationary expectations  may  cause  shifts  in  the  relative demand  for  the 
currencies. 
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